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Digital exposure report

microsoft.com

High exposure. Significant weaknesses put the brand, customers and email at risk.

Scanned: 2026-11-15 19:22 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

D
63/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Tell browsers to always use the secure version

    Helps browsers use HTTPS on future visits after they have received the policy.

    Who can fix it: Your web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sIL https://microsoft.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
  2. 2.

    Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run

    This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.

    Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sIL https://microsoft.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
microsoft.com
Website request
GET https://microsoft.com/ → https://www.microsoft.com/
Scan time
2026-11-15 19:22:32 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
None. Every applicable check was assessed.

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security30/30Spoofing email from this domain is hard.
Encryption & certificate25/25Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid.
Browser protections0/30Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing.
DNS infrastructure8/15The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.HighHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+8
  2. 2.MediumClickjacking protection · Hardening gap+5
  3. 3.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
  4. 4.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
  5. 5.LowX-Content-Type-Options · Hardening gap+4
  6. 6.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
  7. 7.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.

Valid SPF record with -all. 4 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT microsoft.com
v=spf1 include:_spf-a.microsoft.com include:_spf-b.microsoft.com include:_spf-ssg-a.msft.net include:_spf1-meo.microsoft.com -all
$ dig +short TXT microsoft.com
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15

Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.

Policy p=reject.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.microsoft.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:itex-rua@microsoft.com; ruf=mailto:itex-ruf@microsoft.com; fo=1
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.microsoft.com
Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: selector2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.microsoft.com
selector2._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCPkb8bu8RGWeJGk3hJrouZXIdZ+HTp/azR…
$ dig +short TXT selector2._domainkey.microsoft.com
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

1 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX microsoft.com
10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
$ dig +short MX microsoft.com
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://microsoft.com/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.microsoft.com/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://microsoft.com/
HTTP 200
Final URL: https://www.microsoft.com/
$ curl -sIL https://microsoft.com/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.

HTTP 307 → https://microsoft.com/

Source data: HTTP GET http://microsoft.com/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 307
Location: https://microsoft.com/
$ curl -sI http://microsoft.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: Microsoft, expiring 2027-01-30 (75 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for microsoft.com
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: Microsoft
Valid from: 2026-10-22
Valid until: 2027-01-30
Names: 2010office.it, adatum.ai, ai.fluentui.dev, aiandyou.today, aielectionsaccord.com, aiotlabs.microsoft.com
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect microsoft.com:443 -servername microsoft.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/8

Browsers aren't told to always use an encrypted connection, enabling interception attacks on public networks.

No Strict-Transport-Security header. Users are exposed to SSL stripping on the first request.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.microsoft.com/
Strict-Transport-Security: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://microsoft.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
  2. Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
  3. Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/*
  Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.

Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8

Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.

No Content-Security-Policy header found.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.microsoft.com/
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://microsoft.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/5

Missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors: this removes one layer of protection against clickjacking.

No valid X-Frame-Options and no frame-ancestors in the CSP.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.microsoft.com/
X-Frame-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://microsoft.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Add X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (or DENY if the site is never embedded anywhere).
  2. Also set frame-ancestors in the CSP — the modern alternative.
/*
  X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. If partners embed the site in an iframe, add them to frame-ancestors instead of using DENY.

Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/4

The browser may interpret files as code unintentionally.

Missing X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header (MIME sniffing).

Source data: Response headers from https://www.microsoft.com/
X-Content-Type-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://microsoft.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff to every response.
/*
  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.

Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3

Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.microsoft.com/
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://microsoft.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/*
  Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.

Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2

Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.

Missing Permissions-Policy header.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.microsoft.com/
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://microsoft.com/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/*
  Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.

Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.microsoft.com/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://microsoft.com/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS microsoft.com: NODATA
$ dig +short DS microsoft.com
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec microsoft.com SOA
delv microsoft.com

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.

CAA records: 0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"

Source data: DNS CAA microsoft.com
0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
$ dig +short CAA microsoft.com
Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

4 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS microsoft.com
ns1-39.azure-dns.com
ns2-39.azure-dns.net
ns3-39.azure-dns.org
ns4-39.azure-dns.info
$ dig +short NS microsoft.com
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
  • PCI DSS v4.03 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline4 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Amicrosoft.com150.171.110.211
AAAAmicrosoft.com2603:1061:14:49::1
MXmicrosoft.com10 microsoft-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
NSmicrosoft.comns1-39.azure-dns.com | ns2-39.azure-dns.net | ns3-39.azure-dns.org | ns4-39.azure-dns.info
TXTmicrosoft.comd365mktkey=3uc1cf82cpv750lzk70v9bvf2 | facebook-domain-verification=fwzwhbbzwmg5fzgotc2go51olc3566 | google-site-verification=pjPOauSPcrfXOZS9jnPPa5axowcHGCDAl1_86dCqFpk | fg2t0gov9424p2tdcuo94goe9j | t7sebee51jrj7vm932k531hipa | google-site-verification=M--CVfn_YwsV-2FGbCp_HFaEj23BmT0cTF4l8hXgpvM | google-site-verification=GfDnTUdATPsK1230J0mXbfsYw-3A9BVMVaKSd4DcKgI | d365mktkey=SxDf1EZxLvMwx6eEZUxzjFFgHoapF8DvtWEUjwq7ZTwx | hubspot-developer-verification=OTQ5NGIwYWEtODNmZi00YWE1LTkyNmQtNDhjMDMxY2JjNDAx | d365mktkey=QDa792dLCZhvaAOOCe2Hz6WTzmTssOp1snABhxWibhMx | d365mktkey=6358r1b7e13hox60tl1uagv14 | google-site-verification=uFg3wr5PWsK8lV029RoXXBBUW0_E6qf1WEWVHhetkOY | docusign=d5a3737c-c23c-4bd0-9095-d2ff621f2840 | d365mktkey=j2qHWq9BHdaa3ZXZH8x64daJZxEWsFa0dxDeilxDoYYx | atlassian-domain-verification=xvoaqRfxSg3PnlVnR4xCSOlKyw1Aln0MMxRiKXnwWroFG7vI76TUC8xYb03MwMXv | workplace-domain-verification=lK0QDLk73xymCYMKUXNpfKAT8TY5Mx | google-site-verification=uhh5_jbxpcQgnb-A7gDIjlrr5Ef34lA2t2_BAveYpnk | MS=ms79629062 | d365mktkey=3l6dste9txazu0Qd2zu4135PUB4E35txLxyzJxjkPbsx | d365mktkey=wbU64GRacxVEQxwcLSQnx0zisXLYzgUbfvsufIqO9ZUx | linear-domain-verification=iuq6saifcnbe | d365mktkey=ZGFU0tlXPekPusNHPo5QQQWpVf0gic0xpuKroNy3NQEx | d365mktkey=JlXV17lfZjyvWxNje1qiP390ACSKzTxo5mGqZ3V2BmYx | d365mktkey=PNcDqkW71x8VOUhcE96aGM4l5PYX1gnlRl6ieXUl5eMx | d365mktkey=Fu49WtSTeClkHtK7S14227RIVpGwwGrzEsO6RVs1I2Ax | ms-domain-verification=25524f4b-1476-489c-a086-30f4c5016ecc | ms-domain-verification=1c4e4677-e58f-4117-8d61-e5b2810388c2 | mixpanel-domain-verify=5803bc4c-5bb6-4ce1-8076-753800097373 | sitecore-domain-verification=1d46cb5467624e33a408d14324874088 | ms-domain-verification=478640ad-6524-43d5-86c4-a914804b9e93 | ms-domain-verification=561512fc-b4ba-4ac7-a946-e464c8f49f1b | _zx2p8gpzv720db2aqmozy4jhwk2nl43 | airtable-verification=79a09e4a8013ff5737798ffb4ea88eee | 1password-site-verification=35ZTURTFFFDC5BW7GFQKRJ77QM | d365mktkey=8fEQahTresJms7tZGxGFr94T1zDz36oCbUt1LJc99mox | d365mktkey=heYmJ57sWrwMjCgIG1xRwTREJrQokUIDtBcNfGuxoWQx | ms-domain-verification=d6545068-89f7-4432-b947-0b137e8a9fe3 | hcp-domain-verification=3ce174a8b9fba88909633ab13eb1d81ce0123454745d66e500052ed84b7248a1 | v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=As/XxnDWZFxFwHvRZj+HbG5/ImtAeabLkiOWu1h7wCJQFAR216E9HoYQ5Hy6o7StoQ== | v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=AoHTKEi2W8L2P8cf9CoDicIxYiuttTkwtIeFOqYCewBGoRZiiF+9/92saUkIDERGAA== | ms-domain-verification=65f91178-9dfb-41cd-929d-08d1a38ed607 | v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=Asc8WWov6gsmCCzn4CSrwRuJIh5SqvaitKz/LlTW+SD54lLC52wzcnWhlTI416p2vw== | liveramp-site-verification=kxcV8fDH_FUNUZQEcAO6lwgim47f_hNLgMP4VG0PF_Q | v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=AqXeTHJ/1FCYeuvJ8dc1B+X3uHaa7m2W0s31vzL4opnrJlSaBdtbWTY8Ti5WiZnu9Q== | v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=An4mJIFLRys9h1EvjX18SJs5p1uEF5MHcs2JJLYPrI48C5Qt9FpaZEM0sQTV4JvNYw== | v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=A/Mf6IKdZzcHfBvpiVz9rkdPTIcCP5IbRDdEkeP3PgXEXF3mNjorahOwaYlMINBF5A== | v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=A8qndBCDJGtFF2+3v/IPIMmM0SaVcrJBoSue7rKob6sUeK7QGeFuWkrtvze3AiqUDA== | zoom-domain-verification=ZOOM_verify_e97a3d385acb4c47b9b924609a280524 | anthropic-domain-verification-phksss=GZrrKDUR4klRLFCvxyOvqcNGE | v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=Azw9+u4M8RoH+bxJidKAZzGDmsPkzY1N4cO7rB/uC5x1RBoNfMyBlH/ott0lpo4pOQ== | dobtdihqagnr18hea8uv1h1mvq | atlassian-domain-verification=Sn5AwyIdVgkaRaJA/IKj7ZFMnWeCBnppa9bXGLuJvsakRHH4lYoBxS8g7GVlud9M | openai-domain-verification=dv-sFtCvKOlWoe31gpoSvs7cqsP | hpe-greenlake-domain-verification=495143304a3330533363357a57684f6335556f316f55654675523541464d3954 | v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=A5JeyhIFWFj4/epHJwt29GRUSrFwGSwXhrhDMAUSklMhfXjI7gi/ekY/fQSWToZdCw== | v=MCPv1; k=ecdsap384; p=A/78JIxAOlNwq8f0T/l50w7zhwQFpEuB8/Jz9CafdXNX7ewOluYpS/EEcSmLgxsHXg== | docker-verification=b912d2f3-8614-4591-962b-9e07dbf7c047 | _ij59qjkrntjw3gpjplj3or17mo3xxvt | google-site-verification=jwrHU99GU8HSXlRFeywLDZmVawD2DWVCebQ41shKK0M | v=spf1 include:_spf-a.microsoft.com include:_spf-b.microsoft.com include:_spf-ssg-a.msft.net include:_spf1-meo.microsoft.com -all | google-gws-recovery-domain-verification=77163048 | google-gws-recovery-domain-verification=77417634
TXT_dmarc.microsoft.comv=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:itex-rua@microsoft.com; ruf=mailto:itex-ruf@microsoft.com; fo=1
CAAmicrosoft.com0 contactemail "caarecordaware@microsoft.com"
DSmicrosoft.com—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain