Digital exposure report
case.edu
Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.
Scanned: 2026-11-19 02:59 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run
This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://case.edu/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- 2.
Turn on DNS signing for your domain
Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.
Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider
How to verify after the fix
dig +short DS case.edu
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- case.edu
- Website request
- GET https://case.edu/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-19 02:59:42 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 29/30 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 11/30 | Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 8/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.MediumClickjacking protection · Hardening gap+5
- 2.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 3.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
- 4.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
- 5.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.
~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 3 of 10 DNS lookups.
v=spf1 ip4:129.22.0.0/16 a:campusmtas.case.edu a:hostedmtas.case.edu include:_spf.google.com ~all
$ dig +short TXT case.edu
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.
Policy p=reject.
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; fo=1; rua=mailto:1hwnfxba@ag.us.dmarcian.com; ruf=mailto:1hwnfxba@fr.us.dmarcian.com;
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.case.edu
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: selector1, s1, s2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
selector1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCyfwSXulCIxeULTQxTjd48Ul1vOb35t0hR… s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA1CJ6+q+N264DhEGxi92ISXCkZT+f06yc… s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDTUzQVpQ1SATUnikEo0S3AEJl3+2Q5ygaEhH44…
$ dig +short TXT selector1._domainkey.case.edu
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
1 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
5 smtp.lb.cwru.edu
$ dig +short MX case.edu
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://case.edu/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://case.edu/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://case.edu/
$ curl -sIL https://case.edu/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 301 → https://case.edu/
HTTP 301 Location: https://case.edu/
$ curl -sI http://case.edu/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: SSL.com, expiring 2027-05-29 (191 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: SSL.com Valid from: 2026-11-12 Valid until: 2027-05-29 Names: case.edu, cfd-dc-prod-1.case.edu Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect case.edu:443 -servername case.edu 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/8Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.
max-age=31536000 (365 days), no includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
$ curl -sIL https://case.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
CSP — protection from script injection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.
No Content-Security-Policy header found.
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://case.edu/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/5Missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors: this removes one layer of protection against clickjacking.
No valid X-Frame-Options and no frame-ancestors in the CSP.
X-Frame-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://case.edu/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
- Add X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (or DENY if the site is never embedded anywhere).
- Also set frame-ancestors in the CSP — the modern alternative.
/* X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. If partners embed the site in an iframe, add them to frame-ancestors instead of using DENY.
X-Content-Type-Options
Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.
nosniff is set.
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://case.edu/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Referrer-Policy
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://case.edu/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
- Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/* Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://case.edu/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://case.edu/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS case.edu: NODATA
$ dig +short DS case.edu
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec case.edu SOA delv case.edu
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 issue "starfieldtech.com" | 0 issue "awstrust.com" | 0 issuewild ";" | 0 issue "ssl.com" | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "amazontrust.com" | 0 issue "pki.goog" | 0 issue "amazonaws.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "godaddy.com" | 0 issue "emsign.com" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "starfieldtech.com" 0 issue "awstrust.com" 0 issuewild ";" 0 issue "ssl.com" 0 issue "amazon.com" 0 issue "amazontrust.com" 0 issue "pki.goog" 0 issue "amazonaws.com" 0 issue "digicert.com" 0 issue "godaddy.com" 0 issue "emsign.com" 0 issue "sectigo.com" 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
$ dig +short CAA case.edu
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
8 NS servers.
ns5.OAR.NET ns.CWRU.edu ns2.CWRU.edu ns7.OAR.NET ns4.OAR.NET ns3.CWRU.edu ns6.OAR.NET ns4.CWRU.edu
$ dig +short NS case.edu
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
- PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence1 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | case.edu | 23.185.0.3 |
| AAAA | case.edu | — |
| MX | case.edu | 5 smtp.lb.cwru.edu |
| NS | case.edu | ns5.OAR.NET | ns.CWRU.edu | ns2.CWRU.edu | ns7.OAR.NET | ns4.OAR.NET | ns3.CWRU.edu | ns6.OAR.NET | ns4.CWRU.edu |
| TXT | case.edu | stripe-verification=30D847D6856E6057C9DCDCDC075ACAE188013B6FF93A2D002252430C18D6E418 | adobe-idp-site-verification=dd5084a50b4d78df7d66ea3d232d7d5c230f441cfb059a19217782c08b01dbf4 | google-site-verification=fhd6p2ZMdb_t2MQmt8ui2hFYZ6T7Wgu1cruBnHt4v0g | cisco-ci-domain-verification=5e1e3ed6e0b31a679241c0967c3e2a8003c451083ac205714d8bbed100da3f26 | google-site-verification=uE5m2Jvj7oH9NyuPH60W1ExfUZnkDwco2_ah6tunKyw | bw=oYtDmZeIgcOUzSOOZonZnF11yJ2d18IZIgBH1mHYmDBW | d365mktkey=3bpq3njsgkhid44t92i681k39 | coursera-domain-verification=sjsRgTWknXlXWxwv3ajU2nBnSt0fJejgyK36rU6P3n6qZdCEuyPBtmt75x5fzWL7 | atlassian-sending-domain-verification=9cbaf077-c876-44ad-81d8-fc94d063fe01 | wrike-verification=MzQwMDU3OTo5M2YwZGU1ZGY1OGIzYzA4MTQ2NmFlMGYyMjAyZDhjMjBkMWNlOWY2ODlkY2Y4Yzg3N2YzNWI1Nzk4NTg0NzU5 | ZOOM_verify_h4xB4HYiS02IoqrhIp02Ow | D0C374E6F91B24E90C2DC09298EC870C | v=spf1 ip4:129.22.0.0/16 a:campusmtas.case.edu a:hostedmtas.case.edu include:_spf.google.com ~all | anthropic-domain-verification-e3swpe=Faxaik1bswo9XzALcpLcR9vpy | e2ma-verification=wm1eb | d365mktkey=7f3caccch8fm32d62jlg34hyb | asv=3232f49d57638876429b8df40f79b386 | clio-domain-verification=4efbb7599382c7371a35b75566b07a04 | myengine=41af3c7d0b8fb6cd48487c81f399cd06 |
| TXT | _dmarc.case.edu | v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; fo=1; rua=mailto:1hwnfxba@ag.us.dmarcian.com; ruf=mailto:1hwnfxba@fr.us.dmarcian.com; |
| CAA | case.edu | 0 issue "starfieldtech.com" | 0 issue "awstrust.com" | 0 issuewild ";" | 0 issue "ssl.com" | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "amazontrust.com" | 0 issue "pki.goog" | 0 issue "amazonaws.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "godaddy.com" | 0 issue "emsign.com" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
| DS | case.edu | — |