Digital exposure report
upm.es
High exposure. Significant weaknesses put the brand, customers and email at risk.
Scanned: 2026-11-19 04:58 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain
Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.
Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS
How to verify after the fix
dig +short TXT _dmarc.upm.es
- 2.
Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run
This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://upm.es/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- upm.es
- Website request
- GET https://upm.es/ → https://www.upm.es/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-19 04:58:00 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 20/30 | Spoofing email in the company's name is possible in some cases. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 8/30 | Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 8/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.MediumClickjacking protection · Hardening gap+5
- 2.MediumDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+10
- 3.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 4.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
- 5.LowX-Content-Type-Options · Hardening gap+4
- 6.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
- 7.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10An authorized sender list is defined and mail from other servers is rejected.
Valid SPF record with -all. 3 of the 10 allowed DNS lookups.
v=spf1 ip4:138.100.198.70/31 include:spf.puc.rediris.es include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.google.com -all
$ dig +short TXT upm.es
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 5/15DMARC is in monitoring mode only — forged email still reaches recipients.
Policy p=none. p=none collects reports but does not protect.
v=DMARC1;p=none;fo=1;rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.upm.es
- Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
- Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
- Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.upm.es. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@upm.es; fo=1"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: google, selector1, selector2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
google._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA6xb0c2VqebIyeEO7sLVOkPOdmH56… selector1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCzieEl7dns/r/qLqlBxrGBIyuGsBbxWmEi… selector2._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCMx8Y8lRqOl5k7Lw5082fVv9tEgWI9RmGV…
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.upm.es
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
2 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
10 mxa-006a4e02.gslb.pphosted.com 10 mxb-006a4e02.gslb.pphosted.com
$ dig +short MX upm.es
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://upm.es/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.upm.es/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://www.upm.es/
$ curl -sIL https://upm.es/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 302 → https://upm.es/
HTTP 302 Location: https://upm.es/
$ curl -sI http://upm.es/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: HARICA, expiring 2027-05-01 (162 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: HARICA Valid from: 2026-10-14 Valid until: 2027-05-01 Names: upm.es, www.upm.es Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect upm.es:443 -servername upm.es 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.
max-age=16070400 (186 days), includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=16070400; includeSubDomains
$ curl -sIL https://upm.es/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
CSP — protection from script injection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.
No Content-Security-Policy header found.
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://upm.es/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/5Missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors: this removes one layer of protection against clickjacking.
No valid X-Frame-Options and no frame-ancestors in the CSP.
X-Frame-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://upm.es/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
- Add X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (or DENY if the site is never embedded anywhere).
- Also set frame-ancestors in the CSP — the modern alternative.
/* X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. If partners embed the site in an iframe, add them to frame-ancestors instead of using DENY.
X-Content-Type-Options
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/4The browser may interpret files as code unintentionally.
Missing X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header (MIME sniffing).
X-Content-Type-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://upm.es/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
- Add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff to every response.
/* X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Referrer-Policy
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://upm.es/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
- Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/* Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://upm.es/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://upm.es/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS upm.es: NODATA
$ dig +short DS upm.es
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec upm.es SOA delv upm.es
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 iodef "mailto:abuse@upm.es" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "fnmt.es" | 0 issue "harica.gr" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "pki.goog" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "ssl.com"
0 iodef "mailto:abuse@upm.es" 0 issue "digicert.com" 0 issue "fnmt.es" 0 issue "harica.gr" 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" 0 issue "pki.goog" 0 issue "sectigo.com" 0 issue "ssl.com"
$ dig +short CAA upm.es
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
4 NS servers.
sun.rediris.es chico.rediris.es galileo.ccupm.upm.es einstein.ccupm.upm.es
$ dig +short NS upm.es
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps
- PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline4 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | upm.es | 138.100.200.6 |
| AAAA | upm.es | — |
| MX | upm.es | 10 mxa-006a4e02.gslb.pphosted.com | 10 mxb-006a4e02.gslb.pphosted.com |
| NS | upm.es | sun.rediris.es | chico.rediris.es | galileo.ccupm.upm.es | einstein.ccupm.upm.es |
| TXT | upm.es | MS=ms92863215 | ZOOM_verify_JyS9mzjlR9qlhzy8CchciQ | google-gws-recovery-domain-verification=69261781 | openai-domain-verification=dv-SpJ3unCOQgmvsrWgtJWBf56t | adobe-idp-site-verification=a21b9e2e-91fc-44d1-b66b-f7c3588d6b69 | yahoo-verification-key=QHUrbU4w12OU9+HDD6yi9oPzmgxLzHr28S35KOba//E= | google-site-verification=TVzg3pTNXeFDbscAznKHl-ZxwwMXAJKplXOTzEE4hF4 | google-site-verification=lf-f_0LsZWcQAf54uV7YZQok3yHm1jqCqDLrpEbJu9k | v=spf1 ip4:138.100.198.70/31 include:spf.puc.rediris.es include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.google.com -all |
| TXT | _dmarc.upm.es | v=DMARC1;p=none;fo=1;rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com |
| CAA | upm.es | 0 iodef "mailto:abuse@upm.es" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issue "fnmt.es" | 0 issue "harica.gr" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "pki.goog" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "ssl.com" |
| DS | upm.es | — |