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Digital exposure report

caece.edu.ar

High exposure. Significant weaknesses put the brand, customers and email at risk.

Scanned: 2026-11-19 02:55 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

D
68/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    List the servers allowed to send your email

    Without this list, it is easier for others to send email that looks like it came from you.

    Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short TXT caece.edu.ar
  2. 2.

    Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run

    This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.

    Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sIL https://caece.edu.ar/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
caece.edu.ar
Website request
GET https://caece.edu.ar/ → https://www.ucaece.edu.ar/
Scan time
2026-11-19 02:55:48 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
None. Every applicable check was assessed.

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security22/30Spoofing email in the company's name is possible in some cases.
Encryption & certificate25/25Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid.
Browser protections11/30Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing.
DNS infrastructure10/15The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.HighSPF — who may send mail for the domain · Confirmed issue+8
  2. 2.MediumClickjacking protection · Hardening gap+5
  3. 3.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
  4. 4.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+5
  5. 5.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
  6. 6.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Failed · Severity: High · Confirmed issue · 2/10

There are several SPF records at once, so mail servers ignore all of them.

Found 2 v=spf1 records. Per RFC 7208 §4.5 this returns permerror and SPF is not enforced.

Source data: DNS TXT caece.edu.ar
v=spf1 include:_spf.elasticemail.com redirect=_shljfy4qj.sdmarc.net
v=spf1 redirect=_shljfy4qj.sdmarc.net
$ dig +short TXT caece.edu.ar
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Merge all mechanisms (include/ip4/ip6) into a single SPF record.
  2. Delete the duplicate records at your DNS provider.
caece.edu.ar.  TXT  "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. An incorrect record can block legitimate mail — add every sender before tightening.

Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15

Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.

Policy p=reject.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.caece.edu.ar
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:a.hljfy4qj@sdmarc.net; adkim=r; aspf=r
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.caece.edu.ar
Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: google. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.caece.edu.ar
google._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQClndoGbXsDosV9R6jC2peVG3HieAe9Eazk…
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.caece.edu.ar
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

7 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX caece.edu.ar
1 aspmx.l.google.com
10 aspmx2.googlemail.com
10 aspmx3.googlemail.com
10 aspmx4.googlemail.com
10 aspmx5.googlemail.com
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
$ dig +short MX caece.edu.ar
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://caece.edu.ar/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.ucaece.edu.ar/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://caece.edu.ar/
HTTP 200
Final URL: https://www.ucaece.edu.ar/
$ curl -sIL https://caece.edu.ar/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.

HTTP 301 → https://www.ucaece.edu.ar

Source data: HTTP GET http://caece.edu.ar/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 301
Location: https://www.ucaece.edu.ar
$ curl -sI http://caece.edu.ar/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. No matching certificate details were available from CT logs; run the verify command to see the served certificate's dates.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for caece.edu.ar
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
The CT log service was unavailable at the time of the check
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect caece.edu.ar:443 -servername caece.edu.ar 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/8

Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.

max-age=31536000 (365 days), no includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.ucaece.edu.ar/
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
$ curl -sIL https://caece.edu.ar/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8

Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.

No Content-Security-Policy header found.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.ucaece.edu.ar/
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://caece.edu.ar/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/5

Missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors: this removes one layer of protection against clickjacking.

No valid X-Frame-Options and no frame-ancestors in the CSP.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.ucaece.edu.ar/
X-Frame-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://caece.edu.ar/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Add X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (or DENY if the site is never embedded anywhere).
  2. Also set frame-ancestors in the CSP — the modern alternative.
/*
  X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. If partners embed the site in an iframe, add them to frame-ancestors instead of using DENY.

Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4

The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.

nosniff is set.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.ucaece.edu.ar/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://caece.edu.ar/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3

Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.ucaece.edu.ar/
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://caece.edu.ar/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/*
  Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.

Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2

Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.

Missing Permissions-Policy header.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.ucaece.edu.ar/
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://caece.edu.ar/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/*
  Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.

Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.ucaece.edu.ar/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://caece.edu.ar/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

The domain's records are digitally signed and hard to forge.

An AD (Authenticated Data) flag was returned by a validating resolver.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = true
$ dig +dnssec caece.edu.ar | grep -E "flags:.* ad"
Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA caece.edu.ar
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA caece.edu.ar
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
caece.edu.ar.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
caece.edu.ar.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@caece.edu.ar"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

2 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS caece.edu.ar
roan.ns.cloudflare.com
zainab.ns.cloudflare.com
$ dig +short NS caece.edu.ar
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps
  • PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline3 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Acaece.edu.ar104.26.8.222 | 104.26.9.222 | 172.67.73.6
AAAAcaece.edu.ar2606:4700:20::681a:8de | 2606:4700:20::681a:9de | 2606:4700:20::ac43:4906
MXcaece.edu.ar1 aspmx.l.google.com | 10 aspmx2.googlemail.com | 10 aspmx3.googlemail.com | 10 aspmx4.googlemail.com | 10 aspmx5.googlemail.com | 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com | 5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
NScaece.edu.arroan.ns.cloudflare.com | zainab.ns.cloudflare.com
TXTcaece.edu.argoogle-site-verification=kJUwsKCT-cFZkqVkGFb_WZ5BMDSoRqbgmr9KUwSMS2I | v=spf1 include:_spf.elasticemail.com redirect=_shljfy4qj.sdmarc.net | v=spf1 redirect=_shljfy4qj.sdmarc.net
TXT_dmarc.caece.edu.arv=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:a.hljfy4qj@sdmarc.net; adkim=r; aspf=r
CAAcaece.edu.ar—
DScaece.edu.ar—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain