Digital exposure report
ku.dk
Good shape, with a few gaps worth closing this quarter.
Scanned: 2026-11-18 01:55 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Stop other sites from embedding your pages
This removes one way to trick visitors into clicking something on your site unknowingly.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://ku.dk/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
- 2.
Stop browsers from guessing file types
This removes one way a file could be treated as something it is not.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://ku.dk/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- ku.dk
- Website request
- GET https://ku.dk/ → https://www.ku.dk/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-18 01:55:37 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 29/30 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 12/30 | Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 15/15 | The domain's infrastructure is well hardened. |
Fix priorities
- 1.MediumClickjacking protection · Hardening gap+5
- 2.LowX-Content-Type-Options · Hardening gap+4
- 3.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
- 4.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
- 5.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.
~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 4 of 10 DNS lookups.
v=spf1 ip4:193.162.253.130 include:bulk.spf.ku.dk include:spf.protection.outlook.com a:unicph-gw.ku.dk a:mail.npkhosting.dk ~all
$ dig +short TXT ku.dk
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.
Policy p=reject.
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; rua=mailto:upglztho@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com; ruf=mailto:upglztho@fr.eu.dmarcadvisor.com; pct=100; fo=1; ri=3600
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.ku.dk
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: selector1, default. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
selector1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDDnCJDdlqABA9yPnl0VDybSUcWfCIkRfzI… default._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC1khFB/sLAhraCMHC1AZa+BGkVMFosqUPP…
$ dig +short TXT selector1._domainkey.ku.dk
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
1 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
10 ku-dk.mail.protection.outlook.com
$ dig +short MX ku.dk
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://ku.dk/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.ku.dk/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://www.ku.dk/
$ curl -sIL https://ku.dk/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 301 → https://www.ku.dk/
HTTP 301 Location: https://www.ku.dk/
$ curl -sI http://ku.dk/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: Let's Encrypt, expiring 2027-01-18 (61 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: Let's Encrypt Valid from: 2026-10-20 Valid until: 2027-01-18 Names: ku.dk Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect ku.dk:443 -servername ku.dk 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/8Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.
max-age=31557600 (365 days), no includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31557600
$ curl -sIL https://ku.dk/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
CSP — protection from script injection
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.
script-src includes: 'unsafe-inline', 'unsafe-eval' — weakens XSS protection.
Content-Security-Policy: default-src *; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' report-sample https://cse.google.com https://video.ku.dk https://script.hotjar.com https://connect.facebook.net https://w.usabilla.com https://ss.studier.ku.dk https://kumain.containers.piwik.pro https://policy.app.cookieinformation.com 'report-sample'; style-src-attr 'unsafe-inline' 'report-sample'; img-src 'self' data: *.ytimg.com *.vimeocdn.com https://tile.openstreetmap.org https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com https://www.googletagmanager.com https://www.google.com https://www.google.fr https://clients1.google.com https://www.facebook.com https://ss.studies.ku.dk https://region1.analytics.google.com https://tr.snapchat.com https://adm.piwik.pro https://kumain.piwik.pro https://www2.adm.ku.dk https://www.ku.dk https://*.ku.dk; base-uri 'self'; frame-src 'self' *.youtube-nocookie.com *.youtube.com *.vimeo.com video.ku.dk https://*.cloudfront.net https://www.survey-xact.dk https://www.google.com https://pinecast.com https://syndicatedsearch.goog https://policy.app.cookieinformation.com https://facebook.com https://www.facebook.com https://ss.studier.ku.dk https://ss.studies.ku.dk https://tr.snapchat.com https://www.googletagmanager.com https://widget.spreaker.com https://player.simplecast.com https://embed.podcasts.apple.com https://www.podbean.com https://via.ritzau.dk https://embed.acast.com https://open.spotify.com; style-src-elem 'self' https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com https://www.google.com 'unsafe-inline' 'report-sample'; script-src-elem 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com https://customer.cludo.com https://kumain.containers.piwik.pro https://kumain.piwik.pro/ppms.js https://w.usabilla.com https://ss.studier.ku.dk https://ss.studies.ku.dk https://www.google.com https://cse.google.com https://policy.app.cookieinformation.com https://script.hotjar.com https://static.hotjar.com https://connect.facebook.net https://sc-static.net https://tr.snapchat.com https://script.crazyegg.com https://video.ku.dk https://www.googletagmanager.com 'report-sample'; font-src data: 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; connect-src * https://kumain.containers.piwik.pro; report-uri https://www.ku.dk/@http-reporting?csp=report&requestTime=1794923832676137&requestHash=a51c997e90efc03288ee34eacadccf7abe861c53
$ curl -sIL https://ku.dk/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/5Missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors: this removes one layer of protection against clickjacking.
No valid X-Frame-Options and no frame-ancestors in the CSP.
X-Frame-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://ku.dk/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
- Add X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (or DENY if the site is never embedded anywhere).
- Also set frame-ancestors in the CSP — the modern alternative.
/* X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. If partners embed the site in an iframe, add them to frame-ancestors instead of using DENY.
X-Content-Type-Options
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/4The browser may interpret files as code unintentionally.
Missing X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header (MIME sniffing).
X-Content-Type-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://ku.dk/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
- Add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff to every response.
/* X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Referrer-Policy
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://ku.dk/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
- Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/* Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://ku.dk/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://ku.dk/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7The domain's records are digitally signed and hard to forge.
An AD (Authenticated Data) flag was returned by a validating resolver.
AD = true
$ dig +dnssec ku.dk | grep -E "flags:.* ad"
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 iodef "mailto:hostmaster@ku.dk" | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "comodoca.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "globalsign.com" | 0 issue "harica.gr" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issuewild "harica.gr" | 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
0 iodef "mailto:hostmaster@ku.dk" 0 issue "amazon.com" 0 issue "comodoca.com" 0 issue "digicert.com" 0 issue "globalsign.com" 0 issue "harica.gr" 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" 0 issue "sectigo.com" 0 issuewild "harica.gr" 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
$ dig +short CAA ku.dk
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
2 NS servers.
ns1.ku.dk ns2.ku.dk
$ dig +short NS ku.dk
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
- PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligenceNo gaps observed
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline3 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | ku.dk | 130.226.237.173 |
| AAAA | ku.dk | — |
| MX | ku.dk | 10 ku-dk.mail.protection.outlook.com |
| NS | ku.dk | ns1.ku.dk | ns2.ku.dk |
| TXT | ku.dk | MS=ms39433918 | University of Copenhagen | HARICA-B6JlbUNpY6FLRGLjreG | HARICA-KALlY5x8AK07V5fax3e | HARICA-Lf19ojXj0uGvZSRtbuY | HARICA-hZL7IeBemUnrvjLOPS8 | HARICA-iGPCG7sxTBIHB30kPXW | klaviyo-site-verification=TxLiZh | ZOOM_verify_XLNNoB6ABQscd0JcOGAjPn | hibp-verify=dweb_2d2dhvr7zwre7wokvnhrl3mq | apple-domain-verification=0dcdbMopnajFHOG4 | jamf-site-verification=kJWBMvj-Hk0Uq4Vyz-_QVg | bw=LJaWj0Fpx3l/58xzv+wMmBx/rnLA3H9DxR51iD2lNFGx | 6c2c989745ec4c9da07a07aa9545b83e45af62d32706b6c50f | have-i-been-pwned-verification=dweb_brscgph7vtipz0x274w61rb7 | google-site-verification=lE8sxzeQUpSEaCB6mw86kRSKRemtlQs5T_TTdleZ4oU | adobe-idp-site-verification=668054226d35e53f8389a1ffef3706cd9e2536340ec998eb37738a0cb3a7ec58 | v=spf1 ip4:193.162.253.130 include:bulk.spf.ku.dk include:spf.protection.outlook.com a:unicph-gw.ku.dk a:mail.npkhosting.dk ~all |
| TXT | _dmarc.ku.dk | v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; rua=mailto:upglztho@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com; ruf=mailto:upglztho@fr.eu.dmarcadvisor.com; pct=100; fo=1; ri=3600 |
| CAA | ku.dk | 0 iodef "mailto:hostmaster@ku.dk" | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "comodoca.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "globalsign.com" | 0 issue "harica.gr" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issuewild "harica.gr" | 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org" |
| DS | ku.dk | 36192 13 2 a28ee611a8f3bc6c92ec2c2cd369b60ebd3fc9e4bf0987fa5b34facacfdb5490 | 36192 13 4 0935fa23021b0426bd64f4b26865b559cb0a81c5f2afca23b652ed76fa6bf5f5f2ca68332759f9c2908a9a96347c853d |