Digital exposure report
nbg.gr
Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.
Scanned: 2026-11-19 02:55 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Send visitors to the secure version of your site
Visitors who type your address without https may stay on an unprotected connection.
Who can fix it: Your web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sI http://nbg.gr/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
- 2.
Turn on DNS signing for your domain
Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.
Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider
How to verify after the fix
dig +short DS nbg.gr
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- nbg.gr
- Website request
- GET https://nbg.gr/ → https://www.nbg.gr/el/idiwtes
- Scan time
- 2026-11-19 02:55:37 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 27/30 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 18/25 | Encryption is in place, but a gap could expose users. |
| Browser protections | 25/30 | The site instructs browsers to block common attacks. |
| DNS infrastructure | 3/15 | The domain's infrastructure lacks basic protections. |
Fix priorities
- 1.HighHTTP → HTTPS redirect · Hardening gap+7
- 2.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 3.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+5
- 4.LowDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+3
- 5.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
- 6.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.
Valid SPF record with -all. 5 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.
v=spf1 ip4:195.78.87.99 ip4:195.78.87.96 ip4:195.78.86.46 ip4:195.78.87.104 ip4:195.78.87.105 ip4:195.78.86.47 ip4:195.78.86.48 ip4:185.136.188.88 ip4:185.136.188.108 ip4:185.136.189.88 ip4:185.136.189.108 mx:nbg.gr include:ces21.nbg.gr include:deliverygateways.mastercard.com include:spfa.mailendo.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all
$ dig +short TXT nbg.gr
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 12/15Forged email in the company's name is sent to the spam folder.
Policy p=quarantine. p=quarantine — consider moving to p=reject. sp=none — subdomains are exposed to spoofing.
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=none; pct=100; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:secsystmonitoring@nbg.gr; ruf=mailto:secsystmonitoring@nbg.gr;
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.nbg.gr
- Keep your current p=quarantine enforcement and edit the existing record in place — do not replace it with p=none.
- Set sp to match p so subdomains get the same enforcement.
- Optional: once reports show all legitimate senders pass, move from p=quarantine to p=reject.
_dmarc.nbg.gr. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; pct=100; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:secsystmonitoring@nbg.gr; ruf=mailto:secsystmonitoring@nbg.gr"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Your domain already enforces DMARC. Edit the record in place; never roll back to p=none.
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: selector1, selector2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
selector1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA2hPQIfTj12U89W68bTYDULpyCH8x… selector2._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA35+KxpawfVDSWuXrG/hs1RNd7vHv…
$ dig +short TXT selector1._domainkey.nbg.gr
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
2 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
20 email.nbg.gr 10 mail.nbg.gr
$ dig +short MX nbg.gr
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://nbg.gr/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.nbg.gr/el/idiwtes). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://www.nbg.gr/el/idiwtes
$ curl -sIL https://nbg.gr/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/7The site is also reachable over an unencrypted connection, so data may travel in plain text on public networks.
http://nbg.gr/ returned HTTP 301 without redirecting to https:// (Location: http://www.nbg.gr/).
HTTP 301 Location: http://www.nbg.gr/
$ curl -sI http://nbg.gr/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
- Set up a permanent (301) redirect from every HTTP request to HTTPS on the server or CDN.
- Then add an HSTS header.
server {
listen 80;
server_name nbg.gr www.nbg.gr;
return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}Safety: This change is made on your server. Make sure HTTPS works first, otherwise the site won't load.
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: DigiCert, expiring 2027-05-23 (185 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: DigiCert Valid from: 2026-11-06 Valid until: 2027-05-23 Names: adfs.externals.nbg.gr, adfs.nbg.gr, businessexpenses.nbg.gr, competition.nbg.gr, consumerloaneligibility.nbg.gr, fg.nbg.gr Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect nbg.gr:443 -servername nbg.gr 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.
max-age=31536000 (365 days), includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
$ curl -sIL https://nbg.gr/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
CSP — protection from script injection
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.
script-src includes: 'unsafe-inline', 'unsafe-eval', a broad source (* / https: / data:) — weakens XSS protection.
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' data: https: 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src * 'self' data: https:; media-src 'self' blob: https://*.userway.org https://*.userwaycdn.com; connect-src 'self' https: https://*.userway.org https://*.userwaycdn.com;
$ curl -sIL https://nbg.gr/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://nbg.gr/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
X-Content-Type-Options
Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.
nosniff is set.
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://nbg.gr/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Referrer-Policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy: same-origin
Referrer-Policy: same-origin
$ curl -sIL https://nbg.gr/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://nbg.gr/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: ASP.NET
$ curl -sIL https://nbg.gr/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS nbg.gr: NODATA
$ dig +short DS nbg.gr
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec nbg.gr SOA delv nbg.gr
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.
No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA nbg.gr
- Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
- Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
nbg.gr. CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" nbg.gr. CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@nbg.gr"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
6 NS servers.
a10-66.akam.net a1-203.akam.net a13-64.akam.net a11-67.akam.net a22-65.akam.net a28-66.akam.net
$ dig +short NS nbg.gr
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps
- PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence3 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | nbg.gr | 2.19.51.137 | 2.19.51.162 |
| AAAA | nbg.gr | — |
| MX | nbg.gr | 20 email.nbg.gr | 10 mail.nbg.gr |
| NS | nbg.gr | a10-66.akam.net | a1-203.akam.net | a13-64.akam.net | a11-67.akam.net | a22-65.akam.net | a28-66.akam.net |
| TXT | nbg.gr | hVVCNABXj2uWmWt1+vb+0qEX9hfJFdApIBQSs2+mH/o= | google-site-verification=sNATbEpjCmsEUdon97OWSxXnqAkhnw3L7dlHW1VnKJY | MS=ms64570782 | v=spf1 ip4:195.78.87.99 ip4:195.78.87.96 ip4:195.78.86.46 ip4:195.78.87.104 ip4:195.78.87.105 ip4:195.78.86.47 ip4:195.78.86.48 ip4:185.136.188.88 ip4:185.136.188.108 ip4:185.136.189.88 ip4:185.136.189.108 mx:nbg.gr include:ces21.nbg.gr include:deliverygateways.mastercard.com include:spfa.mailendo.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all | google-site-verification=1FZn1M-vRZx-llK7g_JNfNiZeXSdlYzcbiPRRgO5bL4 | b4bcfasdfa7b420aik9yafbin5o9n467ab5d9e3 nbglondon.co.uk | huQZsritnWxql2VswFvr41G2qO93LIkqWpUymHPB0ds= | google-gws-recovery-domain-verification=50211951 | cisco-ci-domain-verification=7dbb3bd35c87d2efeb71ccc61a86bd1713a9f4a4a30e61968a0b55d6b6ade51d | google-site-verification=te9Ytpn9rpPuS3ftWB2WNLasDSmHX_Y46jsKD-UOamM | eg/NCxe6cZ0XGjn8plRVu3tqgISg75ALO4571aetm/k= | syHS6IsZM7ZMvltr4TNWVNxzqnc4sAHLTwf26V2VApuaAuE85tCUDy+j1pKtspx0/kTsUKJZg9lBZ21blVZkXQ== | hpe-greenlake-domain-verification=3961477a6758356d765a64726a4d54676d76616379423179324e6c446d773732 | rvxk2nt1h2yy16djm5sh0tn62cyr8577 | confluent-verification=4ef3e82f-6418-466a-8139-3f663467708f | ZOOM_verify_R73IXF6tSqub6uQsDaKmCA |
| TXT | _dmarc.nbg.gr | v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=none; pct=100; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:secsystmonitoring@nbg.gr; ruf=mailto:secsystmonitoring@nbg.gr; |
| CAA | nbg.gr | — |
| DS | nbg.gr | — |