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Digital exposure report

u-sacred-heart.ac.jp

Critical findings in the observed public configuration. Some basic protections were not detected.

Scanned: 2026-11-21 09:50 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

F
38/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain

    Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.

    Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short TXT _dmarc.u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
  2. 2.

    Turn on DNS signing for your domain

    Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short DS u-sacred-heart.ac.jp

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
Website request
GET https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/(no HTTPS response)
Scan time
2026-11-21 09:50:30 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
  • HTTPS available · Not applicable
  • HTTP → HTTPS redirect · Not applicable
  • SSL/TLS certificate validity · Not applicable
  • HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Not applicable
  • CSP — protection from script injection · Not applicable
  • Clickjacking protection · Not applicable
  • X-Content-Type-Options · Not applicable
  • Referrer-Policy · Not applicable
  • Permissions-Policy · Not applicable

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security14/30An attacker can send email that looks like it came from the company.
Encryption & certificate—Not applicable to this domain.
Browser protections—Not applicable to this domain.
DNS infrastructure3/15The domain's infrastructure lacks basic protections.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.MediumSPF — who may send mail for the domain · Hardening gap+13
  2. 2.MediumDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+22
  3. 3.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+16
  4. 4.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+11

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 4/10

The SPF record is neutral and does not block unauthorized senders.

?all (neutral) does not tell the receiving server to reject or flag mail from servers not on the list.

Source data: DNS TXT u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:limedio.ricoh.co.jp include:_spf.fundexapp.jp ?all
$ dig +short TXT u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Map every service that sends mail in the domain's name (Google Workspace / Microsoft 365, newsletter tool, CRM).
  2. Publish exactly one TXT record at the domain root starting with v=spf1.
  3. Start with ~all, and move to -all once DMARC reports confirm all legitimate senders are covered.
u-sacred-heart.ac.jp.  TXT  "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. An incorrect record can block legitimate mail — add every sender before tightening.

Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 5/15

DMARC is in monitoring mode only — forged email still reaches recipients.

Policy p=none. p=none collects reports but does not protect.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
  2. Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
  3. Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.u-sacred-heart.ac.jp.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@u-sacred-heart.ac.jp; fo=1"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.

Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: google. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
google._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa;  p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAiaEMM/j7jqu+FtFg3SGmUgq2ZH/…
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

7 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
20 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
20 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
30 aspmx2.googlemail.com
30 aspmx3.googlemail.com
30 aspmx4.googlemail.com
30 aspmx5.googlemail.com
10 aspmx.l.google.com
$ dig +short MX u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
No A/AAAA record for the domain
$ curl -svI https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/ 2>&1 | grep -E "SSL|HTTP|expire"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

Source data: HTTP GET http://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/ (redirects not followed)
Not checked
$ curl -sI http://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

The domain has no web address (no A/AAAA records), so website checks don't apply.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
No valid certificate found in CT logs
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect u-sacred-heart.ac.jp:443 -servername u-sacred-heart.ac.jp 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Not applicable · Severity: OK · Not applicable

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Not applicable — the domain has no web address.

Source data: Response headers from https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
No HTTPS response received
$ curl -sIL https://u-sacred-heart.ac.jp/
Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS u-sacred-heart.ac.jp: NODATA
$ dig +short DS u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec u-sacred-heart.ac.jp SOA
delv u-sacred-heart.ac.jp

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
u-sacred-heart.ac.jp.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
u-sacred-heart.ac.jp.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@u-sacred-heart.ac.jp"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

3 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
ns012-pmf7ujricpixs7kt.p.d-53.jp
ns012-pmf7ujricpixs7kt.p.d-53.net
ns012-pmf7ujricpixs7kt.p.d-53.info
$ dig +short NS u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules2 observed gaps
  • PCI DSS v4.0Not applicable
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence4 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Au-sacred-heart.ac.jp—
AAAAu-sacred-heart.ac.jp—
MXu-sacred-heart.ac.jp20 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com | 20 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com | 30 aspmx2.googlemail.com | 30 aspmx3.googlemail.com | 30 aspmx4.googlemail.com | 30 aspmx5.googlemail.com | 10 aspmx.l.google.com
NSu-sacred-heart.ac.jpns012-pmf7ujricpixs7kt.p.d-53.jp | ns012-pmf7ujricpixs7kt.p.d-53.net | ns012-pmf7ujricpixs7kt.p.d-53.info
TXTu-sacred-heart.ac.jpgoogle-site-verification=D2Y4NmYd723DBdhXk9aP-mk9M7QHQQpiscKeehbxK8Y | v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:limedio.ricoh.co.jp include:_spf.fundexapp.jp ?all | MS=D96E990AF452FF335CF1FF2F33534C308ED9D3E6 | google-site-verification=5Banm2gtOadPB5fi2xusBqR2fZYEUGNOIFk2nQmSE6k
TXT_dmarc.u-sacred-heart.ac.jpv=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@u-sacred-heart.ac.jp
CAAu-sacred-heart.ac.jp—
DSu-sacred-heart.ac.jp—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain