Digital exposure report
tamuc.edu
High exposure. Significant weaknesses put the brand, customers and email at risk.
Scanned: 2026-11-17 21:04 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain
Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.
Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS
How to verify after the fix
dig +short TXT _dmarc.tamuc.edu
- 2.
Tell browsers to always use the secure version
Helps browsers use HTTPS on future visits after they have received the policy.
Who can fix it: Your web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://tamuc.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- tamuc.edu
- Website request
- GET https://tamuc.edu/ → https://www.etamu.edu/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-17 21:04:53 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 19/30 | Spoofing email in the company's name is possible in some cases. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 12/30 | Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 8/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.HighHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+8
- 2.MediumDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+10
- 3.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 4.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
- 5.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
- 6.LowSoftware version disclosure · Hardening gap
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.
~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 3 of 10 DNS lookups.
v=spf1 include:spf0.tamuc.edu include:spf1.tamuc.edu include:spf2.tamuc.edu ~all
$ dig +short TXT tamuc.edu
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 5/15DMARC is in monitoring mode only — forged email still reaches recipients.
Policy p=none. p=none collects reports but does not protect.
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:ipm2q7z@ar.glockapps.com,mailto:dmarc-reports@tamuc.edu; ruf=mailto:ipm2q7z@fr.glockapps.com,mailto:dmarc-reports@tamuc.edu; aspf=r; fo=1;
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.tamuc.edu
- Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
- Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
- Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.tamuc.edu. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@tamuc.edu; fo=1"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: s1, s2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0zQicgxhKARjR7AQBU4QMLzDueUnxJGZ… s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDGUkf1GVq+liL63kKfrDOy4OF+2GldRQmKviQK…
$ dig +short TXT s1._domainkey.tamuc.edu
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
2 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
20 tamuc-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com 10 smtpagent.tamuc.edu
$ dig +short MX tamuc.edu
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://tamuc.edu/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.etamu.edu/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://www.etamu.edu/
$ curl -sIL https://tamuc.edu/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 302 → https://tamuc.edu/
HTTP 302 Location: https://tamuc.edu/
$ curl -sI http://tamuc.edu/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: Sectigo, expiring 2027-01-24 (68 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: Sectigo Valid from: 2026-07-10 Valid until: 2027-01-24 Names: tamuc.edu Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect tamuc.edu:443 -servername tamuc.edu 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/8Browsers aren't told to always use an encrypted connection, enabling interception attacks on public networks.
No Strict-Transport-Security header. Users are exposed to SSL stripping on the first request.
Strict-Transport-Security: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://tamuc.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
- Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
- Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
- Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/* Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.
CSP — protection from script injection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.
No Content-Security-Policy header found.
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://tamuc.edu/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://tamuc.edu/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
X-Content-Type-Options
Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.
nosniff is set.
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://tamuc.edu/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Referrer-Policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy: same-origin, strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Referrer-Policy: same-origin, strict-origin-when-cross-origin
$ curl -sIL https://tamuc.edu/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://tamuc.edu/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · unscoredThe server discloses its software version, making it easier for attackers to find known vulnerabilities.
Headers with a version number: x-powered-by: PHP/8.4.27. Informational finding, does not affect the score.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: PHP/8.4.27
$ curl -sIL https://tamuc.edu/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
- Hide version numbers in the server settings.
server_tokens off;
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS tamuc.edu: NODATA
$ dig +short DS tamuc.edu
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec tamuc.edu SOA delv tamuc.edu
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 issue "ssl.com" | 0 issuewild "ssl.com" | 0 iodef "mailto:sslnotify@etamu.edu"
0 issue "ssl.com" 0 issuewild "ssl.com" 0 iodef "mailto:sslnotify@etamu.edu"
$ dig +short CAA tamuc.edu
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
3 NS servers.
dns1.tamuc.edu dns3.tamuc.edu dns2.tamuc.edu
$ dig +short NS tamuc.edu
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps
- PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence3 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline4 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | tamuc.edu | 68.232.2.164 |
| AAAA | tamuc.edu | — |
| MX | tamuc.edu | 20 tamuc-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com | 10 smtpagent.tamuc.edu |
| NS | tamuc.edu | dns1.tamuc.edu | dns3.tamuc.edu | dns2.tamuc.edu |
| TXT | tamuc.edu | adobe-idp-site-verification=81911ca83bff0fcda0e16dc65501cf868bf998f9bb37032eccc905e2b8f8045f | google-site-verification=Pmh9FtRcvNUgko6YRfS-ji8MzwNFuN31wTYbCMwScso | apple-domain-verification=6zqMD017faVIXRum | k7e6hc5envmo3dkdftk4bbb3sq | RBMMO7LDQ70TN4B61569AS27A | MS=3F6FCFA79153BCE660E481ACFC92228001474922 | docusign=4e290b27-d83d-4def-a196-51b8f63057a4 | etjniji56bh7p0fqkg9dmjtule | v=spf1 include:spf0.tamuc.edu include:spf1.tamuc.edu include:spf2.tamuc.edu ~all | MS=ms88757214 | smartsheet-site-validation=55KnCDAWOBWxNHX_6mgYdkwsFRLMt5Jm | QXE344E09Z19ILY3NEKNJNQ898XBEOZ0O4LKVTOIH | google-site-verification=T1slYGbHV5QSvXAIg0dXkLJR_79wX2udq0_vzRy6ArM | 0T+16OwXdLiUFOlVbUhYWXt7ZXnAs+e+JdH8kqljLB0tqDCqWowDgpf3WA67Vog6AQLrq/Fob7bFLQ7JJyOLqQ== | ZOOM_verify_LqseZ2YJsKhS89VnI8BPAf |
| TXT | _dmarc.tamuc.edu | v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:ipm2q7z@ar.glockapps.com,mailto:dmarc-reports@tamuc.edu; ruf=mailto:ipm2q7z@fr.glockapps.com,mailto:dmarc-reports@tamuc.edu; aspf=r; fo=1; |
| CAA | tamuc.edu | 0 issue "ssl.com" | 0 issuewild "ssl.com" | 0 iodef "mailto:sslnotify@etamu.edu" |
| DS | tamuc.edu | — |