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Digital exposure report

ncbagroup.com

Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.

Scanned: 2026-11-20 09:00 UTC

Partial coverage: the score is based on 93% of applicable check weight. 1 unverified check(s) are excluded, not counted as failures.

C
75/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run

    This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.

    Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sIL https://ncbagroup.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
  2. 2.

    Turn on DNS signing for your domain

    Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short DS ncbagroup.com

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
ncbagroup.com
Website request
GET https://ncbagroup.com/
Scan time
2026-11-20 09:00:55 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
  • HTTP → HTTPS redirect · Unverified

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security27/30Spoofing email from this domain is hard.
Encryption & certificate18/18Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid.
Browser protections22/30Some browser protections are missing.
DNS infrastructure3/15The domain's infrastructure lacks basic protections.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+8
  2. 2.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+9
  3. 3.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+5
  4. 4.LowDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+3

To verify

Couldn't be confirmed from public data, so excluded from the score. Checking them clarifies your posture; it doesn't guarantee a score change.

  • HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.

Valid SPF record with -all. 4 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT ncbagroup.com
v=spf1 include:za._netblocks.mimecast.com include:spf-uk.emailsignatures365.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com  ip4:196.28.11.99 ip4:196.28.11.100 ip4:196.1.132.20 ip4:196.1.132.119 ip4:196.1.132.22 ip4:196.1.132.15 ip4:69.72.44.205 ip4:41.209.15.194 include:_spf-dc33.sapsf.eu -all
$ dig +short TXT ncbagroup.com
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 12/15

Forged email in the company's name is sent to the spam folder.

Policy p=quarantine. p=quarantine — consider moving to p=reject. sp=none — subdomains are exposed to spoofing.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.ncbagroup.com
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=1;rf=afrf;ri=86400;rua=mailto:911a0864a88c172@rep.dmarcanalyzer.com,mailto:mimecastforensics@ncbagroup.com;ruf=mailto:911a0864a88c172@for.dmarcanalyzer.com,mailto:mimecastforensics@ncbagroup.com
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.ncbagroup.com
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Keep your current p=quarantine enforcement and edit the existing record in place — do not replace it with p=none.
  2. Set sp to match p so subdomains get the same enforcement.
  3. Optional: once reports show all legitimate senders pass, move from p=quarantine to p=reject.
_dmarc.ncbagroup.com.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r; pct=100; fo=1; rf=afrf; ri=86400; rua=mailto:911a0864a88c172@rep.dmarcanalyzer.com,mailto:mimecastforensics@ncbagroup.com; ruf=mailto:911a0864a88c172@for.dmarcanalyzer.com,mailto:mimecastforensics@ncbagroup.com"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Your domain already enforces DMARC. Edit the record in place; never roll back to p=none.

Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: default, s1, s2, smtp. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.ncbagroup.com
default._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEApC1lwIXxmnUWDnZxt6Qo2lQpKQ4d…
s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAv5XxDFJA/+OVFzWsAwsd8bW7oP/Owbyq…
s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA73rr6IFy5Sb7Yl9zFzTn7LWSyp9yTFa/…
smtp._domainkey: k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDGHwsxDx3bYNH8iVoCckv1y0yymCxf5zP4WxvDv98zK…
$ dig +short TXT default._domainkey.ncbagroup.com
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

2 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX ncbagroup.com
0 za-smtp-inbound-1.mimecast.co.za
0 za-smtp-inbound-2.mimecast.co.za
$ dig +short MX ncbagroup.com
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://ncbagroup.com/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://ncbagroup.com/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://ncbagroup.com/
HTTP 200
Final URL: https://ncbagroup.com/
$ curl -sIL https://ncbagroup.com/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't confirm whether plain HTTP redirects: port 80 didn't respond in time or the connection failed. Not scored.

Couldn't confirm whether plain HTTP redirects: port 80 didn't respond in time or the connection failed. Not scored.

Source data: HTTP GET http://ncbagroup.com/ (redirects not followed)
Port 80 not responding (timeout)
$ curl -sI http://ncbagroup.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: GoDaddy, expiring 2027-05-26 (187 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for ncbagroup.com
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: GoDaddy
Valid from: 2026-11-09
Valid until: 2027-05-26
Names: ncbagroup.com, www.ncbagroup.com
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect ncbagroup.com:443 -servername ncbagroup.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.

max-age=31536000 (365 days), includeSubDomains, preload. ≥ 180 days recommended.

Source data: Response headers from https://ncbagroup.com/
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload
$ curl -sIL https://ncbagroup.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8

Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.

No Content-Security-Policy header found.

Source data: Response headers from https://ncbagroup.com/
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://ncbagroup.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Source data: Response headers from https://ncbagroup.com/
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://ncbagroup.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4

The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.

nosniff is set.

Source data: Response headers from https://ncbagroup.com/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://ncbagroup.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy: strict-origin

Source data: Response headers from https://ncbagroup.com/
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin
$ curl -sIL https://ncbagroup.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 2/2

The site restricts access to sensitive browser features.

Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(),midi=(),sync-xhr=(),microphone=(self "https://us.engage.app"),camera=(self "https://us.engage.app"),magnetometer=(),gyroscope=(),fullscreen=(self

Source data: Response headers from https://ncbagroup.com/
Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(),midi=(),sync-xhr=(),microphone=(self "https://us.engage.app"),camera=(self "https://us.engage.app"),magnetometer=(),gyroscope=(),fullscreen=(self)
$ curl -sIL https://ncbagroup.com/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://ncbagroup.com/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://ncbagroup.com/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS ncbagroup.com: NODATA
$ dig +short DS ncbagroup.com
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec ncbagroup.com SOA
delv ncbagroup.com

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA ncbagroup.com
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA ncbagroup.com
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
ncbagroup.com.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
ncbagroup.com.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@ncbagroup.com"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

3 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS ncbagroup.com
ns1.accesskenya.com
ukns1.accesskenya.com
ns0.accesskenya.com
$ dig +short NS ncbagroup.com
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps
  • PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps · 1 unverified
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence3 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Ancbagroup.com102.133.239.9
AAAAncbagroup.com—
MXncbagroup.com0 za-smtp-inbound-1.mimecast.co.za | 0 za-smtp-inbound-2.mimecast.co.za
NSncbagroup.comns1.accesskenya.com | ukns1.accesskenya.com | ns0.accesskenya.com
TXTncbagroup.comatlassian-domain-verification=az9kFXNnCoCezuXz/KQaoj2ZidKFajJ8kHxjhUsmhdDoZtHXIRGHQlxabcc/kTzK | successfactors-site-verification=NTdhYjliYmRiYzYxOGYzNDBmNzA1ZjZjMGY2YjhhMDU1MDc1NjA3MmQwNGUzNGQ0YWY0Njg4Y2NkMjdhN2E3OA | _gwz5q8l6fokcrxjwb6b6u00zatkwvox | google-site-verification=XSWu8Qj1_yZxa7k4lR5wzO1Noqj28EqcrnNCXfK7NXk | ms-domain-verification=06b4b91a-64f4-4b56-b0b7-9fe61fd43ab6 | cisco-ci-domain-verification=42b76c52013ab47fdb8ce1b47aef21d07efd3fc63d1dde3f570c79e479c58a40 | m74j21tgdje52mor37q5a85kji | _ub5szs5fh1si48c562z3ijsecal4cwc | _y7fehi6yyiaj7tdq2u3j6nu8o2bq6pw | msfpkey=68e784cz9xifc2xp02r9ncqqk | 316k8uv0hrvfm2qbtotaheob3 | ch8tdhxh0r03rz7n53m87wjt90x7s3z8 | yhyvwk25r7w18xtrfnhzvr28nckvvcsl | z73495rgsc6v7507df08996j4d7gsgj5 | ahv8k91hmq35dgpu9ipjsro5hs | _gujmomf691lxlwaak6w63sc2nt6jbdh | l6etn2a5p55qfrg97nkte6b958 | msfpkey=7h8v2b7c7gaxwpwbyyyefn4qk | q8rzgql5309tmc9bdllymh9gvsvlznr6 | 7yq9qq5jhd2crwtkwl86mwy0nrmzrm35 | google-site-verification=7gW9eMIHqoDwpryb5BATyMI6RhAjpRMWSSpL0WaqccA | v=spf1 include:za._netblocks.mimecast.com include:spf-uk.emailsignatures365.com include:spf.protection.outlook.com ip4:196.28.11.99 ip4:196.28.11.100 ip4:196.1.132.20 ip4:196.1.132.119 ip4:196.1.132.22 ip4:196.1.132.15 ip4:69.72.44.205 ip4:41.209.15.194 include:_spf-dc33.sapsf.eu -all | successfactors-site-verification=NTdhYjliYmRiYzYxOGYzNDBmNzA1ZjZjMGY2YjhhMDU1MDc1NjA3MmQwNGUzNGQ0YWY0Njg4Y2NkMjdhN2E3OA== | h68kyspw4g7bdy2smynn1sncwm0gpzp3 | YPVLX8rxgl/CUUgp9xN+G6Vn9zgQSuGItcSS1LRkj4ZaJQe7mjMN1/496fuxmWtWXlIyZrvtVnGIy6fUKi3qtw== | google-site-verification=-C_0ZSd0iZtkr8Lp94V71bqOWSwWOVHgccg99BQ45Eg | apple-domain-verification=CwkBWU4eIbSjKn07
TXT_dmarc.ncbagroup.comv=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=1;rf=afrf;ri=86400;rua=mailto:911a0864a88c172@rep.dmarcanalyzer.com,mailto:mimecastforensics@ncbagroup.com;ruf=mailto:911a0864a88c172@for.dmarcanalyzer.com,mailto:mimecastforensics@ncbagroup.com
CAAncbagroup.com—
DSncbagroup.com—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain