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Digital exposure report

oxford.ac.uk

Critical findings in the observed public configuration. Some basic protections were not detected.

Scanned: 2026-11-17 23:03 UTC

Partial coverage: the score is based on 47% of applicable check weight. 9 unverified check(s) are excluded, not counted as failures.

F
32/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    List the servers allowed to send your email

    Without this list, it is easier for others to send email that looks like it came from you.

    Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short TXT oxford.ac.uk
  2. 2.

    Send visitors to the secure version of your site

    Visitors who type your address without https may stay on an unprotected connection.

    Who can fix it: Your web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sI http://oxford.ac.uk/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
oxford.ac.uk
Website request
GET https://oxford.ac.uk/
Scan time
2026-11-17 23:03:17 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
  • DKIM — digital signature on email · Not detected (common selectors only)
  • HTTPS available · Unverified
  • SSL/TLS certificate validity · Unverified
  • HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Unverified
  • CSP — protection from script injection · Unverified
  • Clickjacking protection · Unverified
  • X-Content-Type-Options · Unverified
  • Referrer-Policy · Unverified
  • Permissions-Policy · Unverified

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security12/25An attacker can send email that looks like it came from the company.
Encryption & certificate0/7Browsing to the site is not properly protected by encryption.
Browser protections—Nothing in this category could be verified from public data.
DNS infrastructure3/15The domain's infrastructure lacks basic protections.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.HighSPF — who may send mail for the domain · Hardening gap+21
  2. 2.HighHTTP → HTTPS redirect · Hardening gap+15
  3. 3.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+15
  4. 4.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+11
  5. 5.LowDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+6

To verify

Couldn't be confirmed from public data, so excluded from the score. Checking them clarifies your posture; it doesn't guarantee a score change.

  • HTTPS available
  • SSL/TLS certificate validity
  • CSP — protection from script injection
  • HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
  • Clickjacking protection
  • DKIM — digital signature on email
  • X-Content-Type-Options
  • Referrer-Policy
  • Permissions-Policy

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/10

There is no list of servers authorized to send mail, making it easier to forge email in the company's name.

No v=spf1 TXT record at the domain root. Receiving servers cannot validate the sender's IP address.

Source data: DNS TXT oxford.ac.uk
(no SPF record found)
$ dig +short TXT oxford.ac.uk
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Map every service that sends mail in the domain's name (Google Workspace / Microsoft 365, newsletter tool, CRM).
  2. Publish exactly one TXT record at the domain root starting with v=spf1.
  3. Start with ~all, and move to -all once DMARC reports confirm all legitimate senders are covered.
oxford.ac.uk.  TXT  "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. An incorrect record can block legitimate mail — add every sender before tightening.

Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 12/15

Forged email in the company's name is sent to the spam folder.

Policy p=quarantine. p=quarantine — consider moving to p=reject. No rua — no reports on spoofing attempts are received.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.oxford.ac.uk
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; ruf=mailto:dmarc-ruf@it.ox.ac.uk
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.oxford.ac.uk
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Keep your current p=quarantine enforcement and edit the existing record in place — do not replace it with p=none.
  2. Add rua=mailto:… to the existing record so you receive aggregate reports. Nothing else changes.
  3. Optional: once reports show all legitimate senders pass, move from p=quarantine to p=reject.
_dmarc.oxford.ac.uk.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; ruf=mailto:dmarc-ruf@it.ox.ac.uk; rua=mailto:dmarc@oxford.ac.uk"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Your domain already enforces DMARC. Edit the record in place; never roll back to p=none.

Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Not detected (common selectors only) · Severity: OK · Not scored

No DKIM key was found under the common selectors we probed. That doesn't mean DKIM is missing — selectors can't be listed from public DNS. Not scored.

A missing name for a probed selector (NXDOMAIN/NODATA) only means that selector isn't published. DKIM is marked unverified and excluded from the score. Check a sent message's Authentication-Results for dkim=pass and its s= selector.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.oxford.ac.uk
Selectors checked: google, selector1, selector2, default, k1, s1, s2, dkim, mail, smtp — no key found
google._domainkey: nxdomain
selector1._domainkey: nxdomain
selector2._domainkey: nxdomain
default._domainkey: nxdomain
k1._domainkey: nxdomain
s1._domainkey: nxdomain
s2._domainkey: nxdomain
dkim._domainkey: nxdomain
mail._domainkey: nxdomain
smtp._domainkey: nxdomain
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.oxford.ac.uk
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Info · Severity: OK · unscored

No MX records are published. On its own this doesn't prove the domain can't receive email.

Without MX, senders may fall back to the A/AAAA address (RFC 5321 §5.1). A Null MX is appropriate only once you've confirmed the domain receives no email.

Source data: DNS MX oxford.ac.uk
(no MX records)
$ dig +short MX oxford.ac.uk
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Only if you've confirmed the domain receives no email: publish a Null MX (MX 0 .), and keep SPF -all and DMARC p=reject if it also sends none.
oxford.ac.uk.  MX  0 .

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain.

Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

HTTPS couldn't be confirmed: the request timed out or the connection failed. This isn't treated as a security failure.

Requesting https://oxford.ac.uk/ didn't complete (HTTP 521). Timeouts and transport errors may be transient; the check is excluded from the score.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://oxford.ac.uk/
HTTP 521
$ curl -svI https://oxford.ac.uk/ 2>&1 | grep -E "SSL|HTTP|expire"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/7

The site is also reachable over an unencrypted connection, so data may travel in plain text on public networks.

http://oxford.ac.uk/ returned HTTP 302 without redirecting to https:// (Location: http://www.ox.ac.uk/).

Source data: HTTP GET http://oxford.ac.uk/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 302
Location: http://www.ox.ac.uk/
$ curl -sI http://oxford.ac.uk/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set up a permanent (301) redirect from every HTTP request to HTTPS on the server or CDN.
  2. Then add an HSTS header.
server {
  listen 80;
  server_name oxford.ac.uk www.oxford.ac.uk;
  return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}

Safety: This change is made on your server. Make sure HTTPS works first, otherwise the site won't load.

Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

The certificate couldn't be checked live because the HTTPS connection didn't complete. CT log data alone isn't used to score validity or expiry.

No live TLS evidence was obtained. CT entries are shown as context only. Not scored.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for oxford.ac.uk
No valid certificate found in CT logs
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect oxford.ac.uk:443 -servername oxford.ac.uk 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.

No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.

Source data: Response headers from https://oxford.ac.uk/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://oxford.ac.uk/
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.

No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.

Source data: Response headers from https://oxford.ac.uk/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://oxford.ac.uk/
Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.

No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.

Source data: Response headers from https://oxford.ac.uk/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://oxford.ac.uk/
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.

No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.

Source data: Response headers from https://oxford.ac.uk/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://oxford.ac.uk/
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.

No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.

Source data: Response headers from https://oxford.ac.uk/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://oxford.ac.uk/
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.

No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.

Source data: Response headers from https://oxford.ac.uk/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://oxford.ac.uk/
Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS oxford.ac.uk: NODATA
$ dig +short DS oxford.ac.uk
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec oxford.ac.uk SOA
delv oxford.ac.uk

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA oxford.ac.uk
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA oxford.ac.uk
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
oxford.ac.uk.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
oxford.ac.uk.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@oxford.ac.uk"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

3 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS oxford.ac.uk
dns2.ox.ac.uk
dns1.ox.ac.uk
dns0.ox.ac.uk
$ dig +short NS oxford.ac.uk
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules2 observed gaps · 1 unverified
  • PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps · 5 unverified
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence4 observed gaps · 3 unverified
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps · 6 unverified

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Aoxford.ac.uk163.1.221.216
AAAAoxford.ac.uk—
MXoxford.ac.uk—
NSoxford.ac.ukdns2.ox.ac.uk | dns1.ox.ac.uk | dns0.ox.ac.uk
TXToxford.ac.uk_globalsign-domain-verification=wiDg8qaoolWaTbaZq8YxJLFxFT36aoIO03meY20xze | E2BC45B9-B484-4FD3-BEE5-12F88081169D
TXT_dmarc.oxford.ac.ukv=DMARC1; p=quarantine; ruf=mailto:dmarc-ruf@it.ox.ac.uk
CAAoxford.ac.uk—
DSoxford.ac.uk—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain