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Digital exposure report

wtc.edu

High exposure. Significant weaknesses put the brand, customers and email at risk.

Scanned: 2026-11-19 02:55 UTC

Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.

D
68/100

What to do first

  1. 1.

    Tell receiving mail servers how to treat fake email from your domain

    Without this policy, inboxes have less guidance for spotting messages that impersonate you.

    Who can fix it: Your email provider, together with whoever manages your DNS

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short TXT _dmarc.wtc.edu
  2. 2.

    Turn on DNS signing for your domain

    Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.

    Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider

    How to verify after the fix

    dig +short DS wtc.edu

A starting point, not a security guarantee.

What this grade means

Tested hostname
wtc.edu
Website request
GET https://wtc.edu/ → https://www.wtc.edu/
Scan time
2026-11-19 02:55:45 UTC
Grading method
Version 2How grading works
Unverified or excluded checks
None. Every applicable check was assessed.

This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.

Score by category

Email security14/30An attacker can send email that looks like it came from the company.
Encryption & certificate25/25Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid.
Browser protections26/30The site instructs browsers to block common attacks.
DNS infrastructure3/15The domain's infrastructure lacks basic protections.

Fix priorities

  1. 1.MediumSPF — who may send mail for the domain · Hardening gap+6
  2. 2.MediumDMARC — anti-spoofing policy · Hardening gap+10
  3. 3.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
  4. 4.LowCAA — who may issue certificates · Hardening gap+5
  5. 5.LowCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+3

Findings

SPF — who may send mail for the domain

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 4/10

The SPF record has no instruction for unauthorized senders.

No all mechanism and no redirect= found, so the default is neutral.

Source data: DNS TXT wtc.edu
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:sendgrid.net~all
$ dig +short TXT wtc.edu
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Map every service that sends mail in the domain's name (Google Workspace / Microsoft 365, newsletter tool, CRM).
  2. Publish exactly one TXT record at the domain root starting with v=spf1.
  3. Start with ~all, and move to -all once DMARC reports confirm all legitimate senders are covered.
wtc.edu.  TXT  "v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. An incorrect record can block legitimate mail — add every sender before tightening.

Documentation: RFC 7208 — SPF (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

DMARC — anti-spoofing policy

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 5/15

DMARC is in monitoring mode only — forged email still reaches recipients.

Policy p=none. p=none collects reports but does not protect.

Source data: DNS TXT _dmarc.wtc.edu
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:support@wtc.edu,mailto:sclem@datroo.com; ruf=mailto:support@wtc.edu,mailto:sclem@datroo.com; fo=1
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.wtc.edu
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Step 1 (monitoring, no effect on mail): publish p=none with an rua address to receive reports.
  2. Step 2: analyze reports for 2–4 weeks and make sure every legitimate sender passes SPF/DKIM.
  3. Step 3: move to p=quarantine, and finally to p=reject.
_dmarc.wtc.edu.  TXT  "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@wtc.edu; fo=1"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. Jumping straight to reject without a monitoring phase can block legitimate mail.

Documentation: RFC 7489 — DMARC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489) · dmarc.org — FAQ (https://dmarc.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions/)

DKIM — digital signature on email

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.

DKIM public key found for selector: google, s1, s2. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.

Source data: DNS TXT <selector>._domainkey.wtc.edu
google._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAkmK7t8eoQXPqXaD/TCW0DKB/4W2A…
s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCtlKfpHPXy+3xADqF1Jg4gvyRUc9riR4Hua8Kd…
s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCz2d1qhJUycP3UzBsRoYQVCqcYwEjxu6LgtReX…
$ dig +short TXT google._domainkey.wtc.edu
Documentation: RFC 6376 — DKIM (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376) · M3AAWG — Email Authentication Best Practices (https://www.m3aawg.org/sites/default/files/m3aawg-email-authentication-recommended-best-practices-09-2020.pdf)

MX — inbound mail routing

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

Mail exchangers are published for the domain.

5 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.

Source data: DNS MX wtc.edu
5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com
1 aspmx.l.google.com
10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com
10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com
5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
$ dig +short MX wtc.edu
Documentation: RFC 7505 — Null MX (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7505) · RFC 5321 §5.1 — Locating the target host (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321#section-5.1)

HTTPS available

Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10

The site loads over an encrypted connection.

https://wtc.edu/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://www.wtc.edu/). Client-side certificate validation passed.

Source data: HTTPS GET https://wtc.edu/
HTTP 200
Final URL: https://www.wtc.edu/
$ curl -sIL https://wtc.edu/
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HTTP → HTTPS redirect

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7

Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.

HTTP 301 → https://www.wtc.edu/

Source data: HTTP GET http://wtc.edu/ (redirects not followed)
HTTP 301
Location: https://www.wtc.edu/
$ curl -sI http://wtc.edu/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
Documentation: OWASP — Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797)

SSL/TLS certificate validity

Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8

The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.

Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: GoDaddy, expiring 2027-02-14 (87 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.

Source data: Certificate Transparency logs (certspotter) for wtc.edu
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted
CT logs (context only, not scored):
Issuer: GoDaddy
Valid from: 2026-01-13
Valid until: 2027-02-14
Names: *.wtc.edu, wtc.edu
Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect wtc.edu:443 -servername wtc.edu 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
Documentation: Certificate Transparency (https://certificate.transparency.dev/) · Let's Encrypt — Docs (https://letsencrypt.org/docs/) · Mozilla — Server Side TLS (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS)

HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser

Passed · Severity: OK · 7/8

Browsers are told to always use an encrypted connection to the site.

max-age=31536000 (365 days), no includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.wtc.edu/
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
$ curl -sIL https://wtc.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
Documentation: MDN — Strict-Transport-Security (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security) · RFC 6797 — HSTS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6797) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

CSP — protection from script injection

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 5/8

A script policy exists, but it's permissive and offers only partial protection.

script-src includes: no script-src/default-src — weakens XSS protection.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.wtc.edu/
Content-Security-Policy: upgrade-insecure-requests; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self';
$ curl -sIL https://wtc.edu/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
Fix recommendation (effort: Complex)
  1. First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
  2. Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
  3. Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/*
  Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'

Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.

Documentation: MDN — Content Security Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP) · OWASP — CSP Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Clickjacking protection

Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5

The site can't be embedded by foreign sites.

frame-ancestors 'self'

Source data: Response headers from https://www.wtc.edu/
X-Frame-Options: (missing)
CSP frame-ancestors: 'self'
$ curl -sIL https://wtc.edu/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Frame-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Frame-Options) · OWASP — Clickjacking Defense (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)

X-Content-Type-Options

Passed · Severity: OK · 4/4

The browser won't guess file types in a way that could execute code.

nosniff is set.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.wtc.edu/
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
$ curl -sIL https://wtc.edu/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
Documentation: MDN — X-Content-Type-Options (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Referrer-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

Internal URLs don't leak to external sites.

Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Source data: Response headers from https://www.wtc.edu/
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
$ curl -sIL https://wtc.edu/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Referrer-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Permissions-Policy

Passed · Severity: OK · 2/2

The site restricts access to sensitive browser features.

Permissions-Policy: bluetooth=(), browsing-topics=(self), camera=(), document-domain=(self), encrypted-media=(), execution-while-not-rendered=(self), execution-while-out-of-viewpor

Source data: Response headers from https://www.wtc.edu/
Permissions-Policy: bluetooth=(), browsing-topics=(self), camera=(), document-domain=(self), encrypted-media=(), execution-while-not-rendered=(self), execution-while-out-of-viewport=(self), identity-credentials-get=(), picture-in-picture=(self), storage-access=(self)
$ curl -sIL https://wtc.edu/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
Documentation: MDN — Permissions-Policy (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Permissions-Policy) · OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Software version disclosure

Passed · Severity: OK · unscored

The server doesn't disclose software versions.

No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.

Source data: Response headers from https://www.wtc.edu/
server: cloudflare
x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://wtc.edu/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
Documentation: OWASP — HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet (https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html)

DNSSEC — signed DNS records

Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7

The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.

No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.

Source data: DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare / Google): AD flag and DS record at the parent
AD = false
DS wtc.edu: NODATA
$ dig +short DS wtc.edu
Fix recommendation (effort: Medium)
  1. Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
  2. Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
  3. Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec wtc.edu SOA
delv wtc.edu

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.

Documentation: RFC 4033 — DNSSEC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033) · ICANN — DNSSEC: what and why (https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en)

CAA — who may issue certificates

Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/5

Any certificate authority can issue a certificate for the domain, raising the risk of mis-issuance.

No CAA records found. RFC 8659 lets the domain owner restrict which CAs are authorized.

Source data: DNS CAA wtc.edu
(no CAA records found)
$ dig +short CAA wtc.edu
Fix recommendation (effort: Easy)
  1. Identify which certificate authority issued your current certificate (see the certificate check).
  2. Publish CAA for that authority only, and add iodef to receive alerts.
wtc.edu.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
wtc.edu.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@wtc.edu"

Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. If your CDN issues certificates on your behalf, include it too — otherwise certificate renewal will fail.

Documentation: RFC 8659 — CAA (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8659)

DNS server redundancy

Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3

The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.

2 NS servers.

Source data: DNS NS wtc.edu
pdns11.domaincontrol.com
pdns12.domaincontrol.com
$ dig +short NS wtc.edu
Documentation: RFC 2182 — Secondary DNS server operation (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2182)

Indicative alignment

Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.

  • Google & Yahoo sender rules2 observed gaps
  • PCI DSS v4.01 observed gaps
  • NIS2 / vendor due diligence4 observed gaps
  • SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline3 observed gaps

Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.

Public DNS records

Awtc.edu34.238.178.141
AAAAwtc.edu—
MXwtc.edu5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com | 1 aspmx.l.google.com | 10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com | 10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com | 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
NSwtc.edupdns11.domaincontrol.com | pdns12.domaincontrol.com
TXTwtc.edue2ma-verification=z22eb | vkk0r7binpeqh636a8uogqnfgp | v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:sendgrid.net~all | google-site-verification=7q9XvfFt958MgGIHGo7fDXrfFfPQ_WYRpuqmz9vQ0LU | 793v39fa563svacm4rnm8hel1d | MS=E545024ADD5EEC249F12E0C632C4AC19519474A8 | lh8mrom4gink9fqr5qi885ub74 | apple-domain-verification=ZDMX7egppcOBPKqV | adobe-idp-site-verification=3c5867d4-f048-47d4-b4b2-5a5804109d4b | spf.watermarkinsights.com
TXT_dmarc.wtc.eduv=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:support@wtc.edu,mailto:sclem@datroo.com; ruf=mailto:support@wtc.edu,mailto:sclem@datroo.com; fo=1
CAAwtc.edu—
DSwtc.edu—
Passive check only: reading public DNS records, Certificate Transparency logs and ordinary GET requests to the homepage over HTTPS and HTTP. No changes were made to the scanned domain. Results are an indication and do not replace a professional security assessment.

Check your own domain