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Digital exposure report

paris-sorbonne.fr

Critical findings in the observed public configuration. Some basic protections were not detected.

Scanned: 2026-11-17 23:01 UTC

Partial coverage: the score is based on 88% of applicable check weight. 1 unverified check(s) are excluded, not counted as failures.

F
30/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain

    Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.

    Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short TXT _dmarc.paris-sorbonne.fr
  2. 2.

    Turn on DNS signing for your domain

    Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short DS paris-sorbonne.fr

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
paris-sorbonne.fr
Website request
GET https://paris-sorbonne.fr/(no HTTPS response)
Scan time
2026-11-17 23:01:14 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
  • DKIM — digital signature on email · Not detected (common selectors only)
  • HTTPS available · Not applicable
  • HTTP → HTTPS redirect · Not applicable
  • SSL/TLS certificate validity · Not applicable
  • HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Not applicable
  • CSP — protection from script injection · Not applicable
  • Clickjacking protection · Not applicable
  • X-Content-Type-Options · Not applicable
  • Referrer-Policy · Not applicable
  • Permissions-Policy · Not applicable

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security9/25An attacker can send email that looks like it came from the company.
Encryption & certificate—Not applicable to this domain.
Browser protections—Not applicable to this domain.
DNS infrastructure3/15The domain's infrastructure lacks basic protections.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.MediumSPF — who may send mail for the domain · Hardening gap+15
  2. 2.MediumDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+25
  3. 3.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+18
  4. 4.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+13

To verify

Couldn't be confirmed from public data, so excluded from the score. Checking them clarifies your posture; it doesn't guarantee a score change.

  • DKIM — digital signature on email

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 4/10

The SPF record is neutral and does not block unauthorized senders.

?all (neutral) does not tell the receiving server to reject or flag mail from servers not on the list.

Source data: DNS TXT paris-sorbonne.fr
v=spf1 include:spf1.sorbonne-universite.fr ?ALL
$ dig +short TXT paris-sorbonne.fr
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Map every service that sends mail in the domain's name (Google Workspace / Microsoft 365, newsletter tool, CRM).
  2. Publish exactly one TXT record at the domain root starting with v=spf1.
  3. Start with ~all, and move to -all once DMARC reports confirm all legitimate senders are covered.
paris-sorbonne.fr.  TXT  "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. An incorrect record can block legitimate mail — add every sender before tightening.

Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 5/15

DMARC is in monitoring mode only — forged email still reaches recipients.

Policy p=none. p=none collects reports but does not protect.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.paris-sorbonne.fr
v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=dmarc@listes.sorbonne-universite.fr; ruf=dmarc@listes.sorbonne-universite.fr; adkim=r; aspf=r; ri=86400; fo=1; pct=100
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.paris-sorbonne.fr
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
  2. Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
  3. Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.paris-sorbonne.fr.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@paris-sorbonne.fr; fo=1"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.

Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Not detected (common selectors only) · Severity: OK · Not scored

No DKIM key was found under the common selectors we probed. That doesn't mean DKIM is missing — selectors can't be listed from public DNS. Not scored.

A missing name for a probed selector (NXDOMAIN/NODATA) only means that selector isn't published. DKIM is marked unverified and excluded from the score. Check a sent message's Authentication-Results for dkim=pass and its s= selector.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.paris-sorbonne.fr
Selectors checked: google, selector1, selector2, default, k1, s1, s2, dkim, mail, smtp — no key found
google._domainkey: nxdomain
selector1._domainkey: nxdomain
selector2._domainkey: nxdomain
default._domainkey: nxdomain
k1._domainkey: nxdomain
s1._domainkey: nxdomain
s2._domainkey: nxdomain
dkim._domainkey: nxdomain
mail._domainkey: nxdomain
smtp._domainkey: nxdomain
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.paris-sorbonne.fr
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

2 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX paris-sorbonne.fr
50 mx2.relay.renater.fr
50 mx1.relay.renater.fr
$ dig +short MX paris-sorbonne.fr
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
No A/AAAA record for the domain
$ curl -svI https://paris-sorbonne.fr/ 2>&1 | grep -E "SSL|HTTP|expire"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

Source data: HTTP GET http://paris-sorbonne.fr/ (redirects not followed)
Not checked
$ curl -sI http://paris-sorbonne.fr/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for paris-sorbonne.fr
No valid certificate found in CT logs
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect paris-sorbonne.fr:443 -servername paris-sorbonne.fr 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://paris-sorbonne.fr/
Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS paris-sorbonne.fr: NODATA
$ dig +short DS paris-sorbonne.fr
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec paris-sorbonne.fr SOA
delv paris-sorbonne.fr

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA paris-sorbonne.fr
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA paris-sorbonne.fr
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
paris-sorbonne.fr.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
paris-sorbonne.fr.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@paris-sorbonne.fr"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

6 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS paris-sorbonne.fr
ns0.paris-sorbonne.fr
ns2.paris-sorbonne.fr
ns0.sorbonne-universite.fr
ns1.sorbonne-universite.fr
ns1.paris-sorbonne.fr
ns3.paris-sorbonne.fr
$ dig +short NS paris-sorbonne.fr
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules2 observed gaps · 1 unverified
  • PCI DSS v4.0Not applicable
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence4 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Aparis-sorbonne.fr—
AAAAparis-sorbonne.fr—
MXparis-sorbonne.fr50 mx2.relay.renater.fr | 50 mx1.relay.renater.fr
NSparis-sorbonne.frns0.paris-sorbonne.fr | ns2.paris-sorbonne.fr | ns0.sorbonne-universite.fr | ns1.sorbonne-universite.fr | ns1.paris-sorbonne.fr | ns3.paris-sorbonne.fr
TXTparis-sorbonne.frHARICA-D8YkAQvQhXNquFyHgpt | adobe-idp-site-verification=c7354bcbe67c930646d4d646ffcee8f5cf50b212b6467c815ffce53431d61501 | HARICA-2K6z1EHRqbbNJoK0Zhl | MS=DDF09F2437142CDE56E976C272D7A45DB3142B60 | v=spf1 include:spf1.sorbonne-universite.fr ?ALL
TXT_dmarc.paris-sorbonne.frv=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=dmarc@listes.sorbonne-universite.fr; ruf=dmarc@listes.sorbonne-universite.fr; adkim=r; aspf=r; ri=86400; fo=1; pct=100
CAAparis-sorbonne.fr—
DSparis-sorbonne.fr—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain