Digital exposure report
db.com
Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.
Scanned: 2026-11-15 19:22 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run
This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://db.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- 2.
Turn on DNS signing for your domain
Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.
Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider
How to verify after the fix
dig +short DS db.com
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- db.com
- Website request
- GET https://db.com/ → https://www.db.com/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-15 19:22:33 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 29/30 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 13/30 | Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 8/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.MediumHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+4
- 2.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 3.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
- 4.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
- 5.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.
~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 0 of 10 DNS lookups.
v=spf1 ip4:160.83.0.0/16 ~all
$ dig +short TXT db.com
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.
Policy p=reject.
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com,mailto:dmarc.reports@db.com
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.db.com
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: s1, s2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0+M8/Lz0ZtrLs5gXWkzabVgY1enzaF6H… s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDIjxMxkWNIlvKZLAYaln/NXr1caf7aED0C1jV1…
$ dig +short TXT s1._domainkey.db.com
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
7 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
10 smtp12.db.com 10 smtp14.db.com 10 smtp13.db.com 10 smtp24.db.com 10 smtp22.db.com 15 smtp23.db.com 10 smtp15.db.com
$ dig +short MX db.com
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://db.com/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.db.com/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://www.db.com/
$ curl -sIL https://db.com/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 301 → https://db.com:443/
HTTP 301 Location: https://db.com:443/
$ curl -sI http://db.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: DigiCert, expiring 2027-06-01 (198 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: DigiCert Valid from: 2026-11-15 Valid until: 2027-06-01 Names: db.com, prodredirect.db.com, www.db.com Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect db.com:443 -servername db.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 4/8Encryption enforcement is set for too short a time.
max-age=3600 (0 days), includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=3600;includeSubDomains
$ curl -sIL https://db.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
- Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
- Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
- Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/* Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.
CSP — protection from script injection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.
No Content-Security-Policy header found.
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://db.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://db.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
X-Content-Type-Options
Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.
nosniff is set.
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://db.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Referrer-Policy
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://db.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
- Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/* Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://db.com/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://db.com/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS db.com: NODATA
$ dig +short DS db.com
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec db.com SOA delv db.com
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issuewild ";" | 0 issue "quovadisglobal.com" | 0 issue "globalsign.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com"
0 issue "amazon.com" 0 issuewild ";" 0 issue "quovadisglobal.com" 0 issue "globalsign.com" 0 issue "digicert.com"
$ dig +short CAA db.com
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
9 NS servers.
ns11.db-dns.com ns13.db-dns.com ns15.db-dns.com ns10.db-dns.de ns12.db-dns.de ns14.db-dns.de ns2.db-dns.com ns1.db-dns.de ns3.db-dns.de
$ dig +short NS db.com
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
- PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | db.com | 34.120.22.144 |
| AAAA | db.com | — |
| MX | db.com | 10 smtp12.db.com | 10 smtp14.db.com | 10 smtp13.db.com | 10 smtp24.db.com | 10 smtp22.db.com | 15 smtp23.db.com | 10 smtp15.db.com |
| NS | db.com | ns11.db-dns.com | ns13.db-dns.com | ns15.db-dns.com | ns10.db-dns.de | ns12.db-dns.de | ns14.db-dns.de | ns2.db-dns.com | ns1.db-dns.de | ns3.db-dns.de |
| TXT | db.com | jpg4mDPzjFsb1WB6pRbXL2ZN90QRtGhKwcQAVnLT6Xs= | QuoVadis=83836e67-d3bb-42bf-8b35-162af34db768 | apple-domain-verification=Bi9q52e7UmnGKsjy | _globalsign-domain-verification=US4TYJ9f9FDBrNdeqpGLr6ZUUH4OM56S8oQje1wE-H | QuoVadis=48509f83-4123-486b-80ce-1026da852815 | 00DKO000000H0CD=1TBKO000000Gmap | 0D25000000HC3n=1TBKH000000000G;00DKG000001G1Sl=1TBKG000000KylI;00DKL000000H0YA=1TBKL000000000m;00DKG000000LBOc=1TBKG0000008OIe;00D7E000000Amn6=1TBKO000000CaRC | 00D0O000000reHt=1TBKC000000oLkj | google-site-verification=c9kQxLLWwNJ1zVNelvCe2tquJrLikBipCoyFrrV8VPw | pexip-ms-tenant-domain-verification=9f599f8e-b982-44c2-a563-733f53652d58 | atlassian-domain-verification=84JXpQBhAhzPjiM1wU0GlHuC/ky7JExmSHsdduuggeRfV0Mhzt1hqxE6b2cdusS8 | zFSjiNgPRk8FttdelKTV33ESlf2AoEIcf9gyieQnzasDPtFM6UAglk3GVv1kKVNvriGv5z2p3IKQTAmfOJh6jQ== | 00D7Y0000001RKh=1TBKE000000GmaO | 00D590000000MMu=1TBDk0000004CAf | zaU3GmK84cVY+XTX0KpAodECpvZv1evp5eDhPx/H2lPOGx2z1PnF9UnlKi8q5ye2fQ60uQb8U15vSKIX5H495A== | _globalsign-domain-verification=Vg1C9KB2JsBNtPy6ucvXwCGkT_dcFTZnMLQIqJ3HNE | 00D3O0000008mml=1TBKI000000KyjQ | 00DKI000000LGRp=1TBKI0000004CAL | d23a42a29b0840028a4af1557b98572f | 00DKE000000GyaW=1TBKE000000CaSu | 00D7Q000002Aomw=1TBJ60000004CAQ | figma-domain-verification=b683db153c43e78d2735c4d9bf4b82b7344d60c58587cf4217fb72c17af7479f-1723563559 | anthropic-domain-verification-tke0x3=y0CxHlsHHvFrCgpd2d7N0qZI1 | 00DJ6000001HRk7=1TBJ6000000000V | v=spf1 ip4:160.83.0.0/16 ~all | 00D200000000sKb=1TBKA000000Gma9 | 00DKJ000000LGEM=1TBKJ000000CaSM | adobe-idp-site-verification=266841ad46f6a04739ecddfbc4c697b53bb31eda59acd14b65310c0601c5ccd2 | 00DKG000000Gyeu=1TBKG000000000k | 00D4L000000jV6d=1TBJ9000000PAsm | QuoVadis=5bb6360c-7e69-4c23-900f-71ee79ef3351 | 00DKN0000000t5B=1TBKN000000Gmad | QuoVadis=3e58dca1-dd1c-41c7-96e7-92338816c762 | 00DKN0000001V7F=1TBKN0000004CAV | new-relic-domain-verification=6814daddb8c6477db31bf81d7185a987 | GCY2GABHZbRGfSmxtluT | new-relic-domain-verification=137e43072d41470a854b41b90da97c48 | 00DKJ000000LMV8=1TBKJ000000GmbW | 00DKJ000000Gyf0=1TBKJ000000GmbH | QuoVadis=5608ca33-3315-48bc-a04e-2c413c3038ef | 00DKI000000H0Wz=1TBKI000000000k | 00D0Y000001jgp6=1TBJ7000000TN1x | docusign=c2f928f1-7ede-41a1-bf8f-d2950667dab8 | docusign=76cef473-9b56-48fa-9f15-e60e674a3f66 | docker-verification=db44e2a4-eec3-460a-8891-9b6cf83c21ec | _globalsign-domain-verification=5YGDN9fG5Os2kPBJn1cpuiMDnj59t7eg6-NMb8UTJr | wlk48r6lmwm6sxsfnrhhpflbyxg9krrk | 00D580000004Akk=1TBJ8000000fxVU | QuoVadis=9a3e7de8-d044-492f-a47d-686e10d79be6 | adobe-idp-site-verification=ebd1b7c0129651c3c2c80e1d73e2a90e482cec20967920f87bd30a70728d0873 | 1Bj9e2QZSyxn5sGh7Qi5CG9tBn3m | QuoVadis=7e856ef0-6a07-4454-a320-05abc34d4d41 | google-site-verification=TfEbVn0BMIyKDZMGvyj5p6l3gruzN74lchZ2TjqZNxo | 00DKI000000H0GK=1TBKI000000KykO | pexip-ms-tenant-domain-verification=value1,9f599f8e-b982-44c2-a563-733f53652d58 | g1smq76hsdvy86z400wkkdyqr9vw4mw4 | 00D300000000ZSR=1TBKk000000KyjB | QuoVadis=b46d77b0-bd9e-4c18-9c9f-d804d3d37169 | facebook-domain-verification=z9wptfi6z583vs2l8t5wk6zypq0ddf | MS=ms94849899 | 00DKI000000LIe6=1TBKI000000001Y |
| TXT | _dmarc.db.com | v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com,mailto:dmarc.reports@db.com |
| CAA | db.com | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issuewild ";" | 0 issue "quovadisglobal.com" | 0 issue "globalsign.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" |
| DS | db.com | — |