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Digital exposure report

umich.edu

Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.

Scanned: 2026-11-20 07:34 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

C
78/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain

    Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.

    Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short TXT _dmarc.umich.edu
  2. 2.

    Choose which companies may issue certificates for your domain

    This reduces the chance of a certificate being issued by a provider you did not choose.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short CAA umich.edu

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
umich.edu
Website request
GET https://umich.edu/
Scan time
2026-11-20 07:34:45 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
None. Every applicable check was assessed.

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security20/30Spoofing email in the company's name is possible in some cases.
Encryption & certificate25/25Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid.
Browser protections23/30Some browser protections are missing.
DNS infrastructure10/15The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.MediumHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+4
  2. 2.MediumDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+10
  3. 3.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+5
  4. 4.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.

Valid SPF record with -all. 1 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.

Source data: DNS TXT umich.edu
v=spf1 redirect=_spf.mail.umich.edu
$ dig +short TXT umich.edu
Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 5/15

DMARC is in monitoring mode only — forged email still reaches recipients.

Policy p=none. p=none collects reports but does not protect.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.umich.edu
v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100;rua=mailto:dmarc.reports@umich.edu
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.umich.edu
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
  2. Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
  3. Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.umich.edu.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@umich.edu; fo=1"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.

Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: k1, s1, s2, mail. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.umich.edu
k1._domainkey: k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDbNrX2cY/GUKIFx2G/1I00ftdAj713WP9AQ1xir85i8…
s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA1CJ6+q+N264DhEGxi92ISXCkZT+f06yc…
s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDTUzQVpQ1SATUnikEo0S3AEJl3+2Q5ygaEhH44…
mail._domainkey: k=rsa;p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDeMVIzrCa3T14JsNY0IRv5/2V1/v2itlviLQBwXsa7sh…
$ dig +short TXT k1._domainkey.umich.edu
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

2 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX umich.edu
0 mx1.a.mail.umich.edu
0 mx2.a.mail.umich.edu
$ dig +short MX umich.edu
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://umich.edu/ returned HTTP 403 (final URL: https://umich.edu/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://umich.edu/
HTTP 403
Final URL: https://umich.edu/
$ curl -sIL https://umich.edu/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.

HTTP 301 → https://umich.edu/

Source data: HTTP GET http://umich.edu/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 301
Location: https://umich.edu/
$ curl -sI http://umich.edu/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: emSign, expiring 2027-04-12 (143 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for umich.edu
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: emSign
Valid from: 2026-09-25
Valid until: 2027-04-12
Names: umich.edu
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect umich.edu:443 -servername umich.edu 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 4/8

Encryption enforcement is set for too short a time.

max-age=300 (0 days), no includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.

Source data: Response headers from https://umich.edu/
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=300
$ curl -sIL https://umich.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
  2. Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
  3. Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/*
  Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.

Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8

A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.

script-src includes: 'unsafe-eval' — weakens XSS protection.

Source data: Response headers from https://umich.edu/
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; script-src 'nonce-bkZETccmVwa2D7yqUU3Teu' 'unsafe-eval' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; script-src-attr 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; connect-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; frame-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com blob:; child-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com blob:; worker-src blob:; form-action http: https:; base-uri 'self'
$ curl -sIL https://umich.edu/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.

X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

Source data: Response headers from https://umich.edu/
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://umich.edu/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4

The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.

nosniff is set.

Source data: Response headers from https://umich.edu/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://umich.edu/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy: same-origin

Source data: Response headers from https://umich.edu/
Referrer-Policy: same-origin
$ curl -sIL https://umich.edu/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 2/2

The site restricts access to sensitive browser features.

Permissions-Policy: accelerometer=(),camera=(),clipboard-read=(),clipboard-write=(),geolocation=(),gyroscope=(),hid=(),magnetometer=(),microphone=(),payment=(),publickey-credential

Source data: Response headers from https://umich.edu/
Permissions-Policy: accelerometer=(),camera=(),clipboard-read=(),clipboard-write=(),geolocation=(),gyroscope=(),hid=(),magnetometer=(),microphone=(),payment=(),publickey-credentials-get=(),screen-wake-lock=(),serial=(),sync-xhr=(),usb=(),xr-spatial-tracking=*
$ curl -sIL https://umich.edu/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://umich.edu/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://umich.edu/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

The domain's records are digitally signed and hard to forge.

An AD (Authenticated Data) flag was returned by a validating resolver.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = true
$ dig +dnssec umich.edu | grep -E "flags:.* ad"
Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA umich.edu
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA umich.edu
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
umich.edu.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
umich.edu.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@umich.edu"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

4 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS umich.edu
dns1.itd.umich.edu
dns2.itd.umich.edu
dns3.umich.org
dns4.umich.org
$ dig +short NS umich.edu
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps
  • PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence3 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline3 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Aumich.edu162.159.140.37 | 172.66.0.37
AAAAumich.edu2606:4700:7::25 | 2a06:98c1:58::25
MXumich.edu0 mx1.a.mail.umich.edu | 0 mx2.a.mail.umich.edu
NSumich.edudns1.itd.umich.edu | dns2.itd.umich.edu | dns3.umich.org | dns4.umich.org
TXTumich.eduMS=ms49510218 | iContact1258624 | e2ma-verification=4o6 | e2ma-verification=zsz | e2ma-verification=1y0cb | e2ma-verification=3c9eb | e2ma-verification=460eb | e2ma-verification=7a9eb | e2ma-verification=bbueb | e2ma-verification=exibb | e2ma-verification=m3pgb | e2ma-verification=nslgb | e2ma-verification=nuhgb | e2ma-verification=sk8fb | e2ma-verification=u60eb | wpe-verification=readinqwrite | 3E5EAAB878F9B1DEC7BF6A4882682718 | ZOOM_verify_nGh39JkJQSOoOFRUjwPmjA | v=spf1 redirect=_spf.mail.umich.edu | asv=063783b9e2e7b71b1519995753900010 | asv=3409cea16f931a90453c4c4e1fcadf99 | asv=a7593c4cc71712a01968795279d22556 | d365mktkey=733lw7ffo31ti7ozxout3x5l3 | d365mktkey=74u3ef6g3xjf80kvbz3v70bwb | dropbox-domain-verification=a5yb6qz6602l | dropbox-domain-verification=xibtqs96gswn | apple-domain-verification=QcSjbo9Nu9vbTHeW | brevo-code:247d3d78ed9e663c50b0a12efce3b095 | brevo-code:27c34e1b5038f713e91b18edc091f7d3 | brevo-code:3adf9f193073a2e465f1178a8226f655 | brevo-code:66f1aea179b9dac1e341bc96730a0903 | brevo-code:6a1b5714c794582638a3c22137ee387e | brevo-code:6a22fe2075c7836824d65669a2b8d509 | brevo-code:8a9b8c8b911006e247c943c7490896e5 | brevo-code:916190a5216b565989a619ded37b86f7 | SFMC-5lBIbO82RjFqIQn4tMyyKF3OpLINBTpPQjs6oLJu | SFMC-OQN3tnmPOSz-fGaE5by31y_6Ub4VviyOxT1e3RMt | jamf-site-verification=81Baq4qavxoOLkx1VulB7w | autodesk-domain-verification=x-5-4PZ_F2G_bBj_BVsU | verified-for-netlify=123201_umich_virtual_tour_project | d365mktkey=V4QCbGNWEzxRcvUOEjaSIlUlkEvJCfVPxdCjV7uSNxIx | clio-domain-verification=d226c9cd0c93c18ee9f815f8f685b890 | miro-verification=701abed028a466315e4e96a7c16e0ae7b964447f | facebook-domain-verification=earrkog9l7y87qxotg01na6vp90ob6 | ms-domain-verification=806e6295-0316-4573-bdf1-125913e12997 | smartsheet-site-validation=oY0nb96C6xG5_loWLLzVF04btLiZQow5 | vmware-cloud-verification-0612e704-564b-4c09-a310-5c66291ba4ab | google-site-verification=139Z5IVFcA9BZBRUlFv0cgAzAC4yLg8VWpmIcOPNqgM | google-site-verification=L00w8kdtX1yuVhzX8BrAZcAkJlYZ47T7f9sXnygWI78 | google-site-verification=P8BwxmavP7AqtCMjn4NWvFtyZWrP4-JA92e09PiKUTU | google-site-verification=Vrq1UHkE6hvICU5PcYAEn-9eY2fAazHkfH_-UprlcDQ | google-site-verification=b3J-sqZ0hI_gOlJLW3djTVXFHJYYKE_ojG38_5QJYLM | google-site-verification=ePeJieY3ub5dyqoCqCMxcb00j5MqHIOfff7ev8gvp5M | google-site-verification=mEb2ZEP3MoTTKDdiDTgoLUkRr5ycOhriZurxfxMYdCM | google-site-verification=oLGMsCZznEy3f0Wxww-5I9AF0m30h9m6Oqi3gclG9nY | google-site-verification=wlYuEbd-YP88QiCM4sz9RHQXkSlspXVdipF-EApRWLw | google-site-verification=xUO8BnEbTYcXYAAYFj4R1B_gXSBGJGT4el26p0w1RZ4 | mailerlite-domain-verification=4c9bd8e9bcc9532050d764926d28a7b0837605a3 | atlassian-sending-domain-verification=64ae59ad-0030-417d-9da0-02203860823b | atlassian-sending-domain-verification=db703b44-8548-4108-894a-1cf49c66b2dd | atlassian-domain-verification=aOp85M18PqRt/5EUYxQey4nzX1W9HysNJrHZYX8vmb0Eu2k9t25awn2J5a/sZXz8 | atlassian-domain-verification=BJherM6FKfh9Y50Eyv/P7vk1rHJVssQEspD7zXqN8IbUzbCsgAAD/UEk74sYe6kB" | hpe-greenlake-domain-verification=6d7a4850476f6d6e79336872754a4764694c3970564162426a6b74314d614473
TXT_dmarc.umich.eduv=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100;rua=mailto:dmarc.reports@umich.edu
CAAumich.edu—
DSumich.edu41530 13 2 ce51d840fb6e56da4a9fdffd8ce666d3bd6ac63a5a364563554e2b47aa538705 | 58714 13 2 337d48a8abb906be668023caea18ab706e1ad702bd5084ee6f0f1ba23e3d4742
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain