Digital exposure report
docker.com
Good shape, with a few gaps worth closing this quarter.
Scanned: 2026-11-19 02:59 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run
This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://docker.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- 2.
Turn on DNS signing for your domain
Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.
Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider
How to verify after the fix
dig +short DS docker.com
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- docker.com
- Website request
- GET https://docker.com/ → https://www.docker.com/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-19 02:59:36 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 28/30 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 21/30 | Some browser protections are missing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 8/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 2.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.
Valid SPF record with -all. 5 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:spf.tipalti.com include:_spf.salesforce.com include:mktomail.com include:mail.zendesk.com -all
$ dig +short TXT docker.com
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 13/15Forged email in the company's name is sent to the spam folder.
Policy p=quarantine. p=quarantine — consider moving to p=reject.
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:q1xwnepx@ag.dmarcian.com; ruf=mailto:q1xwnepx@fr.dmarcian.com;
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.docker.com
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: google, k1, s1, s2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
google._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA1SYxwEYAH9K843fYruoqdpK2z+nw… k1._domainkey: k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDbNrX2cY/GUKIFx2G/1I00ftdAj713WP9AQ1xir85i8… s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAwKz2kTqeXVjqO07haf9OJY3Pn6w2XaZB… s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCjJZgTj2iz8Lgltl1SX48DAgMQoKEe/erz3t0q…
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.docker.com
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
5 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
1 aspmx.l.google.com 10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com 10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com 5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
$ dig +short MX docker.com
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://docker.com/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.docker.com/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://www.docker.com/
$ curl -sIL https://docker.com/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 301 → https://www.docker.com/
HTTP 301 Location: https://www.docker.com/
$ curl -sI http://docker.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: Amazon Trust Services, expiring 2027-03-30 (131 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: Amazon Trust Services Valid from: 2026-09-14 Valid until: 2027-03-30 Names: *.cloud-stage.docker.com, *.cloud.docker.com, *.docker.com, *.docker.io, *.hub.docker.com, docker.com Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect docker.com:443 -servername docker.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/8Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.
max-age=31622400 (366 days), no includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31622400
$ curl -sIL https://docker.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
CSP — protection from script injection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.
No Content-Security-Policy header found.
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://docker.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://docker.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
X-Content-Type-Options
Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.
nosniff is set.
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://docker.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Referrer-Policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
$ curl -sIL https://docker.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Permissions-Policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 2/2The site restricts access to sensitive browser features.
Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=(), fullscreen=(self "https://www.youtube.com"), payment=()
Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=(), fullscreen=(self "https://www.youtube.com"), payment=()
$ curl -sIL https://docker.com/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://docker.com/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS docker.com: NODATA
$ dig +short DS docker.com
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec docker.com SOA delv docker.com
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 iodef "mailto:infra+caa-iodef@docker.com" | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "comodoca.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "pki.goog" | 0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 iodef "mailto:infra+caa-iodef@docker.com" 0 issue "amazon.com" 0 issue "comodoca.com" 0 issue "digicert.com" 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" 0 issue "pki.goog" 0 issue "sectigo.com"
$ dig +short CAA docker.com
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
4 NS servers.
ns-1289.awsdns-33.org ns-1981.awsdns-55.co.uk ns-207.awsdns-25.com ns-568.awsdns-07.net
$ dig +short NS docker.com
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
- PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence1 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline1 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | docker.com | 23.185.0.4 |
| AAAA | docker.com | 2620:12a:8000::4 | 2620:12a:8001::4 |
| MX | docker.com | 1 aspmx.l.google.com | 10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com | 10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com | 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com | 5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com |
| NS | docker.com | ns-1289.awsdns-33.org | ns-1981.awsdns-55.co.uk | ns-207.awsdns-25.com | ns-568.awsdns-07.net |
| TXT | docker.com | MS=ms42223923 | MS=ms98031138 | adobe-idp-site-verification=a8d1a71d0cba44c2521bcb451d9dc708ee20d93c7b5b04791f699d128bbe6ec2 | airtable-verification=7f122efe7db6b16848108e469042c39c | anthropic-domain-verification-p1ks1q=BmUzJzzDzqNXVWLXmZVoEvTr3 | apple-domain-verification=S580UenDqcwy2I1X | astro-domain-verification=cljrj1fgz00hm01lvtaq65gnn | atlassian-domain-verification=I1f5bgOm9sPUEcK/2JTD6weNlWt+Wwsyo5dwvJe1fGjf9V+x3kyqxZRrl9z7ILEK | cursor-domain-verification-pkwbtp=KD6kIrkeudCadzeviiVJgEWnd | d0vcwvtyam | detectify-verification=87a64c3bf3301354588d90672bd1b74e | docker-verification=4b72827b-32c1-4fe6-a843-2256c0df8a31 | docusign=aeb25cd4-f743-4efc-b6fb-b8bc5dd1d0e8 | google-site-verification=4PyKLfy_lowkc_qcu-byUkmF1kxAUT7tfho7ZiP353s | google-site-verification=5e33xBJIwW1XU49IqmIYtN7yi2Iq0GNnWwN4ujn4G_M | google-site-verification=CFmV0geNs1hCxK0mBEpjWaDoNwBIiDxIRjTvt3YGRDM | google-site-verification=GjEZ_3KyjpDbmRzGdMUtqMeuXdh7HCSc8uRsPGYL-I0 | google-site-verification=Nyiwo5q4kkaD5V-sEiXsW74HXyVRtKVyxYFfZuFLG7M | google-site-verification=VbuWA5NflxQMko2x9BJFIPVYrbuxHQll4UP4gZ4Fm08 | google-site-verification=i6hYWAXRYCtHNnyiQAYXiy_4StkAMJQiNCfH-3olY-I | google-site-verification=rCKOZlVmB_xuu9DiT-urSmmXAEUGn5RI8PxdyCW5LJg | jamf-site-verification=jqNgc5MzMp4UnSANweyyEQ | miro-verification=116f0987438eb5a48c070e080a68e7d7b3087e5f | onetrust-domain-verification=fb12882ae6344670a7b91077bd57c0f1 | openai-domain-verification=dv-tj9VEsgExQvdNl9SCOa2Awju | opine-verification=14d8ea53-d8ae-406f-93b0-76dc879d9b46 | sinch-domain-verification=d8a66194-44cf-49c3-96ab-74325ad6e7be | sonatype-domain-verification=OSSRH-62474 | stripe-verification=804359af3a919b4a46343227e384abdf33e10ad5bb81ea9f1d17ed4e74486ab4 | v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:spf.tipalti.com include:_spf.salesforce.com include:mktomail.com include:mail.zendesk.com -all | zapier-domain-verification-challenge=c3e7ddaf-20bf-40ca-9374-1a917b16be06 |
| TXT | _dmarc.docker.com | v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:q1xwnepx@ag.dmarcian.com; ruf=mailto:q1xwnepx@fr.dmarcian.com; |
| CAA | docker.com | 0 iodef "mailto:infra+caa-iodef@docker.com" | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "comodoca.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "pki.goog" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" |
| DS | docker.com | — |