Digital exposure report
oxford.ac.uk
Critical findings in the observed public configuration. Some basic protections were not detected.
Scanned: 2026-11-17 23:03 UTC
Partial coverage: the score is based on 47% of applicable check weight. 9 unverified check(s) are excluded, not counted as failures.
What to do first
- 1.
List the servers allowed to send your email
Without this list, it is easier for others to send email that looks like it came from you.
Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS
How to verify after the fix
dig +short TXT oxford.ac.uk
- 2.
Send visitors to the secure version of your site
Visitors who type your address without https may stay on an unprotected connection.
Who can fix it: Your web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sI http://oxford.ac.uk/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- oxford.ac.uk
- Website request
- GET https://oxford.ac.uk/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-17 23:03:17 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- DKIM — digital signature on email · Not detected (common selectors only)
- HTTPS available · Unverified
- SSL/TLS certificate validity · Unverified
- HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Unverified
- CSP — protection from script injection · Unverified
- Clickjacking protection · Unverified
- X-Content-Type-Options · Unverified
- Referrer-Policy · Unverified
- Permissions-Policy · Unverified
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 12/25 | An attacker can send email that looks like it came from the company. |
| Encryption & certificate | 0/7 | Browsing to the site is not properly protected by encryption. |
| Browser protections | — | Nothing in this category could be verified from public data. |
| DNS infrastructure | 3/15 | The domain's infrastructure lacks basic protections. |
Fix priorities
- 1.HighSPF — who may send mail for the domain · Hardening gap+21
- 2.HighHTTP → HTTPS redirect · Hardening gap+15
- 3.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+15
- 4.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+11
- 5.LowDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+6
To verify
Couldn't be confirmed from public data, so excluded from the score. Checking them clarifies your posture; it doesn't guarantee a score change.
- HTTPS available
- SSL/TLS certificate validity
- CSP — protection from script injection
- HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
- Clickjacking protection
- DKIM — digital signature on email
- X-Content-Type-Options
- Referrer-Policy
- Permissions-Policy
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/10There is no list of servers authorized to send mail, making it easier to forge email in the company's name.
No v=spf1 TXT record at the domain root. Receiving servers cannot validate the sender's IP address.
(no SPF record found)
$ dig +short TXT oxford.ac.uk
- Map every service that sends mail in the domain's name (Google Workspace / Microsoft 365, newsletter tool, CRM).
- Publish exactly one TXT record at the domain root starting with v=spf1.
- Start with ~all, and move to -all once DMARC reports confirm all legitimate senders are covered.
oxford.ac.uk. TXT "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. An incorrect record can block legitimate mail — add every sender before tightening.
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 12/15Forged email in the company's name is sent to the spam folder.
Policy p=quarantine. p=quarantine — consider moving to p=reject. No rua — no reports on spoofing attempts are received.
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; ruf=mailto:dmarc-ruf@it.ox.ac.uk
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.oxford.ac.uk
- Keep your current p=quarantine enforcement and edit the existing record in place — do not replace it with p=none.
- Add rua=mailto:… to the existing record so you receive aggregate reports. Nothing else changes.
- Optional: once reports show all legitimate senders pass, move from p=quarantine to p=reject.
_dmarc.oxford.ac.uk. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; ruf=mailto:dmarc-ruf@it.ox.ac.uk; rua=mailto:dmarc@oxford.ac.uk"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Your domain already enforces DMARC. Edit the record in place; never roll back to p=none.
DKIM — digital signature on email
Not detected (common selectors only) · Severity: OK · Not scoredNo DKIM key was found under the common selectors we probed. That doesn't mean DKIM is missing — selectors can't be listed from public DNS. Not scored.
A missing name for a probed selector (NXDOMAIN/NODATA) only means that selector isn't published. DKIM is marked unverified and excluded from the score. Check a sent message's Authentication-Results for dkim=pass and its s= selector.
Selectors checked: google, selector1, selector2, default, k1, s1, s2, dkim, mail, smtp — no key found google._domainkey: nxdomain selector1._domainkey: nxdomain selector2._domainkey: nxdomain default._domainkey: nxdomain k1._domainkey: nxdomain s1._domainkey: nxdomain s2._domainkey: nxdomain dkim._domainkey: nxdomain mail._domainkey: nxdomain smtp._domainkey: nxdomain
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.oxford.ac.uk
MX — inbound mail routing
Info · Severity: OK · unscoredNo MX records are published. On its own this doesn't prove the domain can't receive email.
Without MX, senders may fall back to the A/AAAA address (RFC 5321 §5.1). A Null MX is appropriate only once you've confirmed the domain receives no email.
(no MX records)
$ dig +short MX oxford.ac.uk
- Only if you've confirmed the domain receives no email: publish a Null MX (MX 0 .), and keep SPF -all and DMARC p=reject if it also sends none.
oxford.ac.uk. MX 0 .
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain.
HTTPS available
Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scoredHTTPS couldn't be confirmed: the request timed out or the connection failed. This isn't treated as a security failure.
Requesting https://oxford.ac.uk/ didn't complete (HTTP 521). Timeouts and transport errors may be transient; the check is excluded from the score.
HTTP 521
$ curl -svI https://oxford.ac.uk/ 2>&1 | grep -E "SSL|HTTP|expire"
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/7The site is also reachable over an unencrypted connection, so data may travel in plain text on public networks.
http://oxford.ac.uk/ returned HTTP 302 without redirecting to https:// (Location: http://www.ox.ac.uk/).
HTTP 302 Location: http://www.ox.ac.uk/
$ curl -sI http://oxford.ac.uk/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
- Set up a permanent (301) redirect from every HTTP request to HTTPS on the server or CDN.
- Then add an HSTS header.
server {
listen 80;
server_name oxford.ac.uk www.oxford.ac.uk;
return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}Safety: This change is made on your server. Make sure HTTPS works first, otherwise the site won't load.
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scoredThe certificate couldn't be checked live because the HTTPS connection didn't complete. CT log data alone isn't used to score validity or expiry.
No live TLS evidence was obtained. CT entries are shown as context only. Not scored.
No valid certificate found in CT logs Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect oxford.ac.uk:443 -servername oxford.ac.uk 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scoredCouldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.
No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://oxford.ac.uk/
CSP — protection from script injection
Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scoredCouldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.
No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://oxford.ac.uk/
Clickjacking protection
Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scoredCouldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.
No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://oxford.ac.uk/
X-Content-Type-Options
Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scoredCouldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.
No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://oxford.ac.uk/
Referrer-Policy
Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scoredCouldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.
No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://oxford.ac.uk/
Permissions-Policy
Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scoredCouldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.
No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://oxford.ac.uk/
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS oxford.ac.uk: NODATA
$ dig +short DS oxford.ac.uk
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec oxford.ac.uk SOA delv oxford.ac.uk
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.
No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA oxford.ac.uk
- Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
- Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
oxford.ac.uk. CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" oxford.ac.uk. CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@oxford.ac.uk"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
3 NS servers.
dns2.ox.ac.uk dns1.ox.ac.uk dns0.ox.ac.uk
$ dig +short NS oxford.ac.uk
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rules2 observed gaps · 1 unverified
- PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps · 5 unverified
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence4 observed gaps · 3 unverified
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps · 6 unverified
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | oxford.ac.uk | 163.1.221.216 |
| AAAA | oxford.ac.uk | — |
| MX | oxford.ac.uk | — |
| NS | oxford.ac.uk | dns2.ox.ac.uk | dns1.ox.ac.uk | dns0.ox.ac.uk |
| TXT | oxford.ac.uk | _globalsign-domain-verification=wiDg8qaoolWaTbaZq8YxJLFxFT36aoIO03meY20xze | E2BC45B9-B484-4FD3-BEE5-12F88081169D |
| TXT | _dmarc.oxford.ac.uk | v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; ruf=mailto:dmarc-ruf@it.ox.ac.uk |
| CAA | oxford.ac.uk | — |
| DS | oxford.ac.uk | — |