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Digital exposure report

linkedin.com

Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.

Scanned: 2026-11-15 19:22 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

C
79/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Send visitors to the secure version of your site

    Visitors who type your address without https may stay on an unprotected connection.

    Who can fix it: Your web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sI http://linkedin.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
  2. 2.

    Turn on DNS signing for your domain

    Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short DS linkedin.com

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
linkedin.com
Website request
GET https://linkedin.com/ → https://www.linkedin.com/
Scan time
2026-11-15 19:22:34 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
None. Every applicable check was assessed.

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security29/30Spoofing email from this domain is hard.
Encryption & certificate18/25Encryption is in place, but a gap could expose users.
Browser protections24/30The site instructs browsers to block common attacks.
DNS infrastructure8/15The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.HighHTTP → HTTPS redirect · Hardening gap+7
  2. 2.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
  3. 3.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
  4. 4.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10

An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.

~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 2 of 10 DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT linkedin.com
v=spf1 ip4:199.101.162.0/25 ip4:108.174.3.0/24 ip4:108.174.6.0/24 ip4:108.174.0.0/24 ip6:2620:109:c00d:104::/64 ip6:2620:109:c006:104::/64 ip6:2620:109:c003:104::/64 ip6:2620:119:50c0:207::/64 ip4:199.101.161.130 mx mx:docusign.net ~all
$ dig +short TXT linkedin.com
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15

Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.

Policy p=reject.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.linkedin.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:d@rua.agari.com,mailto:yfy3q-9359@rua.dmarc.emailanalyst.com; ruf=mailto:d@ruf.agari.com
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.linkedin.com
Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: google. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.linkedin.com
google._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCLhE5uHP4DCQPLBtQNWwX2rvKIxmdgrYvd…
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.linkedin.com
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

3 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX linkedin.com
10 mail-1.linkedin.com
10 mail-2.linkedin.com
10 mail-3.linkedin.com
$ dig +short MX linkedin.com
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://linkedin.com/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.linkedin.com/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://linkedin.com/
HTTP 200
Final URL: https://www.linkedin.com/
$ curl -sIL https://linkedin.com/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/7

The site is also reachable over an unencrypted connection, so data may travel in plain text on public networks.

http://linkedin.com/ returned HTTP 200 without redirecting to https://.

Source data: HTTP GET http://linkedin.com/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 200
Location: (none)
$ curl -sI http://linkedin.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set up a permanent (301) redirect from every HTTP request to HTTPS on the server or CDN.
  2. Then add an HSTS header.
server {
  listen 80;
  server_name linkedin.com www.linkedin.com;
  return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}

Safety: This change is made on your server. Make sure HTTPS works first, otherwise the site won't load.

Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: DigiCert, expiring 2027-04-22 (158 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for linkedin.com
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: DigiCert
Valid from: 2026-10-22
Valid until: 2027-04-22
Names: linkedin.com
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect linkedin.com:443 -servername linkedin.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/8

Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.

max-age=31536000 (365 days), no includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.linkedin.com/
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
$ curl -sIL https://linkedin.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The site restricts which scripts are allowed to run.

CSP is set without permissive sources in script-src.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.linkedin.com/
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; connect-src 'self' *.licdn.com *.linkedin.com cdn.linkedin.oribi.io dpm.demdex.net/id lnkd.demdex.net blob: accounts.google.com/gsi/ linkedin.sc.omtrdc.net/b/ss/ v.clarity.ms/collect *.microsoft.com *.adnxs.com *.tealiumiq.com login.microsoftonline.com bat.bing.com lnkd.tt.omtrdc.net/rest/v1/delivery www.google.com google.com adservice.google.com pagead2.googlesyndication.com td.doubleclick.net www.googletagmanager.com www.googleadservices.com ad.doubleclick.net googleads.g.doubleclick.net ade.googlesyndication.com *.fls.doubleclick.net; script-src 'report-sample' 'sha256-th47JTnh6tX15SUn/I+GGmsOSXpa7dh5Skner77gxlY=' 'sha256-SSoodjUD3LGm2FfFCVHGqEb8D4UM3OOigidT2UKDcYg=' 'sha256-cKTgdnmO6+hXd85a9wKg1effVfVzenUAtUCyOKY9bQE=' 'sha256-DwtT8+ZZKpxH9pqZNAmJ3GdbLAh5SsYaXR3omTXPCns=' 'sha256-sV9jZa797T0QWBzcU/CNd4tpBhTnh+TFdLnfjlitl28=' 'sha256-aa/Q8CRBDSqTQbCIyioPhZaz+G+dbPyu7BzsjInEmiU=' 'sha256-THuVhwbXPeTR0HszASqMOnIyxqEgvGyBwSPBKBF/iMc=' 'sha256-zTIusdVJJeXz9+iox2a+pdDglzbpRpFVRzEwvW4AONk=' 'sha256-iC8MPqNLw0FDnsBf4DlSkFLNTwhkI85aouiAEB819ic=' 'sha256-2EqrEvcPzl8c6/TSGVvaVMEe7lg700MAz/te4/3kTYY=' 'sha256-y5uW69VItKj51mcc7UD9qfptDVUqicZL+bItEpvVNDw=' 'sha256-DatsFGoJ8gFkzzxo47Ou76WZ+3QBPOQHtBu9p9b3DhA=' 'sha256-k95cyM8gFgPziZe5VQ2IvJvBUVyd5zFt2CokIUwqdHE=' 'sha256-PyCXNcEkzRWqbiNr087fizmiBBrq9O6GGD8eV3P09Ik=' 'sha256-RFqsjmAF1N5LnfpaHFvPqFlVkeIS/DtTAFor+JjJJVc=' 'sha256-2SQ55Erm3CPCb+k03EpNxU9bdV3XL9TnVTriDs7INZ4=' 'sha256-S/KSPe186K/1B0JEjbIXcCdpB97krdzX05S+dHnQjUs=' 'sha256-9pXOIwF4N0gPltLd3AI69lkCjSC2H/Eb3sc5zdmUyYU=' 'sha256-jou6v/Nleyzoc+LXktAv1Fp8M807dVVxy7E/yzVljHc=' 'sha256-6E4e/3dSvj/8JZT2S2yR91mspqM6MyOpKl5lrhHsZa8=' 'sha256-JfJ82reKxtqugVbfRGw/O/1x1Lm1I09rHueXSwvbRws=' 'sha256-BbV1i75oYRtLtfDWs7tnA8QLF5EOO1dVHKL0prVd/fQ=' 'sha256-3woF8BZ54TeXM+czaH3aXoaJsVpiamuAKFsXDykAR/Q=' 'sha256-vIfNcKb8ixJg1cfJIoNNYjWcm0lezj1/XpUNFiZyVsU=' 'sha256-cLsHUHFgT/VGX04cZrJ9xgm4HbzTR7ptutkxK+7BlMk=' 'sha256-BwU8jMnQYUhjOpsDVABpfddV/DlP1ZYrFcTumYw7x54=' 'sha256-wz6ika9i3WU3bpUPdhYDZeO/NrDQniDyiscN0LWnyaY=' 'sha256-3RIGhhApBii1KY+aW1xk7kFyoQY8vSVE5DfT7E9SJUc=' static.licdn.com static-exp1.licdn.com static-exp2.licdn.com static-exp3.licdn.com platform.linkedin.com platform-akam.linkedin.com platform-ecst.linkedin.com platform-azur.linkedin.com snap.licdn.com www.google.com/recaptcha/enterprise.js www.gstatic.com/recaptcha/releases/ www.googletagmanager.com/gtag/js www.googletagmanager.com/gtag/destination googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/viewthroughconversion/ merchantpool1.linkedin.com/mdt.js; img-src data: blob: * 'self' *.licdn.com android-webview-video-poster:; font-src data: * 'self' *.licdn.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' static.licdn.com static-exp1.licdn.com static-exp2.licdn.com static-exp3.licdn.com; media-src 'self' *.licdn.com *.lynda.com; worker-src 'self' blob: static.licdn.com static-exp1.licdn.com static-exp2.licdn.com static-exp3.licdn.com; frame-src 'self' www.youtube.com/embed/ www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/ lnkd.demdex.net smartlock.google.com accounts.google.com player.vimeo.com *.linkedin.com www.slideshare.net *.megaphone.fm *.omny.fm *.sounder.fm msit.powerbi.com app.powerbi.com linkedin.github.io *.licdn.com *.adnxs.com acdn.adnxs-simple.com radar.cedexis.com edge-auth.microsoft.com flo.uri.sh play.vidyard.com www.google.com/recaptcha/ aat-acr-web-prod.azurewebsites.net *.fls.doubleclick.net www.googletagmanager.com td.doubleclick.net googleads.g.doubleclick.net li.protechts.net *.xlgmedia.com *.px-cloud.net merchantpool1.linkedin.com; frame-ancestors 'self' *.www.linkedin.com:*; manifest-src 'self'; report-uri https://www.linkedin.com/security/csp?f=gg
$ curl -sIL https://linkedin.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.

X-Frame-Options: sameorigin frame-ancestors 'self' *.www.linkedin.com:*

Source data: Response headers from https://www.linkedin.com/
X-Frame-Options: sameorigin
CSP frame-ancestors: 'self' *.www.linkedin.com:*
$ curl -sIL https://linkedin.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4

The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.

nosniff is set.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.linkedin.com/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://linkedin.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3

Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.linkedin.com/
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://linkedin.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/*
  Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.

Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2

Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.

Missing Permissions-Policy header.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.linkedin.com/
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://linkedin.com/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/*
  Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.

Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.linkedin.com/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://linkedin.com/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS linkedin.com: NODATA
$ dig +short DS linkedin.com
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec linkedin.com SOA
delv linkedin.com

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.

CAA records: 0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com" | 0 contactemail "tls-alerts@linkedin.com"

Source data: DNS CAA linkedin.com
0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
0 contactemail "tls-alerts@linkedin.com"
$ dig +short CAA linkedin.com
Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

8 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS linkedin.com
dns1.p09.nsone.net
dns2.p09.nsone.net
dns3.p09.nsone.net
dns4.p09.nsone.net
ns1-42.azure-dns.com
ns2-42.azure-dns.net
ns3-42.azure-dns.org
ns4-42.azure-dns.info
$ dig +short NS linkedin.com
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
  • PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence1 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baselineNo gaps observed

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Alinkedin.com130.211.32.14
AAAAlinkedin.com2600:1901:0:d5ad::
MXlinkedin.com10 mail-1.linkedin.com | 10 mail-2.linkedin.com | 10 mail-3.linkedin.com
NSlinkedin.comdns1.p09.nsone.net | dns2.p09.nsone.net | dns3.p09.nsone.net | dns4.p09.nsone.net | ns1-42.azure-dns.com | ns2-42.azure-dns.net | ns3-42.azure-dns.org | ns4-42.azure-dns.info
TXTlinkedin.com448e0dc03e935ecf66d81f1ce3c26b2f2fea13756c031ffc4be91749107f3a79 | AFDVALIDATION=LinkedIn | _cthqqp5zj8g86qf3h97heqitg2zc32b | apple-domain-verification=Hp7LihDNsREwfHX9 | atlassian-domain-verification=dDed2VFvlDajBX8X22w52Jx/W/YLHR81SxUuraa9zNdz4aLjDS/RpfN11w2bxpRc | atlassian-domain-verification=juKdSE4GGphSmzPkhmnRJUNIn0ALdb0vsP7VSPM8TmTP7WgbgUQPLFdNicP7bF58 | atlassian-sending-domain-verification=3bdb0597-814d-4e10-a552-5cf78f92ab3c | bf5fl8sny79w4c70jxp6cp3crkqtr7qk | bluebeam-verification=02px6k8snlrzd6gx3b3oqkeatbzawd | docusign=11f01284-dffc-40f9-8d56-57e5261ede3f | elevenlabs=hRLt8nemUjAWJSL_xhBIsKFyK4yYV089AvwkOB0cxYY | google-site-verification=0Vs9yf1V6RGkuzow85OzIXKEnjpRswpDkI6RgDVspMg | google-site-verification=8LaIeBMwr6K8qWeaGa4CEmfPKiZDwaT38t5mIrtaroI | google-site-verification=VE9BWhjbPPNmbr3ZJcwn5hLTsz7c5KPt3zXdYyaSnSQ | google-site-verification=X0LoSQsAMzR-TK4o-ULrYAwLi_fyopfRLkm_C-4N4Ts | google-site-verification=anx3jpa6VKkTWRJKnglUIzm7UEn-ZCT2WqAfG7h-xOg | google-site-verification=mMV_EnYaB52OhMo-jbNowf8QVIKcXV3WpXreynLFFEo | google-site-verification=oJFWbtlKRblXs4smNibcoJkTJqwT6gd3XMI80VjBihE | google-site-verification=vfmYHwjzUIFPzxFcyuwEToh_1kG9wvcpGgJnB-MhQn8 | google-site-verification=xAGz495k8RbGclhamQx1TkZSHDxOaEd95fOjc8xpbTA | liveramp-site-verification=yQ2nkwhqszpGRQg_J38S60KHInPVs-dclgyNRtRrlBA | miro-verification=260f00146b6d2ad1bb70d6dc07a077b672badd28 | v=spf1 ip4:199.101.162.0/25 ip4:108.174.3.0/24 ip4:108.174.6.0/24 ip4:108.174.0.0/24 ip6:2620:109:c00d:104::/64 ip6:2620:109:c006:104::/64 ip6:2620:109:c003:104::/64 ip6:2620:119:50c0:207::/64 ip4:199.101.161.130 mx mx:docusign.net ~all | vmware-cloud-verification-f4d7c1c7-ad66-450f-82fa-c17b9ee79459
TXT_dmarc.linkedin.comv=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:d@rua.agari.com,mailto:yfy3q-9359@rua.dmarc.emailanalyst.com; ruf=mailto:d@ruf.agari.com
CAAlinkedin.com0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com" | 0 contactemail "tls-alerts@linkedin.com"
DSlinkedin.com—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain