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Digital exposure report

tfh-berlin.de

Critical findings in the observed public configuration. Some basic protections were not detected.

Scanned: 2026-11-17 23:03 UTC

Partial coverage: the score is based on 95% of applicable check weight. 1 unverified check(s) are excluded, not counted as failures.

F
44/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain

    Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.

    Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short TXT _dmarc.tfh-berlin.de
  2. 2.

    Tell browsers to always use the secure version

    Helps browsers use HTTPS on future visits after they have received the policy.

    Who can fix it: Your web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sIL https://tfh-berlin.de/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
tfh-berlin.de
Website request
GET https://tfh-berlin.de/ → https://www.bht-berlin.de/
Scan time
2026-11-17 23:03:15 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
  • DKIM — digital signature on email · Not detected (common selectors only)

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security10/25An attacker can send email that looks like it came from the company.
Encryption & certificate25/25Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid.
Browser protections4/30Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing.
DNS infrastructure3/15The domain's infrastructure lacks basic protections.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.HighHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+8
  2. 2.HighDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+16
  3. 3.MediumClickjacking protection · Hardening gap+5
  4. 4.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
  5. 5.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
  6. 6.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+5
  7. 7.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
  8. 8.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2

To verify

Couldn't be confirmed from public data, so excluded from the score. Checking them clarifies your posture; it doesn't guarantee a score change.

  • DKIM — digital signature on email

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.

Valid SPF record with -all. 1 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT tfh-berlin.de
v=spf1 include:_spf.bht-berlin.de -all
$ dig +short TXT tfh-berlin.de
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/15

No policy tells mail servers to block forged email in the company's name — a common opening for CEO fraud and phishing.

No TXT record at _dmarc.tfh-berlin.de. Without DMARC, mail failing SPF/DKIM may still reach the inbox.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.tfh-berlin.de
(no DMARC record found)
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.tfh-berlin.de
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
  2. Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
  3. Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.tfh-berlin.de.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@tfh-berlin.de; fo=1"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.

Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Not detected (common selectors only) · Severity: OK · Not scored

No DKIM key was found under the common selectors we probed. That doesn't mean DKIM is missing — selectors can't be listed from public DNS. Not scored.

A missing name for a probed selector (NXDOMAIN/NODATA) only means that selector isn't published. DKIM is marked unverified and excluded from the score. Check a sent message's Authentication-Results for dkim=pass and its s= selector.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.tfh-berlin.de
Selectors checked: google, selector1, selector2, default, k1, s1, s2, dkim, mail, smtp — no key found
google._domainkey: nxdomain
selector1._domainkey: nxdomain
selector2._domainkey: nxdomain
default._domainkey: nxdomain
k1._domainkey: nxdomain
s1._domainkey: nxdomain
s2._domainkey: nxdomain
dkim._domainkey: nxdomain
mail._domainkey: nxdomain
smtp._domainkey: nxdomain
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.tfh-berlin.de
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

2 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX tfh-berlin.de
10 mx1.bht-berlin.de
10 mx2.bht-berlin.de
$ dig +short MX tfh-berlin.de
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://tfh-berlin.de/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.bht-berlin.de/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://tfh-berlin.de/
HTTP 200
Final URL: https://www.bht-berlin.de/
$ curl -sIL https://tfh-berlin.de/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.

HTTP 301 → https://www.bht-berlin.de/

Source data: HTTP GET http://tfh-berlin.de/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 301
Location: https://www.bht-berlin.de/
$ curl -sI http://tfh-berlin.de/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: HARICA, expiring 2027-04-01 (134 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for tfh-berlin.de
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: HARICA
Valid from: 2026-09-14
Valid until: 2027-04-01
Names: beuth-hochschule.de, bht-berlin.de, bht-hochschule.de, tfh-berlin.de, www.beuth-hochschule.de, www.bht-berlin.de
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect tfh-berlin.de:443 -servername tfh-berlin.de 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/8

Browsers aren't told to always use an encrypted connection, enabling interception attacks on public networks.

No Strict-Transport-Security header. Users are exposed to SSL stripping on the first request.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.bht-berlin.de/
Strict-Transport-Security: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://tfh-berlin.de/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
  2. Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
  3. Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/*
  Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.

Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8

Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.

No Content-Security-Policy header found.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.bht-berlin.de/
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://tfh-berlin.de/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/5

Missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors: this removes one layer of protection against clickjacking.

No valid X-Frame-Options and no frame-ancestors in the CSP.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.bht-berlin.de/
X-Frame-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://tfh-berlin.de/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Add X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (or DENY if the site is never embedded anywhere).
  2. Also set frame-ancestors in the CSP — the modern alternative.
/*
  X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. If partners embed the site in an iframe, add them to frame-ancestors instead of using DENY.

Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4

The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.

nosniff is set.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.bht-berlin.de/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://tfh-berlin.de/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3

Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.bht-berlin.de/
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://tfh-berlin.de/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/*
  Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.

Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2

Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.

Missing Permissions-Policy header.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.bht-berlin.de/
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://tfh-berlin.de/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/*
  Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.

Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.bht-berlin.de/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://tfh-berlin.de/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS tfh-berlin.de: NODATA
$ dig +short DS tfh-berlin.de
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec tfh-berlin.de SOA
delv tfh-berlin.de

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA tfh-berlin.de
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA tfh-berlin.de
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
tfh-berlin.de.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
tfh-berlin.de.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@tfh-berlin.de"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

2 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS tfh-berlin.de
deneb.dfn.de
dns.bht-berlin.de
$ dig +short NS tfh-berlin.de
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps · 1 unverified
  • PCI DSS v4.03 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence4 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline4 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Atfh-berlin.de141.64.5.76
AAAAtfh-berlin.de—
MXtfh-berlin.de10 mx1.bht-berlin.de | 10 mx2.bht-berlin.de
NStfh-berlin.dedeneb.dfn.de | dns.bht-berlin.de
TXTtfh-berlin.dev=spf1 include:_spf.bht-berlin.de -all | HARICA-FqHp681il82C1rGxuqa | ZOOM_verify_NAeVAJa9RZABodSBqCcIfp
TXT_dmarc.tfh-berlin.de—
CAAtfh-berlin.de—
DStfh-berlin.de—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain