Digital exposure report
societegenerale.com
Good shape, with a few gaps worth closing this quarter.
Scanned: 2026-11-20 07:30 UTC
Partial coverage: the score is based on 95% of applicable check weight. 1 unverified check(s) are excluded, not counted as failures.
What to do first
- 1.
Turn on DNS signing for your domain
Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.
Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider
How to verify after the fix
dig +short DS societegenerale.com
- 2.
Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run
This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://societegenerale.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only"
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- societegenerale.com
- Website request
- GET https://societegenerale.com/ → https://www.societegenerale.com/fr
- Scan time
- 2026-11-20 07:30:35 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- DKIM — digital signature on email · Not detected (common selectors only)
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 25/25 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 23/30 | Some browser protections are missing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 8/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 2.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+5
- 3.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
To verify
Couldn't be confirmed from public data, so excluded from the score. Checking them clarifies your posture; it doesn't guarantee a score change.
- DKIM — digital signature on email
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.
Valid SPF record with -all. 1 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.
v=spf1 include:_spf-a.iap.socgen.com -all
$ dig +short TXT societegenerale.com
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.
Policy p=reject.
v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:societe-generale-cross-asset-research@rua.dmp.cisco.com; ruf=mailto:societe-generale-cross-asset-research@ruf.dmp.cisco.com
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.societegenerale.com
DKIM — digital signature on email
Not detected (common selectors only) · Severity: OK · Not scoredNo DKIM key was found under the common selectors we probed. That doesn't mean DKIM is missing — selectors can't be listed from public DNS. Not scored.
A missing name for a probed selector (NXDOMAIN/NODATA) only means that selector isn't published. DKIM is marked unverified and excluded from the score. Check a sent message's Authentication-Results for dkim=pass and its s= selector.
Selectors checked: google, selector1, selector2, default, k1, s1, s2, dkim, mail, smtp — no key found google._domainkey: nxdomain selector1._domainkey: nxdomain selector2._domainkey: nxdomain default._domainkey: nxdomain k1._domainkey: nxdomain s1._domainkey: nxdomain s2._domainkey: nxdomain dkim._domainkey: nxdomain mail._domainkey: nxdomain smtp._domainkey: nxdomain
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.societegenerale.com
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
2 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
5 mail.iap.socgen.com 50 secmail.iap.socgen.com
$ dig +short MX societegenerale.com
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://societegenerale.com/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.societegenerale.com/fr). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://www.societegenerale.com/fr
$ curl -sIL https://societegenerale.com/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 301 → https://www.societegenerale.com/
HTTP 301 Location: https://www.societegenerale.com/
$ curl -sI http://societegenerale.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: DigiCert, expiring 2027-06-03 (195 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: DigiCert Valid from: 2026-11-17 Valid until: 2027-06-03 Names: afrique.societegenerale.com, banque.sg.fr, investors.societegenerale.com, p-backend.societegenerale.com, societegenerale.africa, societegenerale.com Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect societegenerale.com:443 -servername societegenerale.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.
max-age=31536000 (365 days), includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains, max-age=31536000
$ curl -sIL https://societegenerale.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
CSP — protection from script injection
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 3/8A policy protecting against malicious scripts exists in monitoring mode only.
Only Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only was found — violations are reported but not blocked.
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-eval' www.googletagmanager.com tag.aticdn.net cdn.krxd.net polyfill.io polyfill-fastly.io unpkg.com sdk.privacy-center.org *.hotjar.com *.siteimprove.net *.siteimprove.com *.youtube.com tools.euroland.com trinitymedia.ai *.trinitymedia.ai api.privacy-center.org www.googleadservices.com *.google.com pagead2.googlesyndication.com googleads.g.doubleclick.net cdn.polyfill.io *.clarity.ms c.bing.com cdn.jsdelivr.net cdn.jsdelivr.net cdn.id5-sync.com; object-src 'none'; style-src 'self' *.hotjar.com 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: www.googletagmanager.com *.google.com googleads.g.doubleclick.net pagead2.googlesyndication.com www.googleadservices.com *.hotjar.com *.clarity.ms c.bing.com sdk.privacy-center.org logs1409.xiti.com *.societegenerale.com; media-src 'self' *.ausha.co; frame-src 'self' www.googletagmanager.com *.youtube.com www.youtube-nocookie.com player.ausha.co trinitymedia.ai tools.eurolandir.com; frame-ancestors 'self'; child-src 'self'; font-src 'self' *.hotjar.com data:; connect-src 'self' www.googletagmanager.com *.google.com pagead2.googlesyndication.com www.googleadservices.com googleads.g.doubleclick.net *.hotjar.com *.hotjar.io wss://*.hotjar.com *.clarity.ms c.bing.com *.pa-cd.com *.siteimprove.net *.siteimprove.com api.privacy-center.org *.trinitymedia.ai; report-uri /csp-report
$ curl -sIL https://societegenerale.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://societegenerale.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
X-Content-Type-Options
Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.
nosniff is set.
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://societegenerale.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Referrer-Policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
$ curl -sIL https://societegenerale.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://societegenerale.com/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://societegenerale.com/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS societegenerale.com: NODATA
$ dig +short DS societegenerale.com
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec societegenerale.com SOA delv societegenerale.com
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 issue "digicert.com"
0 issue "digicert.com"
$ dig +short CAA societegenerale.com
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
4 NS servers.
tigdns01.socgen.com tigdns05.socgen.com tigdns06.socgen.com tigdns02.socgen.com
$ dig +short NS societegenerale.com
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rules1 unverified
- PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence1 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline1 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | societegenerale.com | 185.11.125.215 | 149.126.74.215 |
| AAAA | societegenerale.com | — |
| MX | societegenerale.com | 5 mail.iap.socgen.com | 50 secmail.iap.socgen.com |
| NS | societegenerale.com | tigdns01.socgen.com | tigdns05.socgen.com | tigdns06.socgen.com | tigdns02.socgen.com |
| TXT | societegenerale.com | v=spf1 include:_spf-a.iap.socgen.com -all | v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCrLHiExVd55zd/IQ/J/mRwSRMAocV/hMB3jXwaHH36d9NaVynQFYV8NaWi69c1veUtRzGt7yAioXqLj7Z4TeEUoOLgrKsn8YnckGs9i3B3tVFB+Ch/4mPhXWiNfNdynHWBcPcbJ8kjEQ2U8y78dHZj1YeRXXVvWob2OaKynO8/lQIDAQAB; | google-site-verification=T-yOvslrK0MCgYKCMIY_tfvbTUSLknB4SQzSickLoaY | cxf1px36yq8pywpw8z3hyzb4hl06phqt | google-site-verification=4XTCkoetbfYRSxg5sjgCiJeRZRO1D_IQ8cCJlVjxTD8 | _globalsign-domain-verification=3Z8bdt8iCWVQuFZDQkoKYwCoWBX6gyXdBAZWw1GzmI | facebook-domain-verification=8a2f8bzfxvigf6jn5wfjytfor29wps | 3j8g7tjxnn09vz3c4xch88q969fglg1z | cddw5j7y7f8j5plcnc3bpfy9vtqdgjxl | 28jx4j8j00p7hnp1bz5ggc721vjw9cm8 | _fifvgyve5euth6xyiup728hninuz6he | google-site-verification=X39fACn7v-noiXizBaFmSPYP9gJfQWdOkZwKDgyjcdc | _eelwr1cf8ws01at1xf28kjsqdxurfqm | dtm-domain-verification=Lvd-O22NzISd1ML8h5P6_2vvBpk1x-NcR3G8SM5QTGo | _lu82w3z5jxvfuu5lfdiriyymwx0d2j3 |
| TXT | _dmarc.societegenerale.com | v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:societe-generale-cross-asset-research@rua.dmp.cisco.com; ruf=mailto:societe-generale-cross-asset-research@ruf.dmp.cisco.com |
| CAA | societegenerale.com | 0 issue "digicert.com" |
| DS | societegenerale.com | — |