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Digital exposure report

truist.com

Good shape, with a few gaps worth closing this quarter.

Scanned: 2026-11-19 02:55 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

B
85/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Turn on DNS signing for your domain

    Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short DS truist.com
  2. 2.

    Limit what your site shares when visitors click links

    This reduces how much page address detail is passed to other websites.

    Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host

    How to verify after the fix

    curl -sIL https://truist.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
truist.com
Website request
GET https://truist.com/ → https://www.truist.com/
Scan time
2026-11-19 02:55:39 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
None. Every applicable check was assessed.

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security30/30Spoofing email from this domain is hard.
Encryption & certificate25/25Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid.
Browser protections22/30Some browser protections are missing.
DNS infrastructure8/15The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
  2. 2.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
  3. 3.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
  4. 4.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.

Valid SPF record with -all. 1 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT truist.com
v=spf1 include:guard.truist.com -all
$ dig +short TXT truist.com
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 15/15

Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.

Policy p=reject.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.truist.com
v=DMARC1;p=reject;fo=1;rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.truist.com
Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: s1, s2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.truist.com
s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAsr6V1jPXhfPC8LsyGFrX3zE8cryXEPwh…
s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC52MgrqFO6b20z1AjF6dVNCM7BNiGOMWCXaPvR…
$ dig +short TXT s1._domainkey.truist.com
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

2 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX truist.com
10 mxa-0058fb01.gslb.pphosted.com
10 mxb-0058fb01.gslb.pphosted.com
$ dig +short MX truist.com
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://truist.com/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.truist.com/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://truist.com/
HTTP 200
Final URL: https://www.truist.com/
$ curl -sIL https://truist.com/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.

HTTP 301 → https://truist.com/

Source data: HTTP GET http://truist.com/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 301
Location: https://truist.com/
$ curl -sI http://truist.com/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. No matching certificate details were available from CT logs; run the verify command to see the served certificate's dates.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for truist.com
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
The CT log service was unavailable at the time of the check
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect truist.com:443 -servername truist.com 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.

max-age=63072000 (730 days), includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.truist.com/
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubdomains;
$ curl -sIL https://truist.com/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8

A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.

script-src includes: 'unsafe-inline', 'unsafe-eval', a broad source (* / https: / data:) — weakens XSS protection.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.truist.com/
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' *.truist.com *.truist-tst.com *.truist-prd.com *.lightstream.com *.truistleadershipinstitute.com *.sheffieldfinancial.com *.afcodirect.com *.cafo.com *.postechnologygroup.com *.primeratepfc.com *.regionalacceptance.com  https://gateway.zscalerthree.net https://fast.wistia.com 4264071.fls.doubleclick.net https: accdn.lpsnmedia.net ad.doubleclick.net adservice.google.com analytics.tiktok.com bat.bing.com cdnjs.cloudflare.com cdn.cookielaw.org https://assets.adobedtm.com cm.g.doubleclick.net connect.facebook.com connect.facebook.net ct.pinterest.com d.adroll.com doubleclick.net dsum-sec.casalemedia.com eb2.3lift.com geolocation.onetrust.com globalsiteanalytics.com googleads.g.doubleclick.net ib.adnxs.com idsync.rlcdn.com image2.pubmatic.com img.en25.com insight.adsrvr.org js.adsrvr.org login.zscalerthree.net lpcdn.lpsnmedia.net lptag.liveperson.net pixel.rubiconproject.com px.ads.linkedin.com s.adroll.com s.pinimg.com s1137986.t.eloqua.com s1358293874.t.eloqua.com sc-static.net siteintercept.qualtrics.com snap.licdn.com snapchat.com solutions.invocacdn.com static.ads-twitter.com sync.outbrain.com sync.taboola.com td.doubleclick.net tr.snapchat.com trc.taboola.com ups.analytics.yahoo.com us-u.openx.net utt.impactcdn.com va.v.liveperson.net www.facebook.com www.googleadservices.com www.googletagmanager.com www.pages02.net www.sc.pages02.net x.bidswitch.net zn9enqgwlulcwnbsw-truistcx.siteintercept.qualtrics.com blob:; worker-src 'self' blob:, frame-ancestors test.lightstream.com www.lightstream.com *.truist.com *.truist-tst.com *.truist-prd.com;
$ curl -sIL https://truist.com/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Source data: Response headers from https://www.truist.com/
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://truist.com/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4

The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.

nosniff is set.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.truist.com/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://truist.com/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3

Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.truist.com/
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://truist.com/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/*
  Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.

Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2

Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.

Missing Permissions-Policy header.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.truist.com/
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://truist.com/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/*
  Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.

Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.truist.com/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://truist.com/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS truist.com: NODATA
$ dig +short DS truist.com
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec truist.com SOA
delv truist.com

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.

CAA records: 0 issue "entrust.net" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 contactemail "ccs_certificate_services@truist.com" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "amazon.com"

Source data: DNS CAA truist.com
0 issue "entrust.net"
0 issue "digicert.com"
0 contactemail "ccs_certificate_services@truist.com"
0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issue "amazon.com"
$ dig +short CAA truist.com
Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

6 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS truist.com
a11-64.akam.net
a24-67.akam.net
a1-33.akam.net
a20-66.akam.net
a3-64.akam.net
a14-65.akam.net
$ dig +short NS truist.com
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
  • PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence1 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline1 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Atruist.com23.212.249.18 | 23.212.249.25
AAAAtruist.com2600:1407:3c00:cc::172d:2ed2 | 2600:1407:3c00:cc::172d:2ec7
MXtruist.com10 mxa-0058fb01.gslb.pphosted.com | 10 mxb-0058fb01.gslb.pphosted.com
NStruist.coma11-64.akam.net | a24-67.akam.net | a1-33.akam.net | a20-66.akam.net | a3-64.akam.net | a14-65.akam.net
TXTtruist.com00Dbc000008wzUj=1TBbc0000000CSb | 00Dca0000036s2r=1TBca0000000CVp | 00Ddn000004L9kL=1TBdn0000000LXV | 00DWe000006mOG4=1TBWe0000000NSr | 00Ddh000005tcdV=1TBdh0000000QH3 | docusign=dad8f48c-d94f-4f98-9ab2-c92c5a568fd3 | 00DD30000002hlv=1TBD3000000CaZq | kbq0kg69w5d4nl6szn5q512qzsyj1l74 | 00DcX000003Vqzt=1TBcX0000000CsP | 00Dbc000009WWkN=1TBbc0000000Efh | 00Dbb000007y6WL=1TBbb0000000QNV | webexdomainverification.4C675B8B706EB136E053AB06FC0A3F65=0e5107ae-d9c8-419d-92cf-387218c08aa3 | 00DDj0000009ckD=1TBDj000000002s | 00D30000000nB3g=1TB7y00000001yc | 00DKT000000H1Tm=1TBbf0000000MdF | 00Df40000047wt9=1TBcx0000000DDN | astro-domain-verification=cmlseumu5008m01mzm7uuhjkl | 00DD30000002oWd=1TBD300000000AV | h1-domain-verification=Xn94LiyheU6ae7bN114FMKsik7WsqkMfTD1pTdbNgrkqVuUx | 00Dbb0000082oDp=1TBbb0000000S9B | 00D1N000002tH4t=1TBHu000000oLl1 | 00DOz00000DQdMP=1TBOz0000000MAD | 00D80000000cZ5G=1TBPo0000000BTK | 00DD30000002g7d=1TBD30000008OQn | 00DEc00000fFkXa=1TBEc0000000zeb | 00DKQ0000000liV=1TBKQ0000004C9x | 00DRt00000RAbN1=1TBRt00000010Z3 | _6a1kxckj6tg2mubxipki8zjsnbg33d0 | 00DD30000002oZO=1TBD300000000A6 | 00DWD00000CVvfp=1TBWD0000000H8v | MS=ms32988301 | intersight=9bc75a7a1da45e31dd6a18e3a12d77d7499fc9083b65355288dbad752499f15b | 00D8a000003hMNI=1TBV400000001dd | miro-verification=72f17c85d38a55f71c24c21f2ec9de0345255e07 | 00D7g0000010tuZ=1TBD7000000GmcV | 00DO400000QrPXb=1TBO40000000dhJ | 00DA0000000XsvL=1TBKW000000KylE | 2bs2vr94lfkv9cw5xxff577mx2sg5kv8 | 00DWe000006i2Vh=1TBWe0000000NKn | apple-domain-verification=cPILP62SPz5iIgkz | 00D300000000Y6k=1TBVt00000002ug | 00DWe000005ilGT=1TBWe0000000J97 | adobe-idp-site-verification=8be79ff8c9e2e113482edc4bcf0042e03d6fbdb9ff6129dd1566163755aba715 | 00DD7000000jd6d=1TBD70000004CBs | 00Dbb000007xHC5=1TBbb0000000QQj | 00D6g000005jjwk=1TBKi000000oLm8 | 00DD300000035vi=1TBD3000000Gmek | 00Dbc000008KZQ2=1TBbc0000000B1t | v=spf1 include:guard.truist.com -all | 00Ddo000003Jfs9=1TBdo00000008Yf | 00DD30000002fVZ=1TBD30000008OPQ | 00Dbc00000Agdf7=1TBbc0000000Fwj | 00Dbc0000096fWL=1TBbc0000000DGb | 00Dbc000008LBDZ=1TBbc0000000ACH | 00Dh80000003v6b=1TBh800000000eL | 00Dh80000002iMj=1TBh800000000Mb | 00Ddo000001kdVd=1TBdo00000008Gv | 00DD30000002dwt=1TBD3000000007q | 00Ddn000003Y1Pl=1TBdn0000000BQ5 | paloaltonetworks-site-verification=4bca506e9536457cb5dcf2f0b35934927d147ba86534ff04379205210ced2f83 | 00Ddo000002ThDJ=1TBdo000000085d | 00DWE00000TWq7d=1TBWE0000000V2D | webexdomainverification.5ccf42bd88c96ea2e053ab06fc0ad1ac=fc5abaed-f8f2-4f13-8af5-fdb4203be5cd | 00D300000000Auu=1TBV100000003PL | 00DWD00000CVvW9=1TBWD0000000HiP | 00Ddn000003qZRN=1TBdn0000000FdN | T00D020000004iYW=1TBhQ00000000o1 | 00Df4000001Rdnn=1TBHs000000Caeg | docusign=5ad2fa99-d925-40b4-9458-d18be81e3a6e | intersight=233454335f00eb1eede6d17340c218134ac080ceba27062e2cce6671fbab2fcf | 00DDg0000001qCt=1TBDg0000008OKD | 00DD30000002dT9=1TBD30000008OPf | adobe-idp-site-verification=f2e902ee68b528ac1c3409d088acea869546aa5b95caa8d4912c9ff897787acb | 1qzps66pjgc66t9cc1pf24yhj1frqfpn | webexdomainverification.5cbebb51d63e79a2e053ab06fc0a1ac7=1a645b1e-3960-416d-a822-9bcb40050ae8 | 00DO200000IhXCr=1TBO20000000Uu9 | mnbfdm71yvy6zpkwj1gts5wwbfh21r65 | 00DQL00000UHNAD=1TBQL0000001GsL | 00DWD00000CUMQn=1TBWD0000000HIb | 00DWD00000CUMc8=1TBWD0000000H0r | cisco-ci-domain-verification=67cb40e2652201094ba62a769fbf78df731009e7b40bbf59c8517acec1d9ff45 | webexdomainverification.4C675B8A75F8B136E053AB06FC0A3F65=40d83fcd-377b-472d-adae-b448f68bb717 | 00DWJ000006KFIn=1TBWJ0000000Em9 | facebook-domain-verification=rotdamnpfarq4c4n6jzg3bdevamu0y | webexdomainverification.4C675B8B6994B136E053AB06FC0A3F65=91d30105-341b-490b-9404-bd42b288930e | l4fp5hdlfz75gt37t766xgxfbn4x4336 | 00DDw000005FD1O=1TBDw0000008OMD | 00Ddn000003ZtZN=1TBdn0000000AiX | 00Ddo000003qFMD=1TBdo0000000AQn | 00DD30000002NO4=1TBD30000004CE9 | webexdomainverification.4C675B8AE86CB136E053AB06FC0A3F65=ee55fa20-cd63-487f-97e0-f4227f7dcc2e | 00DDL00000CuGhL=1TBDL000000000R | 00DO100000Jgl9F=1TBO10000000PPp | 00Dd0000000fcBH=1TBQQ0000000ERC | verification_token=bP4Y31y2KtobJuBWcDdIB56tA | Dynatrace-site-verification=c7ced738-3ac7-47a1-8636-6219e38c49c2__o9k4jedn5nr5oh1uf7j27aqil0 | 00Ddx00000512jF=1TBdx0000000All | 00Dbc0000094Y5x=1TBbc0000000CsP | 00Ddn000003pjuG=1TBdn0000000Fa9 | webexdomainverification.4C675B8B62CFB136E053AB06FC0A3F65=e2d6ca06-9a82-47f8-9887-a19689c7c8ba | 00Dbb000009UfvK=1TBbb0000000W9Z | 00D8G0000004ZnT=1TBdz0000000AnN | 00DWA000005pfav=1TBWA0000004iaL | 00D3I0000008lxN=1TBhQ000000010v | box-domain-verification=ad0802caca7c385e40663e324f646a7053f53cd9fa92d0278f3fea20762e0ddd | pendo-domain-verification=ef646651-a876-4b75-a477-c89ec53d0e3e | 00DhG000000HtMf=1TBhG00000004Wf | google-site-verification=T-upWE7V45_qgyNZWnhzdSAWimeRn2OixRvOYIndCoo | zywave-domain-verification=dHO4vDtSpZW8tI/LGtmSQCmJRrl3OH2ZH2bXSor1Lsk= | snowflake-verification=1b113220-01a1-1000-8074-0000000003f8 | 00DD30000001dhD=1TBD3000000KymA
TXT_dmarc.truist.comv=DMARC1;p=reject;fo=1;rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com
CAAtruist.com0 issue "entrust.net" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 contactemail "ccs_certificate_services@truist.com" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "amazon.com"
DStruist.com—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain