Digital exposure report
nyuad.nyu.edu
Critical findings in the observed public configuration. Some basic protections were not detected.
Scanned: 2026-11-17 23:01 UTC
Partial coverage: the score is based on 95% of applicable check weight. 1 unverified check(s) are excluded, not counted as failures.
What to do first
- 1.
Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain
Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.
Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS
How to verify after the fix
dig +short TXT _dmarc.nyuad.nyu.edu
- 2.
List the servers allowed to send your email
Without this list, it is easier for others to send email that looks like it came from you.
Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS
How to verify after the fix
dig +short TXT nyuad.nyu.edu
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- nyuad.nyu.edu
- Website request
- GET https://nyuad.nyu.edu/ → https://nyuad.nyu.edu/en/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-17 23:01:14 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- DKIM — digital signature on email · Not detected (common selectors only)
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 0/25 | An attacker can send email that looks like it came from the company. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 23/30 | Some browser protections are missing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 3/15 | The domain's infrastructure lacks basic protections. |
Fix priorities
- 1.HighSPF — who may send mail for the domain · Hardening gap+11
- 2.HighDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+16
- 3.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 4.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+5
- 5.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
- 6.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+2
- 7.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3
To verify
Couldn't be confirmed from public data, so excluded from the score. Checking them clarifies your posture; it doesn't guarantee a score change.
- DKIM — digital signature on email
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/10There is no list of servers authorized to send mail, making it easier to forge email in the company's name.
No v=spf1 TXT record at the domain root. Receiving servers cannot validate the sender's IP address.
(no SPF record found)
$ dig +short TXT nyuad.nyu.edu
- Map every service that sends mail in the domain's name (Google Workspace / Microsoft 365, newsletter tool, CRM).
- Publish exactly one TXT record at the domain root starting with v=spf1.
- Start with ~all, and move to -all once DMARC reports confirm all legitimate senders are covered.
nyuad.nyu.edu. TXT "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. An incorrect record can block legitimate mail — add every sender before tightening.
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/15No policy tells mail servers to block forged email in the company's name — a common opening for CEO fraud and phishing.
No TXT record at _dmarc.nyuad.nyu.edu. Without DMARC, mail failing SPF/DKIM may still reach the inbox.
(no DMARC record found)
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.nyuad.nyu.edu
- Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
- Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
- Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.nyuad.nyu.edu. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@nyuad.nyu.edu; fo=1"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.
DKIM — digital signature on email
Not detected (common selectors only) · Severity: OK · Not scoredNo DKIM key was found under the common selectors we probed. That doesn't mean DKIM is missing — selectors can't be listed from public DNS. Not scored.
A missing name for a probed selector (NXDOMAIN/NODATA) only means that selector isn't published. DKIM is marked unverified and excluded from the score. Check a sent message's Authentication-Results for dkim=pass and its s= selector.
Selectors checked: google, selector1, selector2, default, k1, s1, s2, dkim, mail, smtp — no key found google._domainkey: nxdomain selector1._domainkey: nxdomain selector2._domainkey: nxdomain default._domainkey: nxdomain k1._domainkey: nxdomain s1._domainkey: nxdomain s2._domainkey: nxdomain dkim._domainkey: nxdomain mail._domainkey: nxdomain smtp._domainkey: nxdomain
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.nyuad.nyu.edu
MX — inbound mail routing
Info · Severity: OK · unscoredNo MX records are published. On its own this doesn't prove the domain can't receive email.
Without MX, senders may fall back to the A/AAAA address (RFC 5321 §5.1). A Null MX is appropriate only once you've confirmed the domain receives no email.
(no MX records)
$ dig +short MX nyuad.nyu.edu
- Only if you've confirmed the domain receives no email: publish a Null MX (MX 0 .), and keep SPF -all and DMARC p=reject if it also sends none.
nyuad.nyu.edu. MX 0 .
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain.
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://nyuad.nyu.edu/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://nyuad.nyu.edu/en/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://nyuad.nyu.edu/en/
$ curl -sIL https://nyuad.nyu.edu/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 301 → https://nyuad.nyu.edu/
HTTP 301 Location: https://nyuad.nyu.edu/
$ curl -sI http://nyuad.nyu.edu/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: SSL.com, expiring 2027-06-01 (195 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: SSL.com Valid from: 2026-11-16 Valid until: 2027-06-01 Names: nyuad.nyu.edu, www.nyuad.nyu.edu Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect nyuad.nyu.edu:443 -servername nyuad.nyu.edu 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.
max-age=31536000 (365 days), includeSubDomains, preload. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload
$ curl -sIL https://nyuad.nyu.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
CSP — protection from script injection
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.
script-src includes: no script-src/default-src — weakens XSS protection.
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' https://*.nyu.edu
$ curl -sIL https://nyuad.nyu.edu/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.
X-Frame-Options: Deny frame-ancestors 'self' https://*.nyu.edu
X-Frame-Options: Deny CSP frame-ancestors: 'self' https://*.nyu.edu
$ curl -sIL https://nyuad.nyu.edu/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
X-Content-Type-Options
Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.
nosniff is set.
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://nyuad.nyu.edu/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Referrer-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 1/3The policy sends full URLs to external sites.
Referrer-Policy: no-referrer-when-downgrade — sends the full URL including path and query.
Referrer-Policy: no-referrer-when-downgrade
$ curl -sIL https://nyuad.nyu.edu/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
- Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/* Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://nyuad.nyu.edu/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://nyuad.nyu.edu/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS nyuad.nyu.edu: NODATA
$ dig +short DS nyuad.nyu.edu
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec nyuad.nyu.edu SOA delv nyuad.nyu.edu
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.
No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA nyuad.nyu.edu
- Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
- Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
nyuad.nyu.edu. CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" nyuad.nyu.edu. CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@nyuad.nyu.edu"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
3 NS servers.
ns2.nyu.org ns1.nyu.net ns4.nyu.edu
$ dig +short NS nyuad.nyu.edu
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rules2 observed gaps · 1 unverified
- PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence4 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline3 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | nyuad.nyu.edu | 159.60.131.115 |
| AAAA | nyuad.nyu.edu | — |
| MX | nyuad.nyu.edu | — |
| NS | nyuad.nyu.edu | ns2.nyu.org | ns1.nyu.net | ns4.nyu.edu |
| TXT | nyuad.nyu.edu | — |
| TXT | _dmarc.nyuad.nyu.edu | — |
| CAA | nyuad.nyu.edu | — |
| DS | nyuad.nyu.edu | — |