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Digital exposure report

cam.ac.uk

Good shape, with a few gaps worth closing this quarter.

Scanned: 2026-11-15 19:22 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

B
88/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Choose which companies may issue certificates for your domain

    This reduces the chance of a certificate being issued by a provider you did not choose.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short CAA cam.ac.uk
  2. 2.

    Tell browsers to always use the secure version

    Helps browsers use HTTPS on future visits after they have received the policy.

    Who can fix it: Your web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sIL https://cam.ac.uk/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
cam.ac.uk
Website request
GET https://cam.ac.uk/ → https://www.cam.ac.uk/
Scan time
2026-11-15 19:22:44 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
None. Every applicable check was assessed.

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security30/30Spoofing email from this domain is hard.
Encryption & certificate25/25Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid.
Browser protections23/30Some browser protections are missing.
DNS infrastructure10/15The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.MediumHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+4
  2. 2.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+5
  3. 3.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.

Valid SPF record with -all. 4 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT cam.ac.uk
v=spf1 include:_spf.cam.ac.uk include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.google.com include:spf.uk.odmad.quest-on-demand.com -all
$ dig +short TXT cam.ac.uk
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15

Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.

Policy p=reject.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.cam.ac.uk
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc-rua@dmarc.service.gov.uk, mailto:jiq3dpgf@ag.eu.dmarcian.com
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.cam.ac.uk
Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: google, selector1, selector2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.cam.ac.uk
google._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEArRR4UsJ2adkznTqeYo3lUPzvDF1N…
selector1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAy/Prc8kr/vpMUBlp3BuHih9YTYdk…
selector2._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA14enaM2l6msoEvlQho0iNrRt3Zwe…
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.cam.ac.uk
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

1 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX cam.ac.uk
0 cam-ac-uk.mail.protection.outlook.com
$ dig +short MX cam.ac.uk
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://cam.ac.uk/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.cam.ac.uk/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://cam.ac.uk/
HTTP 200
Final URL: https://www.cam.ac.uk/
$ curl -sIL https://cam.ac.uk/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.

HTTP 301 → https://www.cam.ac.uk/

Source data: HTTP GET http://cam.ac.uk/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 301
Location: https://www.cam.ac.uk/
$ curl -sI http://cam.ac.uk/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: Let's Encrypt, expiring 2026-12-24 (38 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for cam.ac.uk
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: Let's Encrypt
Valid from: 2026-09-25
Valid until: 2026-12-24
Names: cam.ac.uk, www.cam.ac.uk
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect cam.ac.uk:443 -servername cam.ac.uk 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 4/8

Encryption enforcement is set for too short a time.

max-age=2592000 (30 days), includeSubDomains, preload. ≥ 180 days recommended.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cam.ac.uk/
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=2592000, max-age=31622400; includeSubDomains; preload
$ curl -sIL https://cam.ac.uk/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
  2. Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
  3. Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/*
  Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.

Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8

A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.

script-src includes: no script-src/default-src — weakens XSS protection.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cam.ac.uk/
Content-Security-Policy: report-uri /report-csp-violation; upgrade-insecure-requests
$ curl -sIL https://cam.ac.uk/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cam.ac.uk/
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://cam.ac.uk/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4

The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.

nosniff is set.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cam.ac.uk/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://cam.ac.uk/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cam.ac.uk/
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
$ curl -sIL https://cam.ac.uk/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 2/2

The site restricts access to sensitive browser features.

Permissions-Policy: autoplay=*, camera=self, fullscreen=*, geolocation=*, microphone=self, picture-in-picture=*, web-share=self

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cam.ac.uk/
Permissions-Policy: autoplay=*, camera=self, fullscreen=*, geolocation=*, microphone=self, picture-in-picture=*, web-share=self
$ curl -sIL https://cam.ac.uk/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cam.ac.uk/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://cam.ac.uk/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

The domain's records are digitally signed and hard to forge.

An AD (Authenticated Data) flag was returned by a validating resolver.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = true
$ dig +dnssec cam.ac.uk | grep -E "flags:.* ad"
Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA cam.ac.uk
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA cam.ac.uk
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
cam.ac.uk.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
cam.ac.uk.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@cam.ac.uk"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

9 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS cam.ac.uk
ns1.mythic-beasts.com
ns2.ic.ac.uk
ns3.mythic-beasts.com
dns0.cl.cam.ac.uk
dns0.eng.cam.ac.uk
auth0.dns.cam.ac.uk
auth1.dns.cam.ac.uk
auth2.dns.cam.ac.uk
auth3.dns.cam.ac.uk
$ dig +short NS cam.ac.uk
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
  • PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Acam.ac.uk23.185.0.2
AAAAcam.ac.uk2620:12a:8000::2 | 2620:12a:8001::2
MXcam.ac.uk0 cam-ac-uk.mail.protection.outlook.com
NScam.ac.ukns1.mythic-beasts.com | ns2.ic.ac.uk | ns3.mythic-beasts.com | dns0.cl.cam.ac.uk | dns0.eng.cam.ac.uk | auth0.dns.cam.ac.uk | auth1.dns.cam.ac.uk | auth2.dns.cam.ac.uk | auth3.dns.cam.ac.uk
TXTcam.ac.uk_l57xfo8xodfo7j6g0fb9zoljfwh18qt | _um3kem45o33chvq68mb4qyt72y57oow | 9026cbf1-7b8b-4613-87ce-a46bda32c08f | QuoVadis=a2edaff3-bdc6-44c5-8550-2167fe7338c4 | jamf-site-verification=9Xc0IY8F9-nFQz_ItUdvSg | airtable-verification=a44072da1d55edc25c09b3eb72f8cedd | miro-verification=a1052e0584a21e3d2792bce42f69dc21def357fc | have-i-been-pwned-verification=505eab056dca3ebf0a94cc28eeef0c31 | google-site-verification=DzWWuhcpZ1B2FT5ftPCIV8rK6hbuLEEaojFzIt_YhSM | google-site-verification=WBy6QZ92OsuLOOPs8Zrr4GxorRnSu9H_aiLmyCjX-nI | google-site-verification=vob_qUOVAbGehTQ74k1vnA1XCWJB2CSWwsP9fNdwALU | access-domain-verification=80b9280e5d8d74cd9a01a3af64bba66df221437d7612cc895110546f3b86d2ce | atlassian-domain-verification=S5SLTUt0OLAN9mxNzSRE7Cwjz4YOzlAVb87kMqkz6FcVeqp9q2PX8wtErVchDQYH | dell-technologies-domain-verification=cam.ac.uk_b220a1b2-fe6b-4199-bae5-c07814bfc1e0_1768470629 | hpe-greenlake-domain-verification=78487863375a505250746c662d4236615a71794f322d47423172636354537362 | v=spf1 include:_spf.cam.ac.uk include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.google.com include:spf.uk.odmad.quest-on-demand.com -all
TXT_dmarc.cam.ac.ukv=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc-rua@dmarc.service.gov.uk, mailto:jiq3dpgf@ag.eu.dmarcian.com
CAAcam.ac.uk—
DScam.ac.uk17004 13 2 25425306c22124e8319210335a3085247ea8c74df0bd0dd7faae535594d6c3d0
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain