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Digital exposure report

icc.edu

Critical findings in the observed public configuration. Some basic protections were not detected.

Scanned: 2026-11-18 01:55 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

F
59/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain

    Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.

    Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short TXT _dmarc.icc.edu
  2. 2.

    Tell browsers to always use the secure version

    Helps browsers use HTTPS on future visits after they have received the policy.

    Who can fix it: Your web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sIL https://icc.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
icc.edu
Website request
GET https://icc.edu/
Scan time
2026-11-18 01:55:53 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
None. Every applicable check was assessed.

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security19/30Spoofing email in the company's name is possible in some cases.
Encryption & certificate18/25Encryption is in place, but a gap could expose users.
Browser protections19/30Some browser protections are missing.
DNS infrastructure3/15The domain's infrastructure lacks basic protections.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.HighHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+8
  2. 2.HighHTTP → HTTPS redirect · Hardening gap+7
  3. 3.MediumDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+11
  4. 4.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
  5. 5.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+5
  6. 6.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.

Valid SPF record with -all. 7 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT icc.edu
v=spf1 ip4:162.247.135.8 ip4:176.31.145.254 ip4:139.60.98.9 ip4:149.72.196.149 ip4:64.135.51.70 include:amazonses.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:sendgrid.net include:spf-na.exlibrisgroup.com include:spf_.watermarkinsights.com include:_spf.salesforce.com include:_tuf-spf.touchnet.com -all
$ dig +short TXT icc.edu
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 4/15

DMARC is in monitoring mode only — forged email still reaches recipients.

Policy p=none. p=none collects reports but does not protect. No rua — no reports on spoofing attempts are received.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.icc.edu
v=DMARC1; p=none
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.icc.edu
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
  2. Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
  3. Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.icc.edu.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@icc.edu; fo=1"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.

Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: selector2, s1, s2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.icc.edu
selector2._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC6yDeETAj97XpdMPp13JebBIE4u7erjMqA…
s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA2hFcQzZTJDh/9M++lUOjrM6uFMJiFh8J…
s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDHsK5LweLPwBdvFvmpm9zitPj1q6yd4TjXkBlm…
$ dig +short TXT selector2._domainkey.icc.edu
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

1 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX icc.edu
0 icc-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com
$ dig +short MX icc.edu
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://icc.edu/ returned HTTP 403 (final URL: https://icc.edu/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://icc.edu/
HTTP 403
Final URL: https://icc.edu/
$ curl -sIL https://icc.edu/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/7

The site is also reachable over an unencrypted connection, so data may travel in plain text on public networks.

http://icc.edu/ returned HTTP 403 without redirecting to https://.

Source data: HTTP GET http://icc.edu/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 403
Location: (none)
$ curl -sI http://icc.edu/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set up a permanent (301) redirect from every HTTP request to HTTPS on the server or CDN.
  2. Then add an HSTS header.
server {
  listen 80;
  server_name icc.edu www.icc.edu;
  return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}

Safety: This change is made on your server. Make sure HTTPS works first, otherwise the site won't load.

Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: DigiCert, expiring 2027-03-14 (116 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for icc.edu
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: DigiCert
Valid from: 2026-08-28
Valid until: 2027-03-14
Names: *.icc.edu, icc.edu
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect icc.edu:443 -servername icc.edu 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/8

Browsers aren't told to always use an encrypted connection, enabling interception attacks on public networks.

No Strict-Transport-Security header. Users are exposed to SSL stripping on the first request.

Source data: Response headers from https://icc.edu/
Strict-Transport-Security: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://icc.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
  2. Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
  3. Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/*
  Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.

Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8

A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.

script-src includes: 'unsafe-eval' — weakens XSS protection.

Source data: Response headers from https://icc.edu/
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; script-src 'nonce-Dv3COdlEA2ctTrHT7JQUmN' 'unsafe-eval' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; script-src-attr 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; connect-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; frame-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com blob:; child-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com blob:; worker-src blob:; form-action http: https:; base-uri 'self'
$ curl -sIL https://icc.edu/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Source data: Response headers from https://icc.edu/
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://icc.edu/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4

The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.

nosniff is set.

Source data: Response headers from https://icc.edu/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://icc.edu/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy: same-origin

Source data: Response headers from https://icc.edu/
Referrer-Policy: same-origin
$ curl -sIL https://icc.edu/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 2/2

The site restricts access to sensitive browser features.

Permissions-Policy: accelerometer=(),camera=(),clipboard-read=(),clipboard-write=(),geolocation=(),gyroscope=(),hid=(),magnetometer=(),microphone=(),payment=(),publickey-credential

Source data: Response headers from https://icc.edu/
Permissions-Policy: accelerometer=(),camera=(),clipboard-read=(),clipboard-write=(),geolocation=(),gyroscope=(),hid=(),magnetometer=(),microphone=(),payment=(),publickey-credentials-get=(),screen-wake-lock=(),serial=(),sync-xhr=(),usb=(),xr-spatial-tracking=*
$ curl -sIL https://icc.edu/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://icc.edu/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://icc.edu/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS icc.edu: NODATA
$ dig +short DS icc.edu
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec icc.edu SOA
delv icc.edu

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA icc.edu
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA icc.edu
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
icc.edu.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
icc.edu.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@icc.edu"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

2 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS icc.edu
dana.ns.cloudflare.com
jay.ns.cloudflare.com
$ dig +short NS icc.edu
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps
  • PCI DSS v4.03 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence4 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline3 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Aicc.edu172.66.135.24 | 172.66.138.209
AAAAicc.edu2606:4700:10::ac42:8718 | 2606:4700:10::ac42:8ad1
MXicc.edu0 icc-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com
NSicc.edudana.ns.cloudflare.com | jay.ns.cloudflare.com
TXTicc.eduC3B526E6B6520A2530C408FE0C67556297132359 | MS=ms74403167 | _lpsgd94qrlqe59s1lau7z3plh6c49m0 | _vl0zes43vjpqqsh6i9bro3i2res3d7m | _wern9kjhd54rxxl8gbjlv79qehy5v3i | adobe-idp-site-verification=c32f33305e3cc2bd122b7f1b6270d1d24685606bbccb5844271c0ed195e80703 | amazonses:9STY0QKzxGtqYPPNJwxJG2urVZ/Uo2xtpWihZ8qen+w= | ca3-0dca566183bc4de5ac04543a2274a835 | canva-site-verification=G1nn0vGDs8SUjqnQtzU0-Q | coursera-domain-verification=2LX9U72AKfajkr9Ce6rjlbCSKBxmmCFYvIqBdl5X65Dh03cJDeFdsI5UWmVLRqpo | coursera-domain-verification=nNuEPuNiNNUQzFMqEsMxrqvPbYfRinSGI6PbYOmLHPgdS0rrdbfadUKUDIScrdHY | dB5urkNyv39VRDfzgRG4nTZCsv/t0W1Ql2ZzUj4g/bKCLGdFwgXfApUfE3F94Npd6wdYevkeHkGrHpk9t1KhkA== | google-site-verification=aZXG-qSYv8Z7RLWgU1KEQ-jk8SP-Z46ws58Y0XKNFhs | mkbln6b78fn91r0s4qj9x2brcx55hwf4 | pz38bgg2kt63dgmj7wj1b9chb5kg8ckl | v=spf1 ip4:162.247.135.8 ip4:176.31.145.254 ip4:139.60.98.9 ip4:149.72.196.149 ip4:64.135.51.70 include:amazonses.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:sendgrid.net include:spf-na.exlibrisgroup.com include:spf_.watermarkinsights.com include:_spf.salesforce.com include:_tuf-spf.touchnet.com -all
TXT_dmarc.icc.eduv=DMARC1; p=none
CAAicc.edu—
DSicc.edu—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain