Digital exposure report
sbs.edu
Critical findings in the observed public configuration. Some basic protections were not detected.
Scanned: 2026-11-17 23:03 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain
Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.
Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS
How to verify after the fix
dig +short TXT _dmarc.sbs.edu
- 2.
Tell browsers to always use the secure version
Helps browsers use HTTPS on future visits after they have received the policy.
Who can fix it: Your web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://sbs.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- sbs.edu
- Website request
- GET https://sbs.edu/ → https://www.sbs.edu/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-17 23:03:13 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 20/30 | Spoofing email in the company's name is possible in some cases. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 0/30 | Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 10/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.HighHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+8
- 2.MediumClickjacking protection · Hardening gap+5
- 3.MediumDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+10
- 4.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
- 5.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+5
- 6.LowX-Content-Type-Options · Hardening gap+4
- 7.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
- 8.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.
Valid SPF record with -all. 4 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.
v=spf1 mx mx:sbs.edu ip4:77.109.148.96/28 ip4:81.62.200.112/28 ip4:138.201.14.12 ip4:138.201.52.21 ip4:159.69.123.238 ip6:2a01:4f8:172:d12::2 ip4:128.140.83.56 ip4:168.119.105.115 ip6:2a01:4f8:1c17:67d7::1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:eu.mailgun.org -all
$ dig +short TXT sbs.edu
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 5/15DMARC is in monitoring mode only — forged email still reaches recipients.
Policy p=none. p=none collects reports but does not protect.
v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100; rua=mailto:re+icsfo2wigx0@dmarc.postmarkapp.com; sp=none; aspf=r;
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.sbs.edu
- Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
- Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
- Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.sbs.edu. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@sbs.edu; fo=1"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: selector2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
selector2._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC1bnypWNlq0ockj2vE/cJJiavNSqF/rySa…
$ dig +short TXT selector2._domainkey.sbs.edu
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
1 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
0 sbs-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com
$ dig +short MX sbs.edu
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://sbs.edu/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.sbs.edu/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://www.sbs.edu/
$ curl -sIL https://sbs.edu/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 302 → https://sbs.edu/
HTTP 302 Location: https://sbs.edu/
$ curl -sI http://sbs.edu/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: SSL.com, expiring 2027-02-02 (76 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: SSL.com Valid from: 2026-07-19 Valid until: 2027-02-02 Names: autodiscover.sbs.edu, d-mail.sbs.edu, mail.sbs.edu, sbs.edu Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect sbs.edu:443 -servername sbs.edu 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/8Browsers aren't told to always use an encrypted connection, enabling interception attacks on public networks.
No Strict-Transport-Security header. Users are exposed to SSL stripping on the first request.
Strict-Transport-Security: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://sbs.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
- Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
- Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
- Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/* Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.
CSP — protection from script injection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.
No Content-Security-Policy header found.
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://sbs.edu/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/5Missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors: this removes one layer of protection against clickjacking.
No valid X-Frame-Options and no frame-ancestors in the CSP.
X-Frame-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://sbs.edu/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
- Add X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (or DENY if the site is never embedded anywhere).
- Also set frame-ancestors in the CSP — the modern alternative.
/* X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. If partners embed the site in an iframe, add them to frame-ancestors instead of using DENY.
X-Content-Type-Options
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/4The browser may interpret files as code unintentionally.
Missing X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header (MIME sniffing).
X-Content-Type-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://sbs.edu/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
- Add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff to every response.
/* X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Referrer-Policy
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://sbs.edu/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
- Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/* Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://sbs.edu/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://sbs.edu/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7The domain's records are digitally signed and hard to forge.
An AD (Authenticated Data) flag was returned by a validating resolver.
AD = true
$ dig +dnssec sbs.edu | grep -E "flags:.* ad"
CAA — who may issue certificates
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.
No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA sbs.edu
- Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
- Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
sbs.edu. CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" sbs.edu. CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@sbs.edu"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
2 NS servers.
cory.ns.cloudflare.com zara.ns.cloudflare.com
$ dig +short NS sbs.edu
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps
- PCI DSS v4.03 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence3 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline5 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | sbs.edu | 104.26.14.217 | 104.26.15.217 | 172.67.69.52 |
| AAAA | sbs.edu | 2606:4700:20::681a:ed9 | 2606:4700:20::681a:fd9 | 2606:4700:20::ac43:4534 |
| MX | sbs.edu | 0 sbs-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com |
| NS | sbs.edu | cory.ns.cloudflare.com | zara.ns.cloudflare.com |
| TXT | sbs.edu | MS=ms20632582 | apple-domain-verification=14kt86IjkDPhKhvn | facebook-domain-verification=uxw3nkdrtdngtfbrlnxeuc84o3aryy | google-site-verification=2wSRnvgQwmuZtNYeaPzcZoYmnrFJRUP1gSI0vwwHofw | google-site-verification=ZmEjLqrPjskD8X0eXESNsJRv3nfrfyQo1zsgAkmcHLw | v=spf1 mx mx:sbs.edu ip4:77.109.148.96/28 ip4:81.62.200.112/28 ip4:138.201.14.12 ip4:138.201.52.21 ip4:159.69.123.238 ip6:2a01:4f8:172:d12::2 ip4:128.140.83.56 ip4:168.119.105.115 ip6:2a01:4f8:1c17:67d7::1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:eu.mailgun.org -all |
| TXT | _dmarc.sbs.edu | v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100; rua=mailto:re+icsfo2wigx0@dmarc.postmarkapp.com; sp=none; aspf=r; |
| CAA | sbs.edu | — |
| DS | sbs.edu | 2371 13 2 ec809fe640e2ec04f9f06f16abb994dd48fb87a3fba3a5b8d35c177dbeaa55d5 |