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Digital exposure report

economist.com

Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.

Scanned: 2026-11-15 19:22 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

C
79/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Tell browsers to always use the secure version

    Helps browsers use HTTPS on future visits after they have received the policy.

    Who can fix it: Your web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sIL https://economist.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
  2. 2.

    Turn on DNS signing for your domain

    Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short DS economist.com

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
economist.com
Website request
GET https://economist.com/ → https://www.economist.com/
Scan time
2026-11-15 19:22:46 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
None. Every applicable check was assessed.

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security27/30Spoofing email from this domain is hard.
Encryption & certificate25/25Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid.
Browser protections19/30Some browser protections are missing.
DNS infrastructure8/15The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.HighHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+8
  2. 2.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
  3. 3.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10

An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.

~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 6 of 10 DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT economist.com
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:amazonses.com include:_spf.salesforce.com include:servers.mcsv.net include:spfa.cpmails.com include:spf1.economist.com ~all
$ dig +short TXT economist.com
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 13/15

Forged email in the company's name is sent to the spam folder.

Policy p=quarantine. p=quarantine — consider moving to p=reject.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.economist.com
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:rua-import-31438@sendforensics.com
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.economist.com
Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: google, k1, s1, s2, mail. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.economist.com
google._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAj8FuOB1HouvuKjvoH8Bj9wyMg/MR…
k1._domainkey: k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDbNrX2cY/GUKIFx2G/1I00ftdAj713WP9AQ1xir85i8…
s1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCcyh2IsJvNuBpBERQaak7vKGykb7hGSM8T…
s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCzV4WqaxDkW7bwguIWJAnqAeKUtXzq3W6iy1FH…
mail._domainkey: k=rsa;\010p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDeMVIzrCa3T14JsNY0IRv5/2V1/v2itlviLQBwXs…
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.economist.com
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

5 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX economist.com
1 aspmx.l.google.com
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com
10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com
$ dig +short MX economist.com
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://economist.com/ returned HTTP 403 (final URL: https://www.economist.com/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://economist.com/
HTTP 403
Final URL: https://www.economist.com/
$ curl -sIL https://economist.com/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.

HTTP 301 → https://www.economist.com/

Source data: HTTP GET http://economist.com/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 301
Location: https://www.economist.com/
$ curl -sI http://economist.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: GoDaddy, expiring 2027-02-07 (83 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for economist.com
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: GoDaddy
Valid from: 2026-01-06
Valid until: 2027-02-07
Names: *.economist.com, economist.com
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect economist.com:443 -servername economist.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/8

Browsers aren't told to always use an encrypted connection, enabling interception attacks on public networks.

No Strict-Transport-Security header. Users are exposed to SSL stripping on the first request.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.economist.com/
Strict-Transport-Security: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://economist.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
  2. Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
  3. Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/*
  Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.

Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8

A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.

script-src includes: 'unsafe-eval' — weakens XSS protection.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.economist.com/
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; script-src 'nonce-gNHz59OqrDJOxaRKLr58bj' 'unsafe-eval' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; script-src-attr 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; connect-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; frame-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com blob:; child-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com blob:; worker-src blob:; form-action http: https:; base-uri 'self'
$ curl -sIL https://economist.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Source data: Response headers from https://www.economist.com/
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://economist.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4

The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.

nosniff is set.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.economist.com/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://economist.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy: same-origin

Source data: Response headers from https://www.economist.com/
Referrer-Policy: same-origin
$ curl -sIL https://economist.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 2/2

The site restricts access to sensitive browser features.

Permissions-Policy: accelerometer=(),camera=(),clipboard-read=(),clipboard-write=(),geolocation=(),gyroscope=(),hid=(),magnetometer=(),microphone=(),payment=(),publickey-credential

Source data: Response headers from https://www.economist.com/
Permissions-Policy: accelerometer=(),camera=(),clipboard-read=(),clipboard-write=(),geolocation=(),gyroscope=(),hid=(),magnetometer=(),microphone=(),payment=(),publickey-credentials-get=(),screen-wake-lock=(),serial=(),sync-xhr=(),usb=(),xr-spatial-tracking=*
$ curl -sIL https://economist.com/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.economist.com/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://economist.com/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS economist.com: NODATA
$ dig +short DS economist.com
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec economist.com SOA
delv economist.com

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.

CAA records: 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "amazontrust.com" | 0 issue "awstrust.com" | 0 issue "amazonaws.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "pki.goog" | 0 issue "godaddy.com"

Source data: DNS CAA economist.com
0 issue "amazon.com"
0 issue "amazontrust.com"
0 issue "awstrust.com"
0 issue "amazonaws.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issue "pki.goog"
0 issue "godaddy.com"
$ dig +short CAA economist.com
Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

4 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS economist.com
dns1.p02.nsone.net
dns2.p02.nsone.net
dns3.p02.nsone.net
dns4.p02.nsone.net
$ dig +short NS economist.com
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
  • PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Aeconomist.com104.18.42.19 | 172.64.145.237
AAAAeconomist.com—
MXeconomist.com1 aspmx.l.google.com | 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com | 5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com | 10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com | 10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com
NSeconomist.comdns1.p02.nsone.net | dns2.p02.nsone.net | dns3.p02.nsone.net | dns4.p02.nsone.net
TXTeconomist.comv=spf2.0/pra a mx include:spf.rimanggis.com ~all | google-site-verification=6JINqi8eBX4Cq2IQuMDqx-zcEVrqIGsUwn67akjL_NQ | _globalsign-domain-verification=h7hNxzyjxWcMmQGgdPl1sYiG5V-Bjrl_CsJqpKbIU4 | _globalsign-domain-verification=_MvaGBHROp0lO8jfRBlUhVvNlSY3UqwMW2MKrFQD0j | google-site-verification=-IZ_bGbCMjxT7R9muUSQC8U2CmTbX4Jl-xXf5kkqzeA | google-site-verification=J-5vS04lUpwFu33fb1lVeIiM0fhsBtzi5O-C3lhtPfU | google-site-verification=Qb5YYUgxi34zMjL_BuQQ_Najf2Rw51HKl3CRIL43Pcc | google-site-verification=umYQJmRxpXTIiMNaF4IsR6apNajC4YwAQ0098xDaU3k | google-site-verification=w_R93wx06QyNfts4iAvHnfcVpRQkm-WpiBg_xs26kxk | MS=24621E8BD1E72EEF43C436A16E7DA57F77130691 | globalsign-domain-verification=YHnWXL-7NA_q79ZvMwQDblw1lRYrh6nXXIoWOab5Fd | 21inh0ishkm6dc2p9vk3qlam0l | v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:amazonses.com include:_spf.salesforce.com include:servers.mcsv.net include:spfa.cpmails.com include:spf1.economist.com ~all | adobe-idp-site-verification=fe3563308082627876b00fed079b9b07fa742f53e1dbad27a04d4066c84e4e52 | facebook-domain-verification=2i21rtf1fbvf27qxahaf05x68twhjy | cloudhealth=056432f7-cc47-40f2-a7ff-f94e38ab420e | ca3-b658fbd113a84fc7a2457785e2a028cb | google-site-verification=QbYbPDNp9mefRCIxiwdP-pwbPHZdRB2ULKa5W-8WJlw | miro-verification=f342c1be96026976f75e811e572741cd2b7dc4cf | ca3-397b89c6332644339a66e5474039efb1 | qb506uja0p70oalro6ufvvqgt8 | 4971555iboa4dcf2se7ndmucc | docker-verification=b3049f71-60ff-4ab5-8e4b-af12071ad9ef | google-site-verification=dzY0WjX5aDMkfAz45NIzTiq4STvJFQVLKardBINrGdU | docusign=b54578ae-aff9-4dea-834d-db831e2aa957 | UK-federation-domain-verification=d262373b2f27d3cad1db8a568d706c79 | google-site-verification=SjXraZgTJjBr9KW8fGa51r5znTl_bHN0l_l-HryKg0c | duo_sso_verification=M08QexH6Mc7fVPS7jsm3WEdvzoVJZz18LlXKjgCyGE39wQQXycZ0H1VKzu34KD3T | ca3-3bc5fae524474e949511aadca9ffb68d | openai-domain-verification=dv-ihHQTdhnTvKLha6AwMHkRkXz | ff9e2be8158dcbdc8f4cc0ff3a7aac77005532d6f7817d8798 | zoho-verification=zb52015705.zmverify.zoho.e | new-relic-domain-verification=6ed4883fe01f4350a7c2d6e4b70440ac | 1c1f838c-c20e-4116-b628-2fd519dfc4f3 | atlassian-domain-verification=ijxvw3ZV5ymQqnxv80sk3KF8m68Y5zejPUmA24aR3X1gDYFZLr1KJnthnreXeb3O | 1password-site-verification=LMMTFIQ3UNB4PHRN4PIDK3XRYY | tollbit-domain-verification=a4ca26ee57be1d61750a8376fd838114dfc91be8c429fdf9c09590cba54b046a | lucidlink-verification=87PF6BE3MBWNVC1A1HSPVEYFBM | stripe-verification=89A5BEC017BC1A0474BEB086C5CD9ED1C5064FEC53663120E30568AD843E5350 | cursor-domain-verification-62734j=SxJ3sl8QlA292FmfZ1F5ITe71 | lucidlink-verification=DF38QZV72ECT76YYFSM1MZQZR8 | anthropic-domain-verification-zzt4eb=hxHesCzVCR69nkH6qtjvnMN87 | OPE0071241 | _998iskp70idb7xlds6nagvu9g13yf8d | datadome-domain-verify=tjdVhvbvz12jNxbmlOOatTgehZm77CeH | zapier-domain-verification-challenge=604101c4-7d18-4eba-9f97-e535b8388d34
TXT_dmarc.economist.comv=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:rua-import-31438@sendforensics.com
CAAeconomist.com0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "amazontrust.com" | 0 issue "awstrust.com" | 0 issue "amazonaws.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "pki.goog" | 0 issue "godaddy.com"
DSeconomist.com—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain