Digital exposure report
rug.nl
Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.
Scanned: 2026-11-17 23:03 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Choose which companies may issue certificates for your domain
This reduces the chance of a certificate being issued by a provider you did not choose.
Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider
How to verify after the fix
dig +short CAA rug.nl
- 2.
Stop browsers from guessing file types
This removes one way a file could be treated as something it is not.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://rug.nl/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- rug.nl
- Website request
- GET https://rug.nl/ → https://www.rug.nl/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-17 23:03:13 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 26/30 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 17/30 | Some browser protections are missing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 10/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+5
- 2.LowX-Content-Type-Options · Hardening gap+4
- 3.LowDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+3
- 4.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
- 5.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
- 6.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.
~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 4 of 10 DNS lookups.
v=spf1 include:spf1.rug.nl include:spf2.rug.nl include:spf3.rug.nl include:spf4.rug.nl ~all
$ dig +short TXT rug.nl
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 12/15Forged email in the company's name is sent to the spam folder.
Policy p=quarantine. p=quarantine — consider moving to p=reject. sp=none — subdomains are exposed to spoofing.
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;rua=mailto:c4b0a07195@rua.easydmarc.eu;ruf=mailto:c4b0a07195@ruf.easydmarc.eu;pct=100;aspf=r;adkim=r;ri=86400;fo=1;t=n
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.rug.nl
- Keep your current p=quarantine enforcement and edit the existing record in place — do not replace it with p=none.
- Set sp to match p so subdomains get the same enforcement.
- Optional: once reports show all legitimate senders pass, move from p=quarantine to p=reject.
_dmarc.rug.nl. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; rua=mailto:c4b0a07195@rua.easydmarc.eu; ruf=mailto:c4b0a07195@ruf.easydmarc.eu; pct=100; aspf=r; adkim=r; ri=86400; fo=1; t=n"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Your domain already enforces DMARC. Edit the record in place; never roll back to p=none.
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: s1, s2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAu+HaJKolJPGqBWpdkh3GhsCmnc7+qn9S… s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDNWjDMOkXHCtaAuyTiTDvWGoobhCYEMrnvmNO3…
$ dig +short TXT s1._domainkey.rug.nl
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
5 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
30 ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM 20 ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM 10 ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM 20 ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM 30 ASPMX3.GOOGLEMAIL.COM
$ dig +short MX rug.nl
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://rug.nl/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.rug.nl/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://www.rug.nl/
$ curl -sIL https://rug.nl/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 302 → https://rug.nl/
HTTP 302 Location: https://rug.nl/
$ curl -sI http://rug.nl/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: HARICA, expiring 2026-12-01 (13 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: HARICA Valid from: 2025-12-01 Valid until: 2026-12-01 Names: production.ucms.rug.nl, rug.nl, www.groningenuniversity.nl, www.rijksuniversiteitgroningen.nl, www.rug.nl, www.universiteitgroningen.nl Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect rug.nl:443 -servername rug.nl 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/8Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.
max-age=31536000 (365 days), no includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
$ curl -sIL https://rug.nl/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
CSP — protection from script injection
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.
script-src includes: no script-src/default-src — weakens XSS protection.
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' https://student.portal.rug.nl https://myuniversity.rug.nl; object-src 'none';
$ curl -sIL https://rug.nl/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN frame-ancestors 'self' https://student.portal.rug.nl https://myuniversity.rug.nl
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN CSP frame-ancestors: 'self' https://student.portal.rug.nl https://myuniversity.rug.nl
$ curl -sIL https://rug.nl/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
X-Content-Type-Options
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/4The browser may interpret files as code unintentionally.
Missing X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header (MIME sniffing).
X-Content-Type-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://rug.nl/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
- Add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff to every response.
/* X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Referrer-Policy
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://rug.nl/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
- Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/* Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://rug.nl/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://rug.nl/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7The domain's records are digitally signed and hard to forge.
An AD (Authenticated Data) flag was returned by a validating resolver.
AD = true
$ dig +dnssec rug.nl | grep -E "flags:.* ad"
CAA — who may issue certificates
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.
No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA rug.nl
- Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
- Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
rug.nl. CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" rug.nl. CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@rug.nl"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
5 NS servers.
dns2.rug.nl dns1.rug.nl ns1.surfnet.nl dns3.rug.nl ns2.surfnet.nl
$ dig +short NS rug.nl
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps
- PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline3 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | rug.nl | 129.125.2.51 |
| AAAA | rug.nl | 2001:610:1a08:292:129:125:2:51 |
| MX | rug.nl | 30 ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM | 20 ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM | 10 ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM | 20 ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM | 30 ASPMX3.GOOGLEMAIL.COM |
| NS | rug.nl | dns2.rug.nl | dns1.rug.nl | ns1.surfnet.nl | dns3.rug.nl | ns2.surfnet.nl |
| TXT | rug.nl | University of Groningen | MS=ms97484282 | v=spf1 include:spf1.rug.nl include:spf2.rug.nl include:spf3.rug.nl include:spf4.rug.nl ~all | bw=7iePWW2zaVtqaRhZZjRWUu985gQ1Ia26nUAJ3BDXMYBp | google-site-verification=pMjlXqlOTWrDjxV9AoW_MGyuGOV3lEAsQ7__vv525Ag | HARICA-VyUX3Mv4LXaUX7ugYDj | google-site-verification=LzOS5q7nSbDRZFZ0FMFKbWSvsfDE8bL861TAh-czT7k | mistral-domain-verification=139d17efc022c67581effa2fc6e0bb747d0c9456 |
| TXT | _dmarc.rug.nl | v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;rua=mailto:c4b0a07195@rua.easydmarc.eu;ruf=mailto:c4b0a07195@ruf.easydmarc.eu;pct=100;aspf=r;adkim=r;ri=86400;fo=1;t=n |
| CAA | rug.nl | — |
| DS | rug.nl | — |