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Digital exposure report

citibank.com

Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.

Scanned: 2026-11-20 07:34 UTC

Partial coverage: the score is based on 95% of applicable check weight. 1 unverified check(s) are excluded, not counted as failures.

C
79/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Send visitors to the secure version of your site

    Visitors who type your address without https may stay on an unprotected connection.

    Who can fix it: Your web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sI http://citibank.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
  2. 2.

    Turn on DNS signing for your domain

    Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short DS citibank.com

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
citibank.com
Website request
GET https://citibank.com/ → https://www.citi.com/
Scan time
2026-11-20 07:34:39 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
  • DKIM — digital signature on email · Not detected (common selectors only)

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security24/25Spoofing email from this domain is hard.
Encryption & certificate18/25Encryption is in place, but a gap could expose users.
Browser protections25/30The site instructs browsers to block common attacks.
DNS infrastructure8/15The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.HighHTTP → HTTPS redirect · Hardening gap+7
  2. 2.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
  3. 3.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
  4. 4.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3

To verify

Couldn't be confirmed from public data, so excluded from the score. Checking them clarifies your posture; it doesn't guarantee a score change.

  • DKIM — digital signature on email

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10

An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.

~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 2 of 10 DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT citibank.com
v=spf1 a:mail.citigroup.com ip4:217.29.160.12 ip4:84.45.73.5 include:spf-00123c01.pphosted.com ~all
$ dig +short TXT citibank.com
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15

Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.

Policy p=reject.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.citibank.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com,mailto:dmarc.reports.rua@citi.com
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.citibank.com
Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Not detected (common selectors only) · Severity: OK · Not scored

No DKIM key was found under the common selectors we probed. That doesn't mean DKIM is missing — selectors can't be listed from public DNS. Not scored.

A missing name for a probed selector (NXDOMAIN/NODATA) only means that selector isn't published. DKIM is marked unverified and excluded from the score. Check a sent message's Authentication-Results for dkim=pass and its s= selector.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.citibank.com
Selectors checked: google, selector1, selector2, default, k1, s1, s2, dkim, mail, smtp — no key found
google._domainkey: nxdomain
selector1._domainkey: nxdomain
selector2._domainkey: nxdomain
default._domainkey: nxdomain
k1._domainkey: nxdomain
s1._domainkey: nxdomain
s2._domainkey: nxdomain
dkim._domainkey: nxdomain
mail._domainkey: nxdomain
smtp._domainkey: nxdomain
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.citibank.com
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

2 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX citibank.com
5 mx-b.mail.citi.com
5 mx-a.mail.citi.com
$ dig +short MX citibank.com
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://citibank.com/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.citi.com/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://citibank.com/
HTTP 200
Final URL: https://www.citi.com/
$ curl -sIL https://citibank.com/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/7

The site is also reachable over an unencrypted connection, so data may travel in plain text on public networks.

http://citibank.com/ returned HTTP 301 without redirecting to https:// (Location: http://www.citibank.com/).

Source data: HTTP GET http://citibank.com/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 301
Location: http://www.citibank.com/
$ curl -sI http://citibank.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set up a permanent (301) redirect from every HTTP request to HTTPS on the server or CDN.
  2. Then add an HSTS header.
server {
  listen 80;
  server_name citibank.com www.citibank.com;
  return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}

Safety: This change is made on your server. Make sure HTTPS works first, otherwise the site won't load.

Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: DigiCert, expiring 2027-05-08 (169 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for citibank.com
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: DigiCert
Valid from: 2026-10-22
Valid until: 2027-05-08
Names: citibank.com
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect citibank.com:443 -servername citibank.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.

max-age=63072000 (730 days), includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.citi.com/
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains
$ curl -sIL https://citibank.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8

A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.

script-src includes: 'unsafe-inline', 'unsafe-eval' — weakens XSS protection.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.citi.com/
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' *.citi.com *.google.com *.qualtrics.com bat.bing.com ct.pinterest.com www.youtube.com cdn.plaid.com code.jquery.com pwm-image.trendmicro.com *.google-analytics.com js.adsrvr.org s.pinimg.com assets.adobedtm.com *.liveperson.com nexus.ensighten.com cdn.boomtrain.com lptag.liveperson.net s.yimg.com gc.kis.v2.scr.kaspersky-labs.com script.crazyegg.com maps.googleapis.com www.googletagmanager.com live.rezync.com mpsnare.iesnare.com negbar.ad-blocker.org video.limelight.com cdn.gbqofs.com ds-aksb-a.akamaihd.net googleads.g.doubleclick.net get663.com c1.rfihub.net www.adobetag.com c.tvpixel.com www.googleadservices.com tpc.googlesyndication.com bcdn-god.we-stats.com a.rfihub.com services-dev.sdiapi.com *.online-metrix.net data.privacy.ensighten.com connect.facebook.net s.rfihub.com/meta blob: p11.techlab-cdn.com *.privacymanager.io *.rlcdn.com; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors https://*.citi.com https://*.citigroup.net https://*.nsroot.net
$ curl -sIL https://citibank.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN frame-ancestors https://*.citi.com https://*.citigroup.net https://*.nsroot.net

Source data: Response headers from https://www.citi.com/
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
CSP frame-ancestors: https://*.citi.com https://*.citigroup.net https://*.nsroot.net
$ curl -sIL https://citibank.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4

The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.

nosniff is set.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.citi.com/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://citibank.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Source data: Response headers from https://www.citi.com/
Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, strict-origin-when-cross-origin
$ curl -sIL https://citibank.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2

Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.

Missing Permissions-Policy header.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.citi.com/
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://citibank.com/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/*
  Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.

Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.citi.com/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://citibank.com/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS citibank.com: NODATA
$ dig +short DS citibank.com
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec citibank.com SOA
delv citibank.com

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.

CAA records: 128 iodef "mailto:CAADNS@citi.com" | 128 issue "digicert.com" | 128 issue "globalsign.com" | 128 issue "visa.com" | 128 issuewild ";"

Source data: DNS CAA citibank.com
128 iodef "mailto:CAADNS@citi.com"
128 issue "digicert.com"
128 issue "globalsign.com"
128 issue "visa.com"
128 issuewild ";"
$ dig +short CAA citibank.com
Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

2 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS citibank.com
ns1.nsroot1.com
ns2.nsroot2.com
$ dig +short NS citibank.com
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules1 unverified
  • PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence1 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline1 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Acitibank.com104.96.178.165 | 104.94.222.171
AAAAcitibank.com—
MXcitibank.com5 mx-b.mail.citi.com | 5 mx-a.mail.citi.com
NScitibank.comns1.nsroot1.com | ns2.nsroot2.com
TXTcitibank.comgoogle-site-verification=kZISuG3O5lKpwO_y-LOv8wR6wuDt8TVjeU8hzFVlI4s | VISA=D7B6E91A9C4FF2AC9083113C7CBDBBDC | v=spf1 a:mail.citigroup.com ip4:217.29.160.12 ip4:84.45.73.5 include:spf-00123c01.pphosted.com ~all | facebook-domain-verification=3afsyr7t6cmarl3sc8dfohlz53n4ho | google-site-verification=l0yLgWkGs-ik3cNg8LCqI4IRtJe_qvzRYILtrnQ-L4E | postman-domain-verification=80f5e8b5b0eb9d94f6c42fc72ee42bef0585ba996bddeeda33442ee5f1db593d4aede826d4d6e58b40be0681a2f40b86aff5238e76c95e449c963bad2e3ffc14 | paloaltonetworks-site-verification=59fcee26fb9ae46cb912e8ec453faa3b82c65ee0e94f7fb7de1a59b07e9b8cf3
TXT_dmarc.citibank.comv=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com,mailto:dmarc.reports.rua@citi.com
CAAcitibank.com128 iodef "mailto:CAADNS@citi.com" | 128 issue "digicert.com" | 128 issue "globalsign.com" | 128 issue "visa.com" | 128 issuewild ";"
DScitibank.com—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain