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Digital exposure report

swmed.edu

Critical findings in the observed public configuration. Some basic protections were not detected.

Scanned: 2026-11-17 21:04 UTC

Partial coverage: the score is based on 52% of applicable check weight. 8 unverified check(s) are excluded, not counted as failures.

F
48/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain

    Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.

    Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short TXT _dmarc.swmed.edu
  2. 2.

    Turn on DNS signing for your domain

    Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short DS swmed.edu

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
swmed.edu
Website request
GET https://swmed.edu/
Scan time
2026-11-17 21:04:53 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
  • HTTPS available · Unverified
  • SSL/TLS certificate validity · Unverified
  • HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Unverified
  • CSP — protection from script injection · Unverified
  • Clickjacking protection · Unverified
  • X-Content-Type-Options · Unverified
  • Referrer-Policy · Unverified
  • Permissions-Policy · Unverified

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security15/30Spoofing email in the company's name is possible in some cases.
Encryption & certificate7/7Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid.
Browser protections—Nothing in this category could be verified from public data.
DNS infrastructure3/15The domain's infrastructure lacks basic protections.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.HighDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+29
  2. 2.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+13
  3. 3.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+10

To verify

Couldn't be confirmed from public data, so excluded from the score. Checking them clarifies your posture; it doesn't guarantee a score change.

  • HTTPS available
  • SSL/TLS certificate validity
  • CSP — protection from script injection
  • HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
  • Clickjacking protection
  • X-Content-Type-Options
  • Referrer-Policy
  • Permissions-Policy

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.

Valid SPF record with -all. 2 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT swmed.edu
v=spf1 mx ip4:199.165.152.0/24 ip4:199.242.236.0/24 ip4:199.242.239.0/24 include:spf-00459502.pphosted.com -all
$ dig +short TXT swmed.edu
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/15

No policy tells mail servers to block forged email in the company's name — a common opening for CEO fraud and phishing.

No TXT record at _dmarc.swmed.edu. Without DMARC, mail failing SPF/DKIM may still reach the inbox.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.swmed.edu
(no DMARC record found)
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.swmed.edu
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
  2. Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
  3. Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.swmed.edu.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@swmed.edu; fo=1"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.

Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: selector1, selector2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.swmed.edu
selector1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDPjgXDK1Qh063rgCzVmgqVA/jLAW2qozz4…
selector2._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCr1XltIWZh6EDXP+6uPMaNzeGqrLXd+eZE…
$ dig +short TXT selector1._domainkey.swmed.edu
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

2 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX swmed.edu
10 mxa-00459502.gslb.pphosted.com
10 mxb-00459502.gslb.pphosted.com
$ dig +short MX swmed.edu
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

HTTPS couldn't be confirmed: the request timed out or the connection failed. This isn't treated as a security failure.

Requesting https://swmed.edu/ didn't complete (HTTP 526). Timeouts and transport errors may be transient; the check is excluded from the score.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://swmed.edu/
HTTP 526
$ curl -svI https://swmed.edu/ 2>&1 | grep -E "SSL|HTTP|expire"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.

HTTP 301 → https://www.utsouthwestern.edu/

Source data: HTTP GET http://swmed.edu/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 301
Location: https://www.utsouthwestern.edu/
$ curl -sI http://swmed.edu/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

The certificate couldn't be checked live because the HTTPS connection didn't complete. CT log data alone isn't used to score validity or expiry.

No live TLS evidence was obtained. CT entries are shown as context only. Not scored.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for swmed.edu
No valid certificate found in CT logs
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect swmed.edu:443 -servername swmed.edu 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.

No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.

Source data: Response headers from https://swmed.edu/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://swmed.edu/
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.

No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.

Source data: Response headers from https://swmed.edu/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://swmed.edu/
Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.

No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.

Source data: Response headers from https://swmed.edu/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://swmed.edu/
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.

No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.

Source data: Response headers from https://swmed.edu/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://swmed.edu/
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.

No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.

Source data: Response headers from https://swmed.edu/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://swmed.edu/
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Unverified · Severity: OK · Not scored

Couldn't be checked — no usable HTTPS response was obtained. Not scored.

No response with headers was received, so this header wasn't evaluated and is excluded from the score.

Source data: Response headers from https://swmed.edu/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://swmed.edu/
Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS swmed.edu: NODATA
$ dig +short DS swmed.edu
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec swmed.edu SOA
delv swmed.edu

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA swmed.edu
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA swmed.edu
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
swmed.edu.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
swmed.edu.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@swmed.edu"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

2 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS swmed.edu
ipamexternaldns02.swmed.org
ipamexternaldns01.swmed.org
$ dig +short NS swmed.edu
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps
  • PCI DSS v4.05 unverified
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence3 observed gaps · 3 unverified
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline1 observed gaps · 6 unverified

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Aswmed.edu199.242.239.105
AAAAswmed.edu—
MXswmed.edu10 mxa-00459502.gslb.pphosted.com | 10 mxb-00459502.gslb.pphosted.com
NSswmed.eduipamexternaldns02.swmed.org | ipamexternaldns01.swmed.org
TXTswmed.eduv=spf1 mx ip4:199.165.152.0/24 ip4:199.242.236.0/24 ip4:199.242.239.0/24 include:spf-00459502.pphosted.com -all
TXT_dmarc.swmed.edu—
CAAswmed.edu—
DSswmed.edu—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain