Digital exposure report
anb.com.sa
Low exposure. The domain is well protected in most areas checked.
Scanned: 2026-11-21 09:50 UTC
Partial coverage: the score is based on 93% of applicable check weight. 1 unverified check(s) are excluded, not counted as failures.
What to do first
- 1.
Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run
This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://anb.com.sa/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- anb.com.sa
- Website request
- GET https://anb.com.sa/ → https://anb.com.sa/web/anb
- Scan time
- 2026-11-21 09:50:09 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- HTTP → HTTPS redirect · Unverified
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 29/30 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 18/18 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 27/30 | The site instructs browsers to block common attacks. |
| DNS infrastructure | 15/15 | The domain's infrastructure is well hardened. |
Fix priorities
- 1.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3
To verify
Couldn't be confirmed from public data, so excluded from the score. Checking them clarifies your posture; it doesn't guarantee a score change.
- HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.
~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 4 of 10 DNS lookups.
v=spf1 ip4:193.109.218.4 ip4:193.200.247.4 ip4:193.109.218.5 ip4:193.200.247.5 mx include:_spf.psm.knowbe4.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf_c.oraclecloud.com ~all
$ dig +short TXT anb.com.sa
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.
Policy p=reject.
v=DMARC1;p=reject;rua=mailto:rua@dmarc360.com,mailto:haseen@rua.dmarc.gov.sa;ruf=mailto:haseen@ruf.dmarc.gov.sa,mailto:ruf@dmarc360.com;fo=1
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.anb.com.sa
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: s1. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
s1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAqb3JBTWpCQ1OjDl4a8Me81l7UaR7xsqYZmv…
$ dig +short TXT s1._domainkey.anb.com.sa
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
4 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
10 mail607.anb.com.sa 10 mail608.anb.com.sa 20 mail604.anb.com.sa 20 mail605.anb.com.sa
$ dig +short MX anb.com.sa
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://anb.com.sa/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://anb.com.sa/web/anb). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://anb.com.sa/web/anb
$ curl -sIL https://anb.com.sa/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scoredCouldn't confirm whether plain HTTP redirects: port 80 didn't respond in time or the connection failed. Not scored.
Couldn't confirm whether plain HTTP redirects: port 80 didn't respond in time or the connection failed. Not scored.
Port 80 not responding (network)
$ curl -sI http://anb.com.sa/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: DigiCert, expiring 2027-04-22 (152 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: DigiCert Valid from: 2026-10-06 Valid until: 2027-04-22 Names: anb.com.sa, anb.sa, everify.anb.com.sa, www.anb.com.sa, www.anb.sa Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect anb.com.sa:443 -servername anb.com.sa 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.
max-age=16070400 (186 days), includeSubDomains, preload. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=16070400; includeSubDomains; preload
$ curl -sIL https://anb.com.sa/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
CSP — protection from script injection
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.
script-src includes: no script-src/default-src — weakens XSS protection.
Content-Security-Policy: object-src *
$ curl -sIL https://anb.com.sa/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://anb.com.sa/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
X-Content-Type-Options
Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.
nosniff is set.
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://anb.com.sa/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Referrer-Policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin
$ curl -sIL https://anb.com.sa/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Permissions-Policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 2/2The site restricts access to sensitive browser features.
Permissions-Policy: : geolocation=(self
Permissions-Policy: : geolocation=(self
$ curl -sIL https://anb.com.sa/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://anb.com.sa/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7The domain's records are digitally signed and hard to forge.
An AD (Authenticated Data) flag was returned by a validating resolver.
AD = true
$ dig +dnssec anb.com.sa | grep -E "flags:.* ad"
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 issue "amazonaws.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "visa.com"
0 issue "amazonaws.com" 0 issue "digicert.com" 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" 0 issue "visa.com"
$ dig +short CAA anb.com.sa
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
2 NS servers.
ns1.anb.com.sa ns2.anb.com.sa
$ dig +short NS anb.com.sa
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
- PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps · 1 unverified
- NIS2 / vendor due diligenceNo gaps observed
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline1 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | anb.com.sa | 193.200.247.170 |
| AAAA | anb.com.sa | 2001:67c:1b0c:140::11 |
| MX | anb.com.sa | 10 mail607.anb.com.sa | 10 mail608.anb.com.sa | 20 mail604.anb.com.sa | 20 mail605.anb.com.sa |
| NS | anb.com.sa | ns1.anb.com.sa | ns2.anb.com.sa |
| TXT | anb.com.sa | VISA=F99F740B5918906C3B7EFA91EE48DE10 | MS=ms76656537 | pkgq2rts3yjcrdj3k41p5strjv845ngl | ZOOM_verify_yE2EMc2_RVqC77p0voUdBA | apple-domain-verification=1PyICe3MHB4P3xOh | google-gws-recovery-domain-verification=52296289 | google-gws-recovery-domain-verification=55641421 | google-site-verification=LivCJbo4IZ5QDkcnQZbImceSlTHDgrUv1MX1MCmb5GY | google-site-verification=mWn2csLgeFYlpsgobkzlyMiUATL7C9QVNxqNqkGUY6Y | ryvkyfL+w0Ydva34cdgJdRb/a770k9AuHLPtM/sw4fbOn5PVxmBc4W9Tc0T5r3udvag0s2p7nOxMuENsZ2rl6Q== | cisco-ci-domain-verification=7f0d27d4989545bc93a2642adc945a0eb518d6b5ea2bff56dcfd12249c7862f4 | v=spf1 ip4:193.109.218.4 ip4:193.200.247.4 ip4:193.109.218.5 ip4:193.200.247.5 mx include:_spf.psm.knowbe4.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf_c.oraclecloud.com ~all |
| TXT | _dmarc.anb.com.sa | v=DMARC1;p=reject;rua=mailto:rua@dmarc360.com,mailto:haseen@rua.dmarc.gov.sa;ruf=mailto:haseen@ruf.dmarc.gov.sa,mailto:ruf@dmarc360.com;fo=1 |
| CAA | anb.com.sa | 0 issue "amazonaws.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "visa.com" |
| DS | anb.com.sa | 12377 14 4 27b374b09423536715c3d8e86cc38b7d4469d0765160945e7fd40df3b0e4847c8e63a28b12169e5c4451542f6ca3414a |