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Digital exposure report

cognism.com

Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.

Scanned: 2026-11-19 03:00 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

C
75/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Send visitors to the secure version of your site

    Visitors who type your address without https may stay on an unprotected connection.

    Who can fix it: Your web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sI http://cognism.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
  2. 2.

    Stop other sites from embedding your pages

    This removes one way to trick visitors into clicking something on your site unknowingly.

    Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sIL https://cognism.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
cognism.com
Website request
GET https://cognism.com/ → https://www.cognism.com/
Scan time
2026-11-19 03:00:07 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
None. Every applicable check was assessed.

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security29/30Spoofing email from this domain is hard.
Encryption & certificate18/25Encryption is in place, but a gap could expose users.
Browser protections13/30Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing.
DNS infrastructure15/15The domain's infrastructure is well hardened.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.HighHTTP → HTTPS redirect · Hardening gap+7
  2. 2.MediumClickjacking protection · Hardening gap+5
  3. 3.LowX-Content-Type-Options · Hardening gap+4
  4. 4.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
  5. 5.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+2
  6. 6.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10

An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.

~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 7 of 10 DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT cognism.com
v=spf1 a mx  include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:aspmx.pardot.com include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:mail.zendesk.com include:_spf.salesforce.com ~all
$ dig +short TXT cognism.com
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15

Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.

Policy p=reject.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.cognism.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_report@cognism.com,mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email; ruf=mailto:dmarc_report@cognism.com; fo=1:d:s; pct=100; ri=172800; adkim=r; aspf=r
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.cognism.com
Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: selector1, s1, s2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.cognism.com
selector1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDNRAbs8WpdFTAVL6cpoOKXeQTbToOw5mbu…
s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA2GQThwXBb/lrP+Z3yvOsZNpxgAbQVEe3…
s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDj523zhGXGX5/vFCJbgnQNLGS2+vlZbZF32YSI…
$ dig +short TXT selector1._domainkey.cognism.com
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

1 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX cognism.com
0 cognism-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
$ dig +short MX cognism.com
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://cognism.com/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.cognism.com/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://cognism.com/
HTTP 200
Final URL: https://www.cognism.com/
$ curl -sIL https://cognism.com/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/7

The site is also reachable over an unencrypted connection, so data may travel in plain text on public networks.

http://cognism.com/ returned HTTP 301 without redirecting to https:// (Location: http://www.cognism.com/).

Source data: HTTP GET http://cognism.com/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 301
Location: http://www.cognism.com/
$ curl -sI http://cognism.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set up a permanent (301) redirect from every HTTP request to HTTPS on the server or CDN.
  2. Then add an HSTS header.
server {
  listen 80;
  server_name cognism.com www.cognism.com;
  return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}

Safety: This change is made on your server. Make sure HTTPS works first, otherwise the site won't load.

Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: Amazon Trust Services, expiring 2027-04-17 (149 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for cognism.com
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: Amazon Trust Services
Valid from: 2026-10-02
Valid until: 2027-04-17
Names: *.cognism.com, cognism.com
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect cognism.com:443 -servername cognism.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/8

Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.

max-age=31536000 (365 days), no includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cognism.com/
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
$ curl -sIL https://cognism.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8

A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.

script-src includes: no script-src/default-src — weakens XSS protection.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cognism.com/
Content-Security-Policy: upgrade-insecure-requests
$ curl -sIL https://cognism.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/5

Missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors: this removes one layer of protection against clickjacking.

No valid X-Frame-Options and no frame-ancestors in the CSP.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cognism.com/
X-Frame-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://cognism.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Add X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (or DENY if the site is never embedded anywhere).
  2. Also set frame-ancestors in the CSP — the modern alternative.
/*
  X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. If partners embed the site in an iframe, add them to frame-ancestors instead of using DENY.

Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/4

The browser may interpret files as code unintentionally.

Missing X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header (MIME sniffing).

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cognism.com/
X-Content-Type-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://cognism.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff to every response.
/*
  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.

Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 1/3

The policy sends full URLs to external sites.

Referrer-Policy: no-referrer-when-downgrade — sends the full URL including path and query.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cognism.com/
Referrer-Policy: no-referrer-when-downgrade
$ curl -sIL https://cognism.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/*
  Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.

Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2

Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.

Missing Permissions-Policy header.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cognism.com/
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://cognism.com/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/*
  Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.

Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.cognism.com/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://cognism.com/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

The domain's records are digitally signed and hard to forge.

An AD (Authenticated Data) flag was returned by a validating resolver.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = true
$ dig +dnssec cognism.com | grep -E "flags:.* ad"
Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.

CAA records: 0 iodef "mailto:security@cognism.com" | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "comodoca.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "ssl.com" | 0 issuewild "amazon.com" | 0 issuewild "comodoca.com" | 0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issuewild "sectigo.com" | 0 issuewild "ssl.com"

Source data: DNS CAA cognism.com
0 iodef "mailto:security@cognism.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "comodoca.com"
0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issue "ssl.com"
0 issuewild "amazon.com"
0 issuewild "comodoca.com"
0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes"
0 issuewild "sectigo.com"
0 issuewild "ssl.com"
$ dig +short CAA cognism.com
Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

2 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS cognism.com
daisy.ns.cloudflare.com
henry.ns.cloudflare.com
$ dig +short NS cognism.com
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
  • PCI DSS v4.03 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligenceNo gaps observed
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline3 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Acognism.com104.18.4.127 | 104.18.5.127
AAAAcognism.com2606:4700::6812:47f | 2606:4700::6812:57f
MXcognism.com0 cognism-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
NScognism.comdaisy.ns.cloudflare.com | henry.ns.cloudflare.com
TXTcognism.comE170E58611 | F814972508 | MS=ms16751425 | MS=ms50043585 | ZOOM_verify_mnTb161iY2gBQl8x1pVSqI | asv=42e9ceefa8a8b0a58f8de1f93055ae53 | stytch_verification_dns=jumpy-starflower-3034 | openai-domain-verification=dv-7HLws4amfYim1CC0EpoWY0fl | ps-cd-verification=086febaf-e2a1-471c-a9ab-8df9d7669673 | anthropic-domain-verification-0ey0wm=JcGKueEZD9Iz6cZfT02blgvcC | google-site-verification=DPKUczociWJ6DtmR0GN0dyzXsIutDyEKOJLrrlxIT7g | google-site-verification=FoM6oXG-zRnjwccLEzmODN6NA8H0A3ILM6lnlX0TLLY | google-site-verification=jvzrEbuaH-VJXYzX5oewW8U3FzbCJEG-BDFQVAaSRL4 | atlassian-sending-domain-verification=99ade3b7-f4d6-418b-82a6-30a129c0de74 | hubspot-developer-verification=ODNkNGQ3NzMtN2E4ZC00YThkLWE2ZTAtMzRhYTExOWViNjc1 | hubspot-developer-verification=YzA5MzFiYmMtZWMyNi00MmMxLTgxNzItZTZiMzA1MDliMDg3 | stripe-verification=ED042634F6B003DCFD1C78B87FEEABC865A262B87FC79AB8156B406D3E1DD6B8 | stripe-verification=F07BFBB75DE36F845485E97B861C045B468159BB3F53EBAC321C38F2802656DB | ahrefs-site-verification_63c90a63d4f9f19d4783bf4eefbf9f9aced29ac7629f4663a3f0fd906ad65248 | atlassian-domain-verification=3a8ss/mhAfz9ZvhwvblSXDkhMKabBZqO2Zr1LSDuPmn/KGuvAigMrdTTi9JBS/8B | pardot488621=84fdab179da841fa256bab7d4ff1b84aeba05c83b212d394450dc984a2545c68pardot588233=1e683439a3ceab3c3e54bd1f1d0c133ebad3e6b13d7a48c9f3c3e4cf16db9f72 | postman-domain-verification=6831e6f66c7629f8eaf4ccdcf2067bf88a6b33053ded138cab05c7f28919e974321611266230a9a97e838fb41c3f457af62ebca5a5d3f3a064e20f55d1ab1545 | v=spf1 a mx include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:aspmx.pardot.com include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:mail.zendesk.com include:_spf.salesforce.com ~all
TXT_dmarc.cognism.comv=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_report@cognism.com,mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email; ruf=mailto:dmarc_report@cognism.com; fo=1:d:s; pct=100; ri=172800; adkim=r; aspf=r
CAAcognism.com0 iodef "mailto:security@cognism.com" | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "comodoca.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "ssl.com" | 0 issuewild "amazon.com" | 0 issuewild "comodoca.com" | 0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issuewild "sectigo.com" | 0 issuewild "ssl.com"
DScognism.com2371 13 2 44e3e6e1f689e8f8e31c21faf87af81629ee6ef66b85012408819e17dbf21e94
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain