Digital exposure report
westliberty.edu
High exposure. Significant weaknesses put the brand, customers and email at risk.
Scanned: 2026-11-20 07:30 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain
Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.
Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS
How to verify after the fix
dig +short TXT _dmarc.westliberty.edu
- 2.
Tell browsers to always use the secure version
Helps browsers use HTTPS on future visits after they have received the policy.
Who can fix it: Your web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://westliberty.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- westliberty.edu
- Website request
- GET https://westliberty.edu/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-20 07:30:35 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 19/30 | Spoofing email in the company's name is possible in some cases. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 12/30 | Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 8/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.HighHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+8
- 2.MediumDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+10
- 3.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 4.LowX-Content-Type-Options · Hardening gap+4
- 5.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
- 6.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.
~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 4 of 10 DNS lookups.
v=spf1 ip4:129.71.2.241 ip4:150.230.177.146 ip4:150.230.162.21 ip4:38.106.32.22/32 ip4:38.106.32.46/32 include:relay.mailchannels.net include:spf.watermarkinsights.com include:e2ma.net include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all
$ dig +short TXT westliberty.edu
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 5/15DMARC is in monitoring mode only — forged email still reaches recipients.
Policy p=none. p=none collects reports but does not protect.
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:ae08e23b7c3a460590dee6ec5aad0c59@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net,mailto:wlnetwork@westliberty.edu; sp=none;
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.westliberty.edu
- Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
- Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
- Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.westliberty.edu. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@westliberty.edu; fo=1"
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: selector1, selector2, s1, s2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
selector1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCw8N/yio12lDQ916WSkOHMNUCI/3KtDi0g… selector2._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCsxTD64PTCZxOKI/Ng6mUaPIJbdXL5lP4m… s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyc8dlb5SjR0QoT2SpbaKpXSko4uxGHz3… s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCrn1NMl5id54UDuv4x7fN2rIKWPb13tkOT3Xnv…
$ dig +short TXT selector1._domainkey.westliberty.edu
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
1 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
0 westliberty-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com
$ dig +short MX westliberty.edu
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://westliberty.edu/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://westliberty.edu/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://westliberty.edu/
$ curl -sIL https://westliberty.edu/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 301 → https://westliberty.edu/
HTTP 301 Location: https://westliberty.edu/
$ curl -sI http://westliberty.edu/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: GoDaddy, expiring 2027-05-02 (163 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: GoDaddy Valid from: 2026-10-16 Valid until: 2027-05-02 Names: *.westliberty.edu, westliberty.edu Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect westliberty.edu:443 -servername westliberty.edu 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Failed · Severity: High · Hardening gap · 0/8Browsers aren't told to always use an encrypted connection, enabling interception attacks on public networks.
No Strict-Transport-Security header. Users are exposed to SSL stripping on the first request.
Strict-Transport-Security: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://westliberty.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
- Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
- Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
- Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/* Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.
CSP — protection from script injection
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.
script-src includes: no script-src/default-src — weakens XSS protection.
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self'
$ curl -sIL https://westliberty.edu/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN frame-ancestors 'self'
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN CSP frame-ancestors: 'self'
$ curl -sIL https://westliberty.edu/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
X-Content-Type-Options
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/4The browser may interpret files as code unintentionally.
Missing X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header (MIME sniffing).
X-Content-Type-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://westliberty.edu/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
- Add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff to every response.
/* X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Referrer-Policy
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://westliberty.edu/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
- Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/* Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Permissions-Policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 2/2The site restricts access to sensitive browser features.
Permissions-Policy: browsing-topics=()
Permissions-Policy: browsing-topics=()
$ curl -sIL https://westliberty.edu/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: WP Engine
$ curl -sIL https://westliberty.edu/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS westliberty.edu: NODATA
$ dig +short DS westliberty.edu
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec westliberty.edu SOA delv westliberty.edu
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "comodoca.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issue "godaddy.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issue "ssl.com" | 0 issuewild "comodoca.com" | 0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issuewild "godaddy.com" | 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issuewild "ssl.com"
0 issue "amazon.com" 0 issue "comodoca.com" 0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" 0 issue "godaddy.com" 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" 0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" 0 issue "ssl.com" 0 issuewild "comodoca.com" 0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" 0 issuewild "godaddy.com" 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org" 0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" 0 issuewild "ssl.com"
$ dig +short CAA westliberty.edu
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
2 NS servers.
pete.ns.cloudflare.com sara.ns.cloudflare.com
$ dig +short NS westliberty.edu
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rules1 observed gaps
- PCI DSS v4.02 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence3 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline4 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | westliberty.edu | 141.193.213.10 | 141.193.213.11 |
| AAAA | westliberty.edu | — |
| MX | westliberty.edu | 0 westliberty-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com |
| NS | westliberty.edu | pete.ns.cloudflare.com | sara.ns.cloudflare.com |
| TXT | westliberty.edu | 31lmeh7dtra06te0d688sl07ue | 7mepe5l13k71nctfus44hkiaab | Google-site-verification=CzAFtfN8IsaHfAYrojUqsFG482CdsM3CJLrVGLi6AV8 | MS=ms13727025 | google-site-verification=JKrr66fj6mVRm7gB4aJKZvvQqYDNtZW-bYUFfU23TZ4 | google-site-verification=hbEQq0aTA61SfZVt-Yz9HOwFu0Ka59fHCKuX4EH8G6Q | google-site-verification=vuTnZH8pTjS5HujRCfVIa9DDYrNQteibaICclYKI70Q | v=spf1 ip4:129.71.2.241 ip4:150.230.177.146 ip4:150.230.162.21 ip4:38.106.32.22/32 ip4:38.106.32.46/32 include:relay.mailchannels.net include:spf.watermarkinsights.com include:e2ma.net include:spf.protection.outlook.com ~all | vpkil9pmflkc2a61esov3ianut |
| TXT | _dmarc.westliberty.edu | v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:ae08e23b7c3a460590dee6ec5aad0c59@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net,mailto:wlnetwork@westliberty.edu; sp=none; |
| CAA | westliberty.edu | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issue "comodoca.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issue "godaddy.com" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issue "ssl.com" | 0 issuewild "comodoca.com" | 0 issuewild "digicert.com; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issuewild "godaddy.com" | 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issuewild "ssl.com" |
| DS | westliberty.edu | — |