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Digital exposure report

teva.com

Good shape, with a few gaps worth closing this quarter.

Scanned: 2026-11-20 07:34 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

B
82/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run

    This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.

    Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sIL https://teva.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
  2. 2.

    Stop browsers from guessing file types

    This removes one way a file could be treated as something it is not.

    Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sIL https://teva.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
teva.com
Website request
GET https://teva.com/ → https://www.teva.com/
Scan time
2026-11-20 07:34:31 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
None. Every applicable check was assessed.

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security29/30Spoofing email from this domain is hard.
Encryption & certificate25/25Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid.
Browser protections13/30Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing.
DNS infrastructure15/15The domain's infrastructure is well hardened.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
  2. 2.LowX-Content-Type-Options · Hardening gap+4
  3. 3.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
  4. 4.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10

An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.

~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 1 of 10 DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT teva.com
v=spf1 include:%{ir}.%{v}.%{d}.spf.has.pphosted.com ~all
$ dig +short TXT teva.com
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15

Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.

Policy p=reject.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.teva.com
v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.teva.com
Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: default. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.teva.com
default._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAzvGFzNdsQngfRoOC0/94wZklOnxy…
$ dig +short TXT default._domainkey.teva.com
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

2 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX teva.com
10 mxa-00352c01.gslb.pphosted.com
10 mxb-00352c01.gslb.pphosted.com
$ dig +short MX teva.com
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://teva.com/ returned HTTP 403 (final URL: https://www.teva.com/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://teva.com/
HTTP 403
Final URL: https://www.teva.com/
$ curl -sIL https://teva.com/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.

HTTP 308 → https://teva.com/

Source data: HTTP GET http://teva.com/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 308
Location: https://teva.com/
$ curl -sI http://teva.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: DigiCert, expiring 2027-05-22 (183 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for teva.com
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: DigiCert
Valid from: 2026-11-05
Valid until: 2027-05-22
Names: *.teva.com, teva.com
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect teva.com:443 -servername teva.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.

max-age=63072000 (730 days), includeSubDomains, preload. ≥ 180 days recommended.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.teva.com/
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload
$ curl -sIL https://teva.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8

Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.

No Content-Security-Policy header found.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.teva.com/
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://teva.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Source data: Response headers from https://www.teva.com/
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://teva.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/4

The browser may interpret files as code unintentionally.

Missing X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header (MIME sniffing).

Source data: Response headers from https://www.teva.com/
X-Content-Type-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://teva.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff to every response.
/*
  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.

Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3

Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.teva.com/
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://teva.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/*
  Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.

Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2

Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.

Missing Permissions-Policy header.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.teva.com/
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://teva.com/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/*
  Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.

Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.teva.com/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://teva.com/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

The domain's records are digitally signed and hard to forge.

An AD (Authenticated Data) flag was returned by a validating resolver.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = true
$ dig +dnssec teva.com | grep -E "flags:.* ad"
Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.

CAA records: 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issuewild "digicert.com" | 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"

Source data: DNS CAA teva.com
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
0 issuewild "digicert.com"
0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
$ dig +short CAA teva.com
Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

6 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS teva.com
ns10.ultradns2.com
ns10.ultradns2.org
edns3.ultradns.biz
edns3.ultradns.com
edns3.ultradns.net
edns3.ultradns.org
$ dig +short NS teva.com
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
  • PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligenceNo gaps observed
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Ateva.com146.75.30.137
AAAAteva.com—
MXteva.com10 mxa-00352c01.gslb.pphosted.com | 10 mxb-00352c01.gslb.pphosted.com
NSteva.comns10.ultradns2.com | ns10.ultradns2.org | edns3.ultradns.biz | edns3.ultradns.com | edns3.ultradns.net | edns3.ultradns.org
TXTteva.com_czp9j7k1abxrb2wktr3jhq9yi3gakex | _j0xzt5pfyn1g1sqslfcppfo1369swey | klaviyo-site-verification=RUaGfc | klaviyo-site-verification=Ssa4Rd | klaviyo-site-verification=UjfCmp | klaviyo-site-verification=Vy4MRC | lucid-verification=<fmt9gwezymu1a08s33ju> | v=spf1 include:%{ir}.%{v}.%{d}.spf.has.pphosted.com ~all | rovag_verification_token=53570EF78AFB4E8FB44914EA22C3BD91 | google-site-verification=jlyT0COZmXlnBCu-ewwWgJTR3yIb34Yn6FqdciqxTeI | google-site-verification=vS0HZ1rUmvj7psdaAoGfT6Pkb1ZH6wegkC9jlyDuEYA
TXT_dmarc.teva.comv=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com
CAAteva.com0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issuewild "digicert.com" | 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
DSteva.com54459 13 2 65440fddd840fe110ef28111ec1aa3d3f3275285ddadacc93df13aa1a7c50486
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain