Digital exposure report
wustl.edu
High exposure. Significant weaknesses put the brand, customers and email at risk.
Scanned: 2026-11-20 09:00 UTC
Full coverage: every applicable check was assessed.
What to do first
- 1.
Limit what scripts your pages are allowed to run
This adds one layer of protection against injected scripts.
Who can fix it: Your website developer or web host
How to verify after the fix
curl -sIL https://wustl.edu/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- 2.
Turn on DNS signing for your domain
Signing helps resolvers detect forged answers about your domain.
Who can fix it: Your domain registrar or DNS provider
How to verify after the fix
dig +short DS wustl.edu
A starting point, not a security guarantee.
What this grade means
- Tested hostname
- wustl.edu
- Website request
- GET https://wustl.edu/ → https://washu.edu/
- Scan time
- 2026-11-20 09:00:55 UTC
- Grading method
- Version 2How grading works
- Unverified or excluded checks
- None. Every applicable check was assessed.
This is a snapshot of the public configuration checks listed in this report. It does not verify the site's owner, business legitimacy, application security, or absence of vulnerabilities. It is not a security certification.
Score by category
| Email security | 27/30 | Spoofing email from this domain is hard. |
| Encryption & certificate | 25/25 | Traffic to the site is encrypted and the certificate is valid. |
| Browser protections | 4/30 | Several browser hardening headers are missing, which removes layers of protection against script injection and framing. |
| DNS infrastructure | 8/15 | The domain's infrastructure works, but recommended hardening is missing. |
Fix priorities
- 1.MediumClickjacking protection · Hardening gap+5
- 2.MediumHSTS — enforce encryption in the browser · Hardening gap+4
- 3.MediumDNSSEC — signed DNS records · Hardening gap+7
- 4.MediumCSP — protection from script injection · Hardening gap+8
- 5.LowX-Content-Type-Options · Hardening gap+4
- 6.LowReferrer-Policy · Hardening gap+3
- 7.LowPermissions-Policy · Hardening gap+2
Findings
SPF — who may send mail for the domain
Passed · Severity: OK · 9/10An authorized sender list is defined; mail from other servers is flagged as suspicious.
~all (softfail) — acceptable when combined with enforced DMARC. 3 of 10 DNS lookups.
v=spf1 include:%{i}._ip.%{h}._ehlo.%{d}._spf.vali.email include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.protection.office365.us ~all$ dig +short TXT wustl.edu
DMARC — anti-spoofing policy
Passed · Severity: OK · 13/15Forged email in the company's name is sent to the spam folder.
Policy p=quarantine. p=quarantine — consider moving to p=reject.
v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;fo=1;rua=mailto:dmarcreports@email.wustl.edu,mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;ruf=mailto:dmarcreports@email.wustl.edu;
$ dig +short TXT _dmarc.wustl.edu
DKIM — digital signature on email
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5A DKIM public key is published. On its own this doesn't prove outgoing mail is signed or aligned with your From domain.
DKIM public key found for selector: selector1, selector2, k1, s1, s2, mail. Confirm signing with dkim=pass in a sent message's Authentication-Results.
selector1._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAokz7IxOtV2kEH979h8Tw72BYbMkh… selector2._domainkey: v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAtkRvEsqE42pS4EdmZIcBhaPU+qev… k1._domainkey: k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDbNrX2cY/GUKIFx2G/1I00ftdAj713WP9AQ1xir85i8… s1._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAp94lgJWGZbERM1fupPjjz63YM1bbbjqE… s2._domainkey: k=rsa; t=s; p=MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyj4i1SvoF3FKGVQQGE+YU2pblrtEOdTi… mail._domainkey: k=rsa;p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDeMVIzrCa3T14JsNY0IRv5/2V1/v2itlviLQBwXsa7sh…
$ dig +short TXT selector1._domainkey.wustl.edu
MX — inbound mail routing
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredMail exchangers are published for the domain.
5 MX record(s). This shows where inbound mail is routed, not whether mail is sent from the domain.
100 ms43096679.msv1.invalid.wustl.edu 10 smtp3.mx.wustl.edu 10 smtp4.mx.wustl.edu 10 smtp2.mx.wustl.edu 10 smtp1.mx.wustl.edu
$ dig +short MX wustl.edu
HTTPS available
Passed · Severity: OK · 10/10The site loads over an encrypted connection.
https://wustl.edu/ returned HTTP 200 (final URL: https://washu.edu/). Client-side certificate validation passed.
HTTP 200 Final URL: https://washu.edu/
$ curl -sIL https://wustl.edu/
HTTP → HTTPS redirect
Passed · Severity: OK · 7/7Visitors arriving at an unencrypted address are automatically sent to the secure version.
HTTP 301 → https://washu.edu/
HTTP 301 Location: https://washu.edu/
$ curl -sI http://wustl.edu/ | grep -iE "^(HTTP|location)"
SSL/TLS certificate validity
Passed · Severity: OK · 8/8The certificate was accepted by a validating TLS client at scan time.
Live TLS handshake succeeded. Latest issuance in CT logs: SSL.com, expiring 2027-06-01 (193 days). CT shows issued certificates, not necessarily the one served — confirm dates with the verify command.
Live TLS handshake: certificate accepted CT logs (context only, not scored): Issuer: SSL.com Valid from: 2026-11-15 Valid until: 2027-06-01 Names: *.wustl.edu, wustl.edu Based on Certificate Transparency logs; may not reflect the certificate currently served.
$ echo | openssl s_client -connect wustl.edu:443 -servername wustl.edu 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -dates
HSTS — enforce encryption in the browser
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 4/8Encryption enforcement is set for too short a time.
max-age=300 (0 days), no includeSubDomains. ≥ 180 days recommended.
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=300
$ curl -sIL https://wustl.edu/ | grep -i "Strict-Transport-Security"
- Start with a short max-age (300 seconds) and make sure every subdomain works over HTTPS.
- Gradually raise it to 31536000 (one year) and add includeSubDomains.
- Consider preload only once the policy is stable — removal from the preload list is slow.
/* Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. HSTS is cached in the visitor's browser — a long max-age on a site without working HTTPS will block access.
CSP — protection from script injection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/8Missing Content-Security-Policy header: this removes one layer of protection against script injection.
No Content-Security-Policy header found.
Content-Security-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://wustl.edu/ | grep -i "Content-Security-Policy"
- First publish Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only — it blocks nothing, it only reports.
- Collect violations for a week or two and tune the policy to your legitimate sources.
- Switch to the Content-Security-Policy header and replace 'unsafe-inline' with a nonce or hash.
/* Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. An overly strict CSP will break scripts — that's why you start in Report-Only mode.
Clickjacking protection
Failed · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/5Missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors: this removes one layer of protection against clickjacking.
No valid X-Frame-Options and no frame-ancestors in the CSP.
X-Frame-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://wustl.edu/ | grep -i "X-Frame-Options"
- Add X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN (or DENY if the site is never embedded anywhere).
- Also set frame-ancestors in the CSP — the modern alternative.
/* X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. If partners embed the site in an iframe, add them to frame-ancestors instead of using DENY.
X-Content-Type-Options
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/4The browser may interpret files as code unintentionally.
Missing X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header (MIME sniffing).
X-Content-Type-Options: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://wustl.edu/ | grep -i "X-Content-Type-Options"
- Add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff to every response.
/* X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Referrer-Policy
Failed · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/3Internal URLs (including parameters) may leak to external sites.
Referrer-Policy is missing; the browser will use its default.
Referrer-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://wustl.edu/ | grep -i "Referrer-Policy"
- Set Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin.
/* Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production.
Permissions-Policy
Needs attention · Severity: Low · Hardening gap · 0/2Access to sensitive features like the camera and location isn't restricted.
Missing Permissions-Policy header.
Permissions-Policy: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://wustl.edu/ | grep -i "Permissions-Policy"
- Disable browser features the site doesn't need (camera, microphone, geolocation).
/* Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()
Safety: This change is made in your server/CDN settings. Test on staging before production. Don't disable a feature the site actually uses.
Software version disclosure
Passed · Severity: OK · unscoredThe server doesn't disclose software versions.
No version numbers found in the Server / X-Powered-By headers.
server: cloudflare x-powered-by: (missing)
$ curl -sIL https://wustl.edu/ | grep -iE "^(server|x-powered-by)"
DNSSEC — signed DNS records
Needs attention · Severity: Medium · Hardening gap · 0/7The domain's records aren't signed, so in some scenarios users could be redirected to a forged server.
No DS record is published at the parent zone, so there's no DNSSEC chain of trust for this zone.
AD = false DS wustl.edu: NODATA
$ dig +short DS wustl.edu
- Enable DNSSEC at your DNS provider (one click at most providers).
- Copy the DS record your provider generates to your domain registrar.
- Wait for propagation and verify with DNSViz.
dig +dnssec wustl.edu SOA delv wustl.edu
Safety: DNS changes are made only at your DNS provider. This tool only reads public data and changes nothing on the domain. A wrong DS record at the registrar will make the domain stop resolving — copy it exactly from the provider.
CAA — who may issue certificates
Passed · Severity: OK · 5/5Only authorized certificate authorities can issue certificates for the domain.
CAA records: 0 issuewild "awstrust.com" | 0 issue "awstrust.com" | 0 issuewild "amazontrust.com" | 0 issue "amazontrust.com" | 0 issuewild "amazon.com" | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issuewild "digicert.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issuewild "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "ssl.com" | 0 issuewild "ssl.com" | 0 issuewild "emsign.com" | 0 issue "emsign.com" | 0 issuewild "amazonaws.com" | 0 issue "amazonaws.com"
0 issuewild "awstrust.com" 0 issue "awstrust.com" 0 issuewild "amazontrust.com" 0 issue "amazontrust.com" 0 issuewild "amazon.com" 0 issue "amazon.com" 0 issuewild "digicert.com" 0 issue "digicert.com" 0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" 0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org" 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" 0 issuewild "sectigo.com" 0 issue "sectigo.com" 0 issue "ssl.com" 0 issuewild "ssl.com" 0 issuewild "emsign.com" 0 issue "emsign.com" 0 issuewild "amazonaws.com" 0 issue "amazonaws.com"
$ dig +short CAA wustl.edu
DNS server redundancy
Passed · Severity: OK · 3/3The domain is served by several DNS servers, so one server failing won't take it down.
5 NS servers.
ns04.ip.wustl.edu ns00.ip.wustl.edu ns03.ip.wustl.edu ns02.ip.wustl.edu ns01.ip.wustl.edu
$ dig +short NS wustl.edu
Indicative alignment
Best-practice mapping of public findings to common frameworks. Passive scanning tests public configuration only; it doesn't prove compliance or a violation.
- Google & Yahoo sender rulesNo gaps observed
- PCI DSS v4.03 observed gaps
- NIS2 / vendor due diligence2 observed gaps
- SOC 2 / ISO 27001 baseline4 observed gaps
Indicative alignment only, based on public configuration. It doesn't establish whether a framework applies to you, and it isn't legal advice, an audit or a certification.
Public DNS records
| A | wustl.edu | 23.185.0.3 |
| AAAA | wustl.edu | — |
| MX | wustl.edu | 100 ms43096679.msv1.invalid.wustl.edu | 10 smtp3.mx.wustl.edu | 10 smtp4.mx.wustl.edu | 10 smtp2.mx.wustl.edu | 10 smtp1.mx.wustl.edu |
| NS | wustl.edu | ns04.ip.wustl.edu | ns00.ip.wustl.edu | ns03.ip.wustl.edu | ns02.ip.wustl.edu | ns01.ip.wustl.edu |
| TXT | wustl.edu | DRXV5DYS8LIBHYFHQX71LXN02CM3U1I13WSDI82QU | amazonses:5P6+gURez5gGPEvpi0/wfckAiqkC1YQQ8apk8eimtHU= | status-page-domain-verification=cn9gsmct0vf9 | google-site-verification=CmuLI-dvXn4RbwGrJw_y48JU0VNJvC4JkVm40hMZcGk | OLDTemporaryv=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com exists:%{i}._spf.mta.salesforce.com ip4:104.45.175.206 ip4:52.224.142.128 ip4:52.180.90.234 ip4:72.167.168.0/24 ip4:72.167.172.0/24 ip4:52.89.65.132 ip4:54.214.222.76 ip4:54.184.82.65 ip4:52.26.164.15 include:spf1.wustl.edu ~all | d365mktkey=7kdpn9nbfup2mhfxhlmmiqdxx | google-site-verification=Mq4I7BGfm3L6R7e2IiBwWPzUgyf_ZSuv1pCStANKR58 | google-site-verification=5uUcdG0dg8qqYOAbQy9xGiPqtRcGK4yMdHa6wtVYl9M | psgk4qeplqpgp492he3nkfdapg | d365mktkey=2g70u9s8aufmjqsdjxl37doc | d365mktkey=14ctzuu12dg60ta62u04ddeuj | google-site-verification=MvtpbllXOb63Yx9w3WFjWCZR-LHtnfAVgFJws-Ue9ME | onetrust-domain-verification=fa333d481f5642dc9f675e5986b22c4c | amazonses:yj+KjwcrLMmm/dD1esz1OfBmWPwcM+LHD0ZJGb0wMf8= | af23hqem7r04ma4v14vgaihp42 | nintex.620bdcc911302c006955fe4f | google-site-verification=xCK6ole63K9XT94xG9frBzEK-MHggzGOQJyzZ3NngTw | amazonses:0pWmZ3cKbqf2da7DCB2YeER7vVSvkINUjtqkIm9lYyk= | 34155841A2508BECD5C798257267FBB80D13C966AA514413798D571EA23CDD21 | atlassian-domain-verification=OjbbFWJspitkuY5UWMr5n4JIpGduH5AWTFsmCjdBS9QcZPi/G/I3bQ1EXZZnCRbX | ca3-af9ba2cddfb84114be9df0d86bb3726e | brevo-code:3110c2b54ef2acb6b31aaf408aeefc9e | brevo-code:47910dad859b8cc59016e254bfc2691e | google-site-verification=TPMv0_isU2jNt_jZ5lRSEhM6TlIftli_iiy40Kp-AwI | brevo-code:0ee56f3223e39c9a2adc900ffc50f920 | openai-domain-verification=dv-XbW9dxs8Bp6zPyV8onDE3SzJ | openai-domain-verification=dv-0ZXAl1wPxHfZQzwz86vpRh0w | anthropic-domain-verification-0qkk6p=jbzgYnLtp3OsUQ0cBYWxmPaaZ | D8CC59A7EE6BCD2C8948C3F4A44A43CD | e2ma-verification=82iib | ms-domain-verification=1befe0ea-5594-4c5f-8a00-bac43a331f02 | v=spf1 include:%{i}._ip.%{h}._ehlo.%{d}._spf.vali.email include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.protection.office365.us ~all | 00Dfo000007NGfx=1TBaZ0000000FTi | e2ma-verification=bfoib | docusign=d3f36653-1429-4415-8fd6-3cf6b2bb2d7c | docusign=1b1a1c47-13e8-4a89-b0cc-ed1284d64a81 | google-site-verification=avl1q9k6NW9ftWu-HBoYBg910KjxNWZntqy4Tc6Nn2c |
| TXT | _dmarc.wustl.edu | v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;fo=1;rua=mailto:dmarcreports@email.wustl.edu,mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;ruf=mailto:dmarcreports@email.wustl.edu; |
| CAA | wustl.edu | 0 issuewild "awstrust.com" | 0 issue "awstrust.com" | 0 issuewild "amazontrust.com" | 0 issue "amazontrust.com" | 0 issuewild "amazon.com" | 0 issue "amazon.com" | 0 issuewild "digicert.com" | 0 issue "digicert.com" | 0 issuewild "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issue "pki.goog; cansignhttpexchanges=yes" | 0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issue "letsencrypt.org" | 0 issuewild "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "sectigo.com" | 0 issue "ssl.com" | 0 issuewild "ssl.com" | 0 issuewild "emsign.com" | 0 issue "emsign.com" | 0 issuewild "amazonaws.com" | 0 issue "amazonaws.com" |
| DS | wustl.edu | — |