Digital exposure report
here.com
Good shape, with a few gaps worth closing this quarter.
Scanned: 2026-11-19 02:59 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Turn on DNS signing for your domain
Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.
Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider
How to verify after the fix
dig +short DS here.com
- 2.
Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run
This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://here.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- here.com
- Website request
- GET https://here.com/ → https://www.here.com/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-19 02:59:38 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 28/30 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 25/30 | The site instructs browsers to block common attacks. |
| DNS infrastructure | 8/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 2.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
- 3.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.
Valid SPF record with -all. 2 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.
v=spf1 exists:%{i}._i.%{d}._d.espf.agari-dns.net include:%{d}.78.spf-protect.agari-dns.net -all$ dig +short TXT here.com
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 13/15Forged email in the company's name is sent to the spam folder.
Policy p=quarantine. p=quarantine — consider moving to p=reject.
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; pct=100; ri=3600; rua=mailto:here@rua.agari.com; ruf=mailto:here@ruf.agari.com
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.here.com
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: selector2, k1, s1, s2, dkim, mail. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
selector2._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC7A7uXgglQo44QraXusVoZ7CRasXwnFx+1… k1._domainkey: k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDbNrX2cY/GUKIFx2G/1I00ftdAj713WP9AQ1xir85i8… s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA3csYlOflkX/D+XyVJQGAlSaTI+oodsAb… s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDaRAger1FTKNMlTn1rfNHXwBuG6Ax8yl55beTA… dkim._domainkey: v=DKIM1;k=rsa;p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAu2gAtnNzEfzNxLKMcfPJuuFoocS/mM… mail._domainkey: k=rsa;p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDeMVIzrCa3T14JsNY0IRv5/2V1/v2itlviLQBwXsa7sh…
$ dig +short TXT selector2._domainkey.here.com
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
1 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
10 here-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
$ dig +short MX here.com
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://here.com/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.here.com/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://www.here.com/
$ curl -sIL https://here.com/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 301 → https://www.here.com:443/
HTTP 301 Location: https://www.here.com:443/
$ curl -sI http://here.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: GlobalSign, expiring 2027-05-20 (182 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: GlobalSign Valid from: 2026-11-02 Valid until: 2027-05-20 Names: *.developer.here.com, *.here.com, *.legal.here.com, cms.developer.here.com, dev.cms.developer.here.com, developer.mobility.here.com Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect here.com:443 -servername here.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.
max-age=63072000 (730 days), includeSubDomains, preload. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload
$ curl -sIL https://here.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
CSP — protection from script injection
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.
script-src includes: 'unsafe-inline', 'unsafe-eval' — weakens XSS protection.
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; font-src * 'self' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' data: *.gstatic.com *.vercel.app *.here.com *.googleapis.com; script-src 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' 'self' *.webforms-here.com *.marketo.net *.marketo.com marketo.com vercel.live cdn.jsdelivr.net *.googletagmanager.com *.vimeo.com vimeo.com *.youtube.com *.vidyard.com vidyard.com youtu.be *.akamaized.net *.tiqcdn.com *.bizible.com *.contently.com *.d41.co *.tealiumiq.com *.doubleclick.net *.ytimg.com *.ipdata.co *.here.com *.vercel.app *.onrecruit.net *.ads.linkedin.com *.omniconvert.com *.newrelic.com *.cloudflare.com *.vercel-scripts.com *.bing.com https://bzrcdn.openai.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' *.here.com *.marketo.com *.googleapis.com; connect-src 'self' *.d41.co *.google.com *.contently.com *.tealiumiq.com *.mktoresp.com *.ipdata.co *.hereapi.com blob: *.here.com *.demdex.net *.marketo.net ipapi.co *.vercel.app *.doubleclick.net *.linkedin.com *.omniconvert.com *.nr-data.net *.api.here.com *.hereapi.com *.algolia.net *.algolianet.com *.algolia.io *.mktoutil.com https://bzr.openai.com https://bzrcdn.openai.com; img-src * 'self' blob: data: https://bzr.openai.com; frame-ancestors 'self' website.webforms-here.com app.contentful.com; worker-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' blob:; child-src 'none'; object-src 'none'; frame-src 'self' *.webforms-here.com *.marketo.com *.marketo.net vercel.live *.googletagmanager.com *.vimeo.com vimeo.com *.youtube.com youtube.com youtu.be *.akamaized.net *.vidyard.com *.tags.tiqcdn.com *.contently.com *.doubleclick.net *.fls.doubleclick.net *.here.com flo.uri.sh *.flourish.studio javascript-apis.vercel.app here-rest-apis.vercel.app hxp-here-fleet-calculator.vercel.app *.widen.net *.kaltura.com here-legal-data-subject-request-for.vercel.app here-legal-wifi-optout-form.vercel.app https://d2b1e83rw2kk9t.cloudfront.net;
$ curl -sIL https://here.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN frame-ancestors 'self' website.webforms-here.com app.contentful.com
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN CSP frame-ancestors: 'self' website.webforms-here.com app.contentful.com
$ curl -sIL https://here.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
X-Content-Type-Options
Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.
nosniff is set.
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://here.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Referrer-Policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
$ curl -sIL https://here.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://here.com/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: Next.js
$ curl -sIL https://here.com/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS here.com: NODATA
$ dig +short DS here.com
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec here.com SOA delv here.com
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 iodef "mailto:security@here.com" | 0 issue "globalsign.com"
0 issue "amazon.com" 0 issue "digicert.com" 0 iodef "mailto:security@here.com" 0 issue "globalsign.com"
$ dig +short CAA here.com
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
12 NS servers.
ns2.heredns.com ns1.heredns.com a22-65.akam.net a12-67.akam.net a26-64.akam.net a7-65.akam.net a1-19.akam.net a3-67.akam.net dns4.p09.nsone.net dns3.p09.nsone.net dns2.p09.nsone.net dns1.p09.nsone.net
$ dig +short NS here.com
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
- PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence1 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline1 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | here.com | 76.223.8.8 | 13.248.132.24 |
| AAAA | here.com | — |
| MX | here.com | 10 here-com.mail.protection.outlook.com |
| NS | here.com | ns2.heredns.com | ns1.heredns.com | a22-65.akam.net | a12-67.akam.net | a26-64.akam.net | a7-65.akam.net | a1-19.akam.net | a3-67.akam.net | dns4.p09.nsone.net | dns3.p09.nsone.net | dns2.p09.nsone.net | dns1.p09.nsone.net |
| TXT | here.com | v=spf1 exists:%{i}._i.%{d}._d.espf.agari-dns.net include:%{d}.78.spf-protect.agari-dns.net -all | cisco-ci-domain-verification=33c6123c3592ec326c4b0d681446794d9538f89253d951f8011ec35c1474e206 | docusign=3a0d9103-d6cc-4cd7-bfbf-aee4ec88a966 | dropbox-domain-verification=txb9fya2axdg | 00d3000000002omeaq | 1b0f8b7e3fbaf34f9a9ffcf267508867312e1e56 | atlassian-domain-verification=knF3haFOOasaERvDLZ795cGspEEaz499y1dgADYbJfxONd95LVoHMl5WB0TF4Huh | logmein-verification-code=062d72cf-3a8e-4578-86b0-452a2f20001d | apple-domain-verification=IydNaiRpdDd67o0r | canva-site-verification=Eg27_3yfFZpMtCzlFVp2wA | atlassian-sending-domain-verification=f892bdc4-8d01-4515-9e95-3db2a1018109 | k=rsa;p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDQfJZX+lhjSK8lWu1hPKLI19UjJHpseso2l6ASGuRB4YZRgmcdQQsvKI2zg2t5Uzw5Q3rkYIGynC7IvQKRc9p6cu41P9PTLDEiDmRM+3kgxbk0FWjzchDR+vBe5n/0g3BZ6bpJp84eflYGQaTHLfLUpZSg6iBAn4fiYoSSQorzUwIDAQAB | asv=1481dffe886a8f6537847ca57a22160a | 2223ae76-c9dc-4163-9307-b8ee155dfdfe | docker-verification=6366f93c-684d-44d8-a76a-97971d130740 | google-site-verification=ovpTI1YuPdCpurXmNDz2eGlHY34CnRd3ftsLfRFk-c0 | adobe-idp-site-verification=ca61d106e0ad3cb38bc6258c8007e36dd2c3d9baea6ce421e8bd92bb264871d7 | Sendinblue-code:dfdedce690b4d15768bae4d243d89107 | google-site-verification=YPaVk3lUI0ka6AK1GyOOpbFVvxgYqB-5WDjmoT1JPro | atlassian-sending-domain-verification=a8b87eb2-63b0-4836-b8c2-0f4e32405904 | have-i-been-pwned-verification=dweb_3zebzhyptns2mtyxjcrwq3n0 | 6c944492-d556-4554-bd7e-1b2ff51ca59a | perplexity-ai-domain-verification-9ax2p6=Pblyo18NPFFDHyXpDSOTebuoS | uber-domain-verification=40f5bec1-6912-4f40-a0fb-649c0e4a364e | mandrill_verify.qN3HESgHxHApLmv1f9Okaw | anthropic-domain-verification-tktsqv=S8QyBonaZHMWXBiFPpVJcck73 | google-site-verification=eVEphaBV3aY_jTy1IujBOWAD4D9VggNTpX300JU25gE | google-gws-recovery-domain-verification=67087515 | _globalsign-domain-verification=9tlf4hEXlOaZqOFoowID-tBkfjgVsssho2br9vuOxR | google-gws-recovery-domain-verification=66630764 | lovable_verification=2wFA6olft03eS3c9ZN8y | _globalsign-domain-verification=VV8UyApFrEvCuO63fu8Mcx_viMOGCj41CR5I4pwd4u | lovable_email_verify=3f765a3cffb28f71a55cdbacad01567186c4b79dd336b8e7ce63a223d0c248d0 | vT7n0NUxaSwT2ZksI4nz8QaZRh6r3GCH | _globalsign-domain-verification=YJua1NF2TPfs-fJveClzpyAqb8WctH-35DZb_SXNdq |
| TXT | _dmarc.here.com | v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; pct=100; ri=3600; rua=mailto:here@rua.agari.com; ruf=mailto:here@ruf.agari.com |
| CAA | here.com | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 iodef "mailto:security@here.com" | 0 issue "globalsign.com" |
| DS | here.com | — |