Back to results

Digital exposure report

twcu.ac.jp

Critical findings in the observed public configuration. Some basic protections were not detected.

Scanned: 2026-11-22 21:55 UTC

Partial coverage: the score is based on 88% of applicable check weight. 1 unverified check(s) are excluded, not counted as failures.

F
35/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain

    Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.

    Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short TXT _dmarc.twcu.ac.jp
  2. 2.

    List the servers allowed to send your email

    Without this list, it is easier for others to send email that looks like it came from you.

    Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short TXT twcu.ac.jp

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
twcu.ac.jp
Website request
GET https://twcu.ac.jp/(no HTTPS response)
Scan time
2026-11-22 21:55:28 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
  • DKIM — digital signature on email · Not detected (common selectors only)
  • HTTPS available · Not applicable
  • HTTP → HTTPS redirect · Not applicable
  • SSL/TLS certificate validity · Not applicable
  • HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Not applicable
  • CSP — protection from script injection · Not applicable
  • Clickjacking protection · Not applicable
  • X-Content-Type-Options · Not applicable
  • Referrer-Policy · Not applicable
  • Permissions-Policy · Not applicable

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security4/25An attacker can send email that looks like it came from the company.
Encryption & certificate—Not applicable to this domain.
Browser protections—Not applicable to this domain.
DNS infrastructure10/15The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.HighDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+38
  2. 2.MediumSPF — who may send mail for the domain · Hardening gap+15
  3. 3.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+13

To verify

Couldn't be confirmed from public data, so excluded from the score. Checking them clarifies your posture; it doesn't guarantee a score change.

  • DKIM — digital signature on email

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 4/10

The SPF record is neutral and does not block unauthorized senders.

?all (neutral) does not tell the receiving server to reject or flag mail from servers not on the list.

Source data: DNS TXT twcu.ac.jp
v=spf1 +ip4:202.11.168.0/21 include:_spf.google.com ?all
$ dig +short TXT twcu.ac.jp
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Map every service that sends mail in the domain's name (Google Workspace / Microsoft 365, newsletter tool, CRM).
  2. Publish exactly one TXT record at the domain root starting with v=spf1.
  3. Start with ~all, and move to -all once DMARC reports confirm all legitimate senders are covered.
twcu.ac.jp.  TXT  "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. An incorrect record can block legitimate mail — add every sender before tightening.

Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/15

No policy tells mail servers to block forged email in the company's name — a common opening for CEO fraud and phishing.

No TXT record at _dmarc.twcu.ac.jp. Without DMARC, mail failing SPF/DKIM may still reach the inbox.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.twcu.ac.jp
(no DMARC record found)
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.twcu.ac.jp
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
  2. Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
  3. Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.twcu.ac.jp.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@twcu.ac.jp; fo=1"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.

Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Not detected (common selectors only) · Severity: OK · Not scored

No DKIM key was found under the common selectors we probed. That doesn't mean DKIM is missing — selectors can't be listed from public DNS. Not scored.

A missing name for a probed selector (NXDOMAIN/NODATA) only means that selector isn't published. DKIM is marked unverified and excluded from the score. Check a sent message's Authentication-Results for dkim=pass and its s= selector.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.twcu.ac.jp
Selectors checked: google, selector1, selector2, default, k1, s1, s2, dkim, mail, smtp — no key found
google._domainkey: nxdomain
selector1._domainkey: nxdomain
selector2._domainkey: nxdomain
default._domainkey: nxdomain
k1._domainkey: nxdomain
s1._domainkey: nxdomain
s2._domainkey: nxdomain
dkim._domainkey: nxdomain
mail._domainkey: nxdomain
smtp._domainkey: nxdomain
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.twcu.ac.jp
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

7 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX twcu.ac.jp
10 aspmx.l.google.com
20 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
20 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
30 aspmx2.googlemail.com
30 aspmx3.googlemail.com
30 aspmx4.googlemail.com
30 aspmx5.googlemail.com
$ dig +short MX twcu.ac.jp
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://twcu.ac.jp/
No A/AAAA record for the domain
$ curl -svI https://twcu.ac.jp/ 2>&1 | grep -E "SSL|HTTP|expire"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

Source data: HTTP GET http://twcu.ac.jp/ (redirects not followed)
Not checked
$ curl -sI http://twcu.ac.jp/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for twcu.ac.jp
No valid certificate found in CT logs
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect twcu.ac.jp:443 -servername twcu.ac.jp 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://twcu.ac.jp/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://twcu.ac.jp/
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://twcu.ac.jp/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://twcu.ac.jp/
Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://twcu.ac.jp/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://twcu.ac.jp/
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://twcu.ac.jp/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://twcu.ac.jp/
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://twcu.ac.jp/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://twcu.ac.jp/
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://twcu.ac.jp/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://twcu.ac.jp/
Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

The domain's records are digitally signed and hard to forge.

An AD (Authenticated Data) flag was returned by a validating resolver.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = true
$ dig +dnssec twcu.ac.jp | grep -E "flags:.* ad"
Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA twcu.ac.jp
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA twcu.ac.jp
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
twcu.ac.jp.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
twcu.ac.jp.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@twcu.ac.jp"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

3 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS twcu.ac.jp
ns006-eaphdoi2nq6l5ej5.e.d-53.jp
ns006-eaphdoi2nq6l5ej5.e.d-53.net
ns006-eaphdoi2nq6l5ej5.e.d-53.info
$ dig +short NS twcu.ac.jp
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules2 observed gaps · 1 unverified
  • PCI DSS v4.0Not applicable
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence3 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Atwcu.ac.jp—
AAAAtwcu.ac.jp—
MXtwcu.ac.jp10 aspmx.l.google.com | 20 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com | 20 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com | 30 aspmx2.googlemail.com | 30 aspmx3.googlemail.com | 30 aspmx4.googlemail.com | 30 aspmx5.googlemail.com
NStwcu.ac.jpns006-eaphdoi2nq6l5ej5.e.d-53.jp | ns006-eaphdoi2nq6l5ej5.e.d-53.net | ns006-eaphdoi2nq6l5ej5.e.d-53.info
TXTtwcu.ac.jp1B0E6B747D6170C5B74E5F6F1FC7EDC1 | iijid=7b733c18201f21ad5dc17b5f0a26ed12 | v=spf1 +ip4:202.11.168.0/21 include:_spf.google.com ?all
TXT_dmarc.twcu.ac.jp—
CAAtwcu.ac.jp—
DStwcu.ac.jp57776 13 2 a036ab4f0af4c25a990784d6db466d9f9cfe9924b3b623e7b6e4bbf7fcd190f3
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain