Digital exposure report
code.berlin
High exposure. Significant weaknesses put the brand, customers and email at risk.
Scanned: 2026-11-19 02:59 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Tell browsers to always use the secure version
Helps browsers use HTTPS on future visits after they have received the policy.
Who can fix it: Your web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://code.berlin/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
- 2.
Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run
This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://code.berlin/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- code.berlin
- Website request
- GET https://code.berlin/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-19 02:59:36 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 27/30 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 0/30 | Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 8/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.HighHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+8
- 2.MediumClickjacking protection · Hardening gap+5
- 3.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 4.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
- 5.LowX-Content-Type-Options · Hardening gap+4
- 6.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
- 7.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.
~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 3 of 10 DNS lookups.
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:2730872.spf04.hubspotemail.net include:_spf.atlassian.net ~all
$ dig +short TXT code.berlin
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 13/15Forged email in the company's name is sent to the spam folder.
Policy p=quarantine. p=quarantine — consider moving to p=reject.
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@code.berlin
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.code.berlin
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: google. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
google._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDLEUW7otKM56gzWsmXdd1PRXW/PnDwkFej…
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.code.berlin
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
5 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
1 aspmx.l.google.com 10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com 10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com 5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
$ dig +short MX code.berlin
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://code.berlin/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://code.berlin/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://code.berlin/
$ curl -sIL https://code.berlin/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 301 → https://code.berlin/
HTTP 301 Location: https://code.berlin/
$ curl -sI http://code.berlin/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: Amazon Trust Services, expiring 2027-01-27 (69 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: Amazon Trust Services Valid from: 2026-07-14 Valid until: 2027-01-27 Names: code.berlin Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect code.berlin:443 -servername code.berlin 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/8Browsers aren't told to always use an encrypted connection, enabling interception attacks on public networks.
No Strict-Transport-Security header. Users are exposed to SSL stripping on the first request.
Strict-Transport-Security: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://code.berlin/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
- Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
- Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
- Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/* Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.
CSP — protection from script injection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.
No Content-Security-Policy header found.
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://code.berlin/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/5Missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors: this removes one layer of protection against clickjacking.
No valid X-Frame-Options and no frame-ancestors in the CSP.
X-Frame-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://code.berlin/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
- Add X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (or DENY if the site is never embedded anywhere).
- Also set frame-ancestors in the CSP — the modern alternative.
/* X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. If partners embed the site in an iframe, add them to frame-ancestors instead of using DENY.
X-Content-Type-Options
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/4The browser may interpret files as code unintentionally.
Missing X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header (MIME sniffing).
X-Content-Type-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://code.berlin/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
- Add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff to every response.
/* X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Referrer-Policy
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://code.berlin/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
- Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/* Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://code.berlin/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://code.berlin/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS code.berlin: NODATA
$ dig +short DS code.berlin
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec code.berlin SOA delv code.berlin
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 issue "awstrust.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "awstrust.com" 0 issue "digicert.com" 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
$ dig +short CAA code.berlin
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
4 NS servers.
ns-1333.awsdns-38.org ns-1668.awsdns-16.co.uk ns-265.awsdns-33.com ns-625.awsdns-14.net
$ dig +short NS code.berlin
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
- PCI DSS v4.03 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline4 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | code.berlin | 18.238.25.12 | 18.238.25.64 | 18.238.25.104 | 18.238.25.5 |
| AAAA | code.berlin | — |
| MX | code.berlin | 1 aspmx.l.google.com | 10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com | 10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com | 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com | 5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com |
| NS | code.berlin | ns-1333.awsdns-38.org | ns-1668.awsdns-16.co.uk | ns-265.awsdns-33.com | ns-625.awsdns-14.net |
| TXT | code.berlin | MS=A6B98215BED0CE2C89C29A5DBB37CE94DA6D5CEF | MS=ms31871371 | ZOOM_verify_buC0GCbU3MnY1TW96qNJF8 | atlassian-domain-verification=MweL1DVhtXwzJsQxCy86SVpRh169ZJOddz6APfiOHyjZzmYZIqF5ro3Le7KaWSw1 | atlassian-sending-domain-verification=83abf972-1013-49ab-94a1-4473f37dfcdf | brevo-code:0c5fa1670226f361ddf5700f066c93fe | google-site-verification=15HVflHO-1vO-qwdOHcIFhD3WAcbOtlQVUW4wom2efg | google-site-verification=93pfToGJCcawdDxgEbRc_ZUKyeMM4313c_uYiCHSaVY | google-site-verification=Pom-mwhb8KaxeJN1KEODs8OpOtvpoJ1cARfmOby5DRQ | google-site-verification=W8Oe95DyB8rE4Nn_2VMJc3XnUIroeCk26E-7bXS3RXw | google-site-verification=ezyuzxQxaS97B2w5x893sbpD0Hd0_1zaI7IsPIQHm24 | google-site-verification=sOPgLz3uOroQh6D75LqXHg4TyXUIfKrEUzB-7GDpqe8 | jamf-site-verification=U4QosJ6v4z5NNxmOqoxcvg | miro-verification=87dd53c91e616679d0c0074c2099ac8649461d47 | notion_verify_fG*G%.A05D,aW%uYF>ZM>YJ_p>m!Kj]yQ0y_fm4yQ#Kg1mhg4.QWi~UauWX>_6~qsxtXve | v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:2730872.spf04.hubspotemail.net include:_spf.atlassian.net ~all |
| TXT | _dmarc.code.berlin | v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@code.berlin |
| CAA | code.berlin | 0 issue "awstrust.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" |
| DS | code.berlin | — |