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Digital exposure report

puce.edu.ec

High exposure. Significant weaknesses put the brand, customers and email at risk.

Scanned: 2026-11-21 09:50 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

D
64/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain

    Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.

    Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short TXT _dmarc.puce.edu.ec
  2. 2.

    Choose which companies may issue certificates for your domain

    This reduces the chance of a certificate being issued by a provider you did not choose.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short CAA puce.edu.ec

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
puce.edu.ec
Website request
GET https://puce.edu.ec/(no HTTPS response)
Scan time
2026-11-21 09:50:09 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
  • HTTPS available · Not applicable
  • HTTP → HTTPS redirect · Not applicable
  • SSL/TLS certificate validity · Not applicable
  • HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Not applicable
  • CSP — protection from script injection · Not applicable
  • Clickjacking protection · Not applicable
  • X-Content-Type-Options · Not applicable
  • Referrer-Policy · Not applicable
  • Permissions-Policy · Not applicable

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security19/30Spoofing email in the company's name is possible in some cases.
Encryption & certificate—Not applicable to this domain.
Browser protections—Not applicable to this domain.
DNS infrastructure10/15The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.MediumDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+22
  2. 2.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+11

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10

An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.

~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 3 of 10 DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT puce.edu.ec
v=spf1 ip4:192.188.55.0/25 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:one.zoho.com  include:zcsend.net ~all
$ dig +short TXT puce.edu.ec
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 5/15

DMARC is in monitoring mode only — forged email still reaches recipients.

Policy p=none. p=none collects reports but does not protect.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.puce.edu.ec
v=DMARC1; p=none;rua=mailto:PAQUEZADA@PUCE.EDU.EC;
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.puce.edu.ec
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
  2. Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
  3. Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.puce.edu.ec.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@puce.edu.ec; fo=1"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.

Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: selector1, selector2, s1, s2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.puce.edu.ec
selector1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDzhesx66DYXWoe10ARP9HW52Lr+Jakmuse…
selector2._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEApfK6aoX6uZgRzhr/hLCvBKrCnY5o…
s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAp8JmgD6lGzguZgAyd6k0ehUsdUSACuXZ…
s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDNHjWaphrppZa0wCHQazgaabzjF3nov/ofah6B…
$ dig +short TXT selector1._domainkey.puce.edu.ec
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

1 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX puce.edu.ec
0 puce-edu-ec.mail.protection.outlook.com
$ dig +short MX puce.edu.ec
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://puce.edu.ec/
No A/AAAA record for the domain
$ curl -svI https://puce.edu.ec/ 2>&1 | grep -E "SSL|HTTP|expire"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

Source data: HTTP GET http://puce.edu.ec/ (redirects not followed)
Not checked
$ curl -sI http://puce.edu.ec/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for puce.edu.ec
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: DigiCert
Valid from: 2026-10-20
Valid until: 2027-05-06
Names: *.puce.edu.ec, puce.edu.ec
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect puce.edu.ec:443 -servername puce.edu.ec 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://puce.edu.ec/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://puce.edu.ec/
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://puce.edu.ec/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://puce.edu.ec/
Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://puce.edu.ec/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://puce.edu.ec/
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://puce.edu.ec/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://puce.edu.ec/
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://puce.edu.ec/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://puce.edu.ec/
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://puce.edu.ec/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://puce.edu.ec/
Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

The domain's records are digitally signed and hard to forge.

An AD (Authenticated Data) flag was returned by a validating resolver.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = true
$ dig +dnssec puce.edu.ec | grep -E "flags:.* ad"
Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA puce.edu.ec
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA puce.edu.ec
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
puce.edu.ec.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
puce.edu.ec.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@puce.edu.ec"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

5 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS puce.edu.ec
ns-881.awsdns-46.net
pucenet.puce.edu.ec
ns-442.awsdns-55.com
ns-1928.awsdns-49.co.uk
ns-1158.awsdns-16.org
$ dig +short NS puce.edu.ec
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps
  • PCI DSS v4.0Not applicable
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline1 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Apuce.edu.ec—
AAAApuce.edu.ec—
MXpuce.edu.ec0 puce-edu-ec.mail.protection.outlook.com
NSpuce.edu.ecns-881.awsdns-46.net | pucenet.puce.edu.ec | ns-442.awsdns-55.com | ns-1928.awsdns-49.co.uk | ns-1158.awsdns-16.org
TXTpuce.edu.ecgoogle-site-verification=rYp-6GBHojH2Klxr9o_hU_gc0ZuOfYsCMwjlWoZBYFQ | v=spf1 ip4:192.188.55.0/25 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:one.zoho.com include:zcsend.net ~all | w801mvsrbh706mmtg0vswdbrhyhb3n3p | efKc7fKB4GlB9choEA7JRf7pSJH3h0CE30w6K4dT7Nnh85czI3XA90FAqGQ0HEItLXCFWKg9hF/gbABs5vIvIw== | _rys86n3iuhwb82xf5q2cz74px7re4d9 | _fgwgp8r9xwgbwdbrh3fj8felq6gl872 | _globalsign-domain-verification=cGMn9e1E9kxpjZhYpxlEbkQoFdWn-taZteYpte9TZY | adobe-idp-site-verification=cc9b26f304df2eeaf9e59bd569b3344512b1356274dff7ca88ed666ef7c316b3
TXT_dmarc.puce.edu.ecv=DMARC1; p=none;rua=mailto:PAQUEZADA@PUCE.EDU.EC;
CAApuce.edu.ec—
DSpuce.edu.ec—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain