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Digital exposure report

absa.co.za

Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.

Scanned: 2026-11-19 05:57 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

C
74/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Send visitors to the secure version of your site

    Visitors who type your address without https may stay on an unprotected connection.

    Who can fix it: Your web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sI http://absa.co.za/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
  2. 2.

    Turn on DNS signing for your domain

    Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short DS absa.co.za

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
absa.co.za
Website request
GET https://absa.co.za/ → https://www.absa.co.za/personal/
Scan time
2026-11-19 05:57:59 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
None. Every applicable check was assessed.

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security30/30Spoofing email from this domain is hard.
Encryption & certificate18/25Encryption is in place, but a gap could expose users.
Browser protections23/30Some browser protections are missing.
DNS infrastructure3/15The domain's infrastructure lacks basic protections.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.HighHTTP → HTTPS redirect · Hardening gap+7
  2. 2.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
  3. 3.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+5
  4. 4.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
  5. 5.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+2
  6. 6.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.

Valid SPF record with -all. 5 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT absa.co.za
v=spf1 ip4:169.202.0.0/16 exists:%{i}._spfc.tiltecx.com include:email.insidedata.co.za include:zalspf.e-purifier.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:cust-spf.exacttarget.com -all
$ dig +short TXT absa.co.za
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15

Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.

Policy p=reject.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.absa.co.za
v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; pct=100; rua=mailto:rua@absa.co.za; ruf=mailto:ruf@absa.co.za; sp=reject
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.absa.co.za
Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: selector1, selector2, smtp. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.absa.co.za
selector1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDLgd51ig+AaViq2Psjd2UKvfkG8ed7pDjE…
selector2._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA5klrK3Yt5Uy+P2kQ6nPeqWacAi4n…
smtp._domainkey: k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0RkpZc0M8UB7daxvTDNx1IGaSsphwaj0Itftf…
$ dig +short TXT selector1._domainkey.absa.co.za
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

1 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX absa.co.za
0 absa-co-za.mail.protection.outlook.com
$ dig +short MX absa.co.za
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://absa.co.za/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.absa.co.za/personal/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://absa.co.za/
HTTP 200
Final URL: https://www.absa.co.za/personal/
$ curl -sIL https://absa.co.za/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/7

The site is also reachable over an unencrypted connection, so data may travel in plain text on public networks.

http://absa.co.za/ returned HTTP 301 without redirecting to https:// (Location: http://www.absa.co.za/).

Source data: HTTP GET http://absa.co.za/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 301
Location: http://www.absa.co.za/
$ curl -sI http://absa.co.za/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set up a permanent (301) redirect from every HTTP request to HTTPS on the server or CDN.
  2. Then add an HSTS header.
server {
  listen 80;
  server_name absa.co.za www.absa.co.za;
  return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}

Safety: This change is made on your server. Make sure HTTPS works first, otherwise the site won't load.

Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: DigiCert, expiring 2027-04-09 (141 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for absa.co.za
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: DigiCert
Valid from: 2026-09-23
Valid until: 2027-04-09
Names: absa.co.za, absainvestmentmanagement.co.za, app.help.absa.co.za, blog.absa.co.za, onlinebanking.help.absa.co.za, www.absa.co.za
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect absa.co.za:443 -servername absa.co.za 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.

max-age=15768000 (183 days), includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.absa.co.za/personal/
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15768000, max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
$ curl -sIL https://absa.co.za/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8

A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.

script-src includes: 'unsafe-inline', 'unsafe-eval' — weakens XSS protection.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.absa.co.za/personal/
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' api.salemove.com api.salemove.eu ui.customsearch.ai analytics.twitter.com assets.adobedtm.com connect.facebook.net static.ads-twitter.com www.googleadservices.com maps.googleapis.com cdn.tt.omtrdc.net absa.tt.omtrdc.net www.google.com www.gstatic.com analytics.analytics-egain.com abdemo.egain.cloud absablog-dev.disqus.com absablog-sit.disqus.com absablog-uat.disqus.com absablog-prod.disqus.com ajax.googleapis.com platform.twitter.com platform.linkedin.com assets.pinterest.com c.disquscdn.com disqus.com secure.rating-widget.com log.pinterest.com rating-widget.com s.ytimg.com www.youtube.com youtube.com esb.ext.api.uat.absa.co.za client.crisp.chat googleads.g.doubleclick.net www.google.co.za www.google.pl dsp-aud.eskimi.com dsp.eskimi.com dsp-pix.eskimi.com dsp-media.eskimi.com cdn.syndication.twimg.com cse.google.com api-iam.intercom.io api.salemove.eu app.salemove.eu asset-proxy.salemove.eu assets.salemove.eu chunderw-gll.twilio.com chunderw-vpc-gll.twilio.com client-logger.salemove.eu eventgw.twilio.com fonts.googleapis.com fonts.gstatic.com io.salemove.eu js.intercomcdn.com kluster.ws.salemove.eu libs.salemove.com maps.googleapis.com maps.gstatic.com media.twiliocdn.com nexus-websocket-a.intercom.io nexus-websocket-b.intercom.io s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com s3.amazonaws.com uplot.salemove.eu widget.intercom.io googletagmanager.com www.googletagmanager.com js-agent.newrelic.com bam.nr-data.net bam-cell.nr-data.net fls.doubleclick.net tt.mbww.com pixel.mathtag.com snap.licdn.com sc-static.net analytics.tiktok.com bat.bing.com fpt.absa.co.za fpt.absa.com.gh fpt.absabank.co.ke fpt.absabank.mu fpt.absa.co.mz fpt.absa.sc fpt.absa.co.tz fpt.absa.co.ug fpt.absa.co.zm fpt.absa.co.bw capi.absa.co.za s2s.absa.co.za p.teads.tv t.teads.tv absa2--a2sadcdev.sandbox.my.site.com absa2--a2sadcdev.sandbox.my.salesforce-scrt.com absa2--a2uat.sandbox.my.site.com absa2--a2uat.sandbox.my.salesforce-scrt.com absa2.my.site.com absa2.my.salesforce-scrt.com absa2--a2qa.sandbox.my.salesforce-scrt.com absa2--a2qa.sandbox.my.site.com absa-en-za-stage-webview-library-service.kitsys.net absa-en-za-stage.kitsys.net
$ curl -sIL https://absa.co.za/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Source data: Response headers from https://www.absa.co.za/personal/
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://absa.co.za/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4

The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.

nosniff is set.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.absa.co.za/personal/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://absa.co.za/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 1/3

The policy sends full URLs to external sites.

Referrer-Policy: no-referrer-when-downgrade — sends the full URL including path and query.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.absa.co.za/personal/
Referrer-Policy: no-referrer-when-downgrade
$ curl -sIL https://absa.co.za/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/*
  Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.

Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2

Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.

Missing Permissions-Policy header.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.absa.co.za/personal/
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://absa.co.za/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/*
  Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.

Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.absa.co.za/personal/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: Express
$ curl -sIL https://absa.co.za/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS absa.co.za: NODATA
$ dig +short DS absa.co.za
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec absa.co.za SOA
delv absa.co.za

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA absa.co.za
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA absa.co.za
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
absa.co.za.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
absa.co.za.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@absa.co.za"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

3 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS absa.co.za
ns4.absa.co.za
ns2.absa.co.za
ns3.absa.co.za
$ dig +short NS absa.co.za
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
  • PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline1 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Aabsa.co.za178.79.178.218
AAAAabsa.co.za2a01:7e00:e000:3f7::
MXabsa.co.za0 absa-co-za.mail.protection.outlook.com
NSabsa.co.zans4.absa.co.za | ns2.absa.co.za | ns3.absa.co.za
TXTabsa.co.za_rhs2i5kh4ddh0r5xg06j2v7ozan466b | _t3v3h7uduuxggrw9a4xefjjkz4xeegr | _zs57fj5gy5uqy0zjibqllih9zulwgot | dwhvg71q4sf81pymyvyq06xk5w5ck87y | ph4h7qjjsy05597f1cd8czqm13xhj23l | apple-domain-verification=FquGYR5QoT4bGElj | MS=2C1154920D1D6B1C9D20B4F633111CBF257BDAE7 | jetbrains-domain-verification=eu9t2us4u5ch789f3dwlk74f3 | miro-verification=091f4212ea1c979e8bf87b7c37d851cc191ffd4e | facebook-domain-verification=0xu6brejrv032seps6eg4q12s80r4m | ms-domain-verification=cd7d6f6c-178b-46f2-8195-68888fe5c6e6 | workplace-domain-verification=1c790a6e-0837-49a1-838e-92e830703e2b | google-site-verification=vUqjHoQ0AcuQHRng0q2zWJ2a3xKIJ2n4i4b_W-g7Oc4 | google-site-verification=vXA6Btao6L48y7zgfhSjWtmiIibyzBw0MavzMjKgfTo | JvyQ5R4NVgiSRv/tyctC9LPcDu/Yu/+O46Em2tDGWJBxnXVKwzU5ObIvHh1+BFCoz6abv8sUu0lUpicWpSeYMQ== | zeVybCJr/So53QgYzOKbJGhjoDrtgx2wyxk8xQNG3rZZ1WoHlKDa9QQGbpaiJJXAjJPdC3/FShXsz1j83gjgPA== | ciscocidomainverification=189394ea0994d78e9ac69cae0904c7eaa3cce87e2628c8ef2d19afa9cb95e25f | atlassian-domain-verification=U/wos8WiURw57wQI/CpXgSmGbtcQgS4Zp9C5gr44uvMPLCqTXxDQmTwprSwvJuag | dell-technologies-domain-verification=absa.co.za_73e1f31e-37f3-4c25-a76c-c588fb5d8658_1688286147 | v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:ca3287a436ec886@rep.dmarcanalyzer.com; ruf=mailto:ca3287a436ec886@for.dmarcanalyzer.com | v=spf1 ip4:169.202.0.0/16 exists:%{i}._spfc.tiltecx.com include:email.insidedata.co.za include:zalspf.e-purifier.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:cust-spf.exacttarget.com -all | B0A0R85297 | ms=ms90276286 | 7pzf00r6lsx56lk3k6lslflw9ydldrvg | _6o7hs4jpxyr04zyktr9dv4jz2pcgo81 | _d4csuk2mrjs34d2an6rnuio25kdthyw
TXT_dmarc.absa.co.zav=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1; pct=100; rua=mailto:rua@absa.co.za; ruf=mailto:ruf@absa.co.za; sp=reject
CAAabsa.co.za—
DSabsa.co.za—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain