Digital exposure report
hamad.qa
Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.
Scanned: 2026-11-20 07:34 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Tell browsers to always use the secure version
Helps browsers use HTTPS on future visits after they have received the policy.
Who can fix it: Your web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://hamad.qa/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
- 2.
Turn on DNS signing for your domain
Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.
Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider
How to verify after the fix
dig +short DS hamad.qa
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- hamad.qa
- Website request
- GET https://hamad.qa/ → https://hamad.qa/EN/Pages/default.aspx
- Scan time
- 2026-11-20 07:34:35 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 30/30 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 14/30 | Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 8/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.HighHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+8
- 2.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 3.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
- 4.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
- 5.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.
Valid SPF record with -all. 3 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.
v=spf1 a mx ip4:213.130.112.11 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
$ dig +short TXT hamad.qa
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.
Policy p=reject.
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc-rua@hamad.qa
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.hamad.qa
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: selector1. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
selector1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDf0jQoS/pTZBfNx1KqF7qYADT2cSqiIPCX…
$ dig +short TXT selector1._domainkey.hamad.qa
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
1 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
0 hamad-qa.mail.protection.outlook.com
$ dig +short MX hamad.qa
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://hamad.qa/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://hamad.qa/EN/Pages/default.aspx). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://hamad.qa/EN/Pages/default.aspx
$ curl -sIL https://hamad.qa/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 302 → https://www.hamad.qa/
HTTP 302 Location: https://www.hamad.qa/
$ curl -sI http://hamad.qa/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: Sectigo, expiring 2027-06-01 (193 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: Sectigo Valid from: 2026-11-15 Valid until: 2027-06-01 Names: hamad.qa, hmcbtexpe.hamad.qa Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect hamad.qa:443 -servername hamad.qa 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/8Browsers aren't told to always use an encrypted connection, enabling interception attacks on public networks.
No Strict-Transport-Security header. Users are exposed to SSL stripping on the first request.
Strict-Transport-Security: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://hamad.qa/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
- Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
- Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
- Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/* Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.
CSP — protection from script injection
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.
script-src includes: no script-src/default-src — weakens XSS protection.
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' teams.microsoft.com *.teams.microsoft.com *.skype.com *.teams.microsoft.us local.teams.office.com *.powerapps.com *.yammer.com *.officeapps.live.com *.office.com *.stream.azure-test.net *.microsoftstream.com *.dynamics.com *.microsoft.com onedrive.live.com *.onedrive.live.com;
$ curl -sIL https://hamad.qa/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN frame-ancestors 'self' teams.microsoft.com *.teams.microsoft.com *.skype.com *.teams.microsoft.us local.teams.office.com *.powerapps.com *.yammer.com *.officeapps.live.com *.office.com *.stream.azure-test.net *.microsoftstream.com *.dynamics.com *.microsoft.com onedrive.live.com *.onedrive.live.com
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN CSP frame-ancestors: 'self' teams.microsoft.com *.teams.microsoft.com *.skype.com *.teams.microsoft.us local.teams.office.com *.powerapps.com *.yammer.com *.officeapps.live.com *.office.com *.stream.azure-test.net *.microsoftstream.com *.dynamics.com *.microsoft.com onedrive.live.com *.onedrive.live.com
$ curl -sIL https://hamad.qa/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
X-Content-Type-Options
Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.
nosniff is set.
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://hamad.qa/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Referrer-Policy
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://hamad.qa/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
- Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/* Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://hamad.qa/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://hamad.qa/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS hamad.qa: NODATA
$ dig +short DS hamad.qa
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec hamad.qa SOA delv hamad.qa
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 issuemail "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "emsign.com" | 0 issuewild "sectigo.com"
0 issuemail "sectigo.com" 0 issue "sectigo.com" 0 issue "emsign.com" 0 issuewild "sectigo.com"
$ dig +short CAA hamad.qa
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
2 NS servers.
ns2.hmc.org.qa ns1.hmc.org.qa
$ dig +short NS hamad.qa
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
- PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | hamad.qa | 20.173.26.56 |
| AAAA | hamad.qa | — |
| MX | hamad.qa | 0 hamad-qa.mail.protection.outlook.com |
| NS | hamad.qa | ns2.hmc.org.qa | ns1.hmc.org.qa |
| TXT | hamad.qa | F4OvAqEM1unMPdKTLDYN3W4Wj/Oqa2rhpSBWX4XILPz7cLfNWs/WW01WPbW+xNfqI3Lbnzvh/b3zJIgb7fRsVQ== | google-site-verification=XkOGSpUoTuutofX5obzlNs86jOqN5FGHZdYb53-Skx0 | google-gws-recovery-domain-verification=57599816 | google-site-verification=VfeF-QhGWpuQjC33nxhB_si-tds4Lotqhyvci8IiAsY | v=spf1 a mx ip4:213.130.112.11 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all | cisco-ci-domain-verification=532ee936c30e0a2c6656541f3c872a7efb9fe5df168932d2da8ec8abe04e64c7 | adobe-idp-site-verification=0dc8104b620b383baa719b76e5b1b4cb79c25e1e1f6cd990fe25ccd07242a51f | MS=ms43425046 | google-site-verification=3GvXtlY5f0WP-XiP3oxx5UYCWgpKxzK-kctbHntwVh8 | 7B4DA7305BD3421218643E391405E6D2 |
| TXT | _dmarc.hamad.qa | v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc-rua@hamad.qa |
| CAA | hamad.qa | 0 issuemail "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "emsign.com" | 0 issuewild "sectigo.com" |
| DS | hamad.qa | — |