Digital exposure report
upf.es
Moderate exposure. There are gaps an attacker could exploit — fix them soon.
Scanned: 2026-11-19 04:57 UTC
Partial coverage: the score is based on 95% of applicable check weight. 1 unverified check(s) are excluded, not counted as failures.
What to do first
- 1.
Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run
This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://upf.es/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- 2.
Turn on DNS signing for your domain
Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.
Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider
How to verify after the fix
dig +short DS upf.es
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- upf.es
- Website request
- GET https://upf.es/ → https://www.upf.edu/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-19 04:57:59 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- DKIM — digital signature on email · Not detected (common selectors only)
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 24/25 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 16/30 | Some browser protections are missing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 8/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 2.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
- 3.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
- 4.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
- 5.LowDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+1
To verify
Couldn't be confirmed from public data, so excluded from the score. Checking them clarifies your posture; it doesn't guarantee a score change.
- DKIM — digital signature on email
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.
Valid SPF record with -all. 0 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.
v=spf1 -all
$ dig +short TXT upf.es
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 14/15Forged email in the company's name is blocked by mail servers.
Policy p=reject. No rua — no reports on spoofing attempts are received.
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.upf.es
- Keep your current p=reject enforcement and edit the existing record in place — do not replace it with p=none.
- Add rua=mailto:… to the existing record so you receive aggregate reports. Nothing else changes.
_dmarc.upf.es. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s; rua=mailto:dmarc@upf.es"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Your domain already enforces DMARC. Edit the record in place; never roll back to p=none.
DKIM — digital signature on email
Not detected (common selectors only) · Severity: OK · Not scoredNo DKIM key was found under the common selectors we probed. That doesn't mean DKIM is missing — selectors can't be listed from public DNS. Not scored.
A missing name for a probed selector (NXDOMAIN/NODATA) only means that selector isn't published. DKIM is marked unverified and excluded from the score. Check a sent message's Authentication-Results for dkim=pass and its s= selector.
Selectors checked: google, selector1, selector2, default, k1, s1, s2, dkim, mail, smtp — no key found google._domainkey: answer selector1._domainkey: answer selector2._domainkey: answer default._domainkey: answer k1._domainkey: answer s1._domainkey: answer s2._domainkey: answer dkim._domainkey: answer mail._domainkey: answer smtp._domainkey: answer
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.upf.es
MX — inbound mail routing
Info · Severity: OK · unscoredNo MX records are published. On its own this doesn't prove the domain can't receive email.
Without MX, senders may fall back to the A/AAAA address (RFC 5321 §5.1). A Null MX is appropriate only once you've confirmed the domain receives no email.
(no MX records)
$ dig +short MX upf.es
- Only if you've confirmed the domain receives no email: publish a Null MX (MX 0 .), and keep SPF -all and DMARC p=reject if it also sends none.
upf.es. MX 0 .
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain.
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://upf.es/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.upf.edu/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://www.upf.edu/
$ curl -sIL https://upf.es/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 301 → https://www.upf.edu/
HTTP 301 Location: https://www.upf.edu/
$ curl -sI http://upf.es/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: Let's Encrypt, expiring 2027-02-09 (82 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: Let's Encrypt Valid from: 2026-11-11 Valid until: 2027-02-09 Names: *.upf.es, upf.es Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect upf.es:443 -servername upf.es 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/8Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.
max-age=31536000 (365 days), no includeSubDomains, preload. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; preload
$ curl -sIL https://upf.es/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
CSP — protection from script injection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.
No Content-Security-Policy header found.
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://upf.es/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
$ curl -sIL https://upf.es/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
X-Content-Type-Options
Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.
nosniff is set.
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://upf.es/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Referrer-Policy
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://upf.es/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
- Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/* Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://upf.es/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://upf.es/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS upf.es: NODATA
$ dig +short DS upf.es
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec upf.es SOA delv upf.es
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "sectigo.com"
0 issue "digicert.com" 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" 0 issue "sectigo.com"
$ dig +short CAA upf.es
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
2 NS servers.
clyde.ns.cloudflare.com marge.ns.cloudflare.com
$ dig +short NS upf.es
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps · 1 unverified
- PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline2 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | upf.es | 172.67.141.185 | 104.21.9.45 |
| AAAA | upf.es | 2606:4700:3037::6815:92d | 2606:4700:3031::ac43:8db9 |
| MX | upf.es | — |
| NS | upf.es | clyde.ns.cloudflare.com | marge.ns.cloudflare.com |
| TXT | upf.es | ca3-431c5e1980c4498b9b12310035f007da | csx707kzm0br08twpyvyqfptdmmkp17p | v=spf1 -all |
| TXT | _dmarc.upf.es | v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s; |
| CAA | upf.es | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" |
| DS | upf.es | — |